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An analysis of the Asian Tsunami of December 2004 showed that thousands of lives could have been 
saved if Sri Lanka and other affected countries had effective warning systems in place at national and 
local levels. In December 2005, LIRNEasia, with funding support from the International Development 
Research Center (IDRC), initiated a research project to evaluate the “last-of-the-mile” communication 
component of an all-hazards warning system (HazInfo) for Sri Lanka.  
 
For purposes of the HazInfo project, the research focused on the non-government organization (NGO) 
contribution and was designed around a governance structure whereby the non-profit NGO, Sarvodaya, 
provided oversight, training, and a hazard information hub for the monitoring of hazard threats and 
dissemination of alert messages to local communities within the Sarvodaya network of communities 
utilizing combinations of different Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). The Pilot 
established Last-Mile networking capability for 32 tsunami-affected communities with 5 ICTs: 
Addressable Satellite Radios for Emergency Alerting (AREA), Remote Alarm Devices (RAD), Mobile 
Phones (MOP), Fixed Phones (FXP) and Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT).  
 
Results to date suggest that the basic internetworking arrangement at lower technical layers has proven 
to be reasonably robust and reliable but that a key challenge remains in the upper layers of application 
software and content provision.  This is evident in the apparent difficulties faced when implementing 
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) messaging over multiple last-mile systems that include commercial 
satellite and terrestrial network technologies in modes of voice and text. Lessons learned from Silent-
Tests and Live-Exercises point to several key bottlenecks in the system where the integrity of CAP 
messages is compromised due to problems associated with software interoperability or direct human 
intervention.  The wider implication of this finding is that content standards by themselves are not 
sufficient to support appropriate and timely emergency response activities. Those working with content 
standards for hazard information systems must consider closely the interoperability issues at various 
layers of interconnectivity.  
 
Community-based Last-Mile Hazard Warning System (LM-HWS) Hazard Information Hub (HIH) and 
Community First-Responders are expected to have Reliability above 90 percent, giving the 
Communities adequate time to execute their Emergency Response Plans, and not at 77 percent as the 
system is performing now. This aspect implies that the first responders require rigorous training and 
certification in emergency communication to avoid ambiguity and misinformation, which is a 
necessary condition to supplement the deficit of an end-to-end automated alerting system. Further 
findings indicate that; reliability at the central message relay can be enhanced by introducing a 
Multilanguage single input multiple output software application (i.e. P2P Multilanguage CAP Broker). 
The ICTs as stand alone communication systems have 97 percent reliability but have merely 78 
percent reliability as warning technologies. Based on the project defined indicators to rate the 
effectiveness of the ICTs, they were assessed to average 36 percent effective as warning technologies. 
However, overall performance of the alert and notification last-mile terminal devices is enhanced when 
a community is equipped with a technology combination that enhances “complimentary redundancy” 
in reliability and effectiveness; where the combination of the WorldSpace AREA sets and the 
Dialog/Microimage Java-enabled MOP performed the best with the AREA + FXP following closely. 
 




2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
2.1 Project Objective 
 
“It is easier to be wise with the benefit of hindsight. Yet, lessons learnt -- negative and positive – help 
in the better design and implementation of future projects. The HazInfo project, which was an action 




The overall aim of the project was to set the stage for community-driven initiatives at the last mile of 
the hazard information dissemination system (HazInfo).  The proposal states that it is not an 
implementation project but a pilot study, based on experimental research design.  The function of the 
pilot study was partly a technology assessment to determine the most cost effective and reliable 




An aspect of the project was to expand upon the results of the Last Mile Hazard Warning System by 
engaging disaster risk reduction techniques in Sarvodaya villages to augment village resiliency and 
responsiveness to disaster while integrating community-based disaster management through the 
Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Center (SCDMC).  
 
 
2.2 Project Background 
 
The research was based on a “participatory concept paper” (NEWS:SL) developed in the months 
following the 2004 tsunami.  The paper notes that a national early warning system (NEWS) is a “pure 
public good.”  As such, responsibility for its supply would normally fall on the government.  However, 
due to lack of capacity for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the last mile of such a system will 
be provided by the local government or by private firms operating in the marketplace; see Figure 17 in 
Technical Annex 2 for an illustration of the last-mile system relative to the end-to-end warning system. 
 
The project was, therefore, designed around a governance structure whereby a non-profit, non-
governmental organization—Sarvodaya—provided oversight, training, and an information hub for the 
monitoring of hazard threat conditions and for the initiation of warning messages to local communities 
in the Sarvodaya network of villages.  Designated first responders selected from the local communities 
were responsible for overseeing emergency preparedness, message dissemination, and emergency 
response at the local level. Figure 18 in Technical Annex 2 illustrates the Sarvodaya community-based 
warning system. 
 
An important aim for the study was to address the rural-urban distinction associated with the 
penetration of communications technology in the Eastern Province and Western Province of Sri Lanka. 
                                                 
1 This a quote directly extracted from the report presented to the HazInfo Project by the Training Partner: TVE Asia Pacific (http://www.tveap.org)   
2 Gordon Gow, PhD, University of Alberta, Canada, ggow@ualberta.ca ,  




Disparity in access to communications media in the rural-urban divide is a significant obstacle to 
achieving effective warning in the last mile of the system in Sri Lanka.  Access to resources and 
training is also split along this rural-urban divide. 
 
 
2.3 Comments on the Proposed Research 
 
The primary objective was to evaluate the suitability of various ICTs as the basis of a LM-HWS in Sri 
Lanka. As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5 in Technical Annex 4, an experimental design was proposed to 
assess the technology.  Six factors were to be considered: 
 
• Reliability of the ICTs 
• Effectiveness of the ICTs 
• Effectiveness of the training regime 
• Level of organizational development 
• Gender specific response 
• Integration of ICTs into everyday life 
 
These factors were assigned a set of corresponding indicators (see Technical Annex 5 to 11) that 
formed the basis for observations and evaluations of the technology and training.  It is important to 
note that the combination of technology and training involved the specification of distinct but 
possibility related criteria.  In some cases, technology was the critical factor, whereas, in other cases, 
training was most significant.  In most cases, however, some combination of technology and training 
was responsible for observed results. 
 
Simulated drills took place over 6 month period to gather information with respect to the six stated 
specific objectives above and following hypotheses: 
• Stage 4 & 5 Sarvodaya villages that are more organized, i.e., have a formal structure that enables 
coordination and direction of activities will respond more effectively to hazard warnings than less 
organized stage 1, 2 & 3 villages. 
• Villages that are provided training in recognizing and responding to hazards along with 
deployment of ICTs will respond more effectively to hazard warnings than villages that received 
no training. 
• Villages that have ICTs deployed for dissemination of hazard information will respond more 
effectively to hazard warnings than villages that have to rely on their existing channels of 
information for warnings. 
• ICTs that in addition to their hazard function can also be leveraged in other areas to enrich the lives 
of the villages will potentially have lower downtime than ICTs that are poorly integrated into the 
day to day life of the beneficiaries.  
 
Of the initially chosen 10 districts, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Hambantota, Ampara, 
Kalmunai, and Trincomalee districts successfully completed their Live-Exercises. However, as a result 
of the North-East conflict, inadequate leadership, lack of resources, and language barriers prevented 
Jaffna and Batticaloa District from successfully completing training, deploying ICTs, and conducting 




Live-Exercise. Of the fully participating communities, all had an equal level of participation and 
enthusiasm implying that Sarvodaya villages in all stages responded at the same capacity to hazard 
warnings and disaster resilience capacity building; i.e. all executed tsunami evacuation plans, which is 
the only emergency response plan the community was trained to execute. 
 
Last-Mile Communities realize the potential of the LM-HWS to help them sleep easy at night. 
Revoking it without enhancing it based on the research findings and also expanding into the remaining 
15,000+ Sarvodaya Communities in Sri Lanka would jeopardize the trust they have in Sarvodaya. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH FINDING 
 
 
Indicators of the overall ICT Performance were assessed against the point system based on the 
composition of a set of scaling functions as described in the Technical Annex 5 – 13 and the expected 
outcome of the ICTs are discussed in Technical Annex 14. Reader is encouraged to read the Technical 
Annex prior to continuing this section to better understand the assessment methodology that gives rise 
to the results discussed in this section. The results are based on a very small sample space and do not 
show the best comparatives. However, the rating provides the planners with a set of indicators to 
enhance the reliability and effectiveness of individual components: HIH Message Relay, ICT 
Networks/Terminal-devices, and Community, of the National and Last-Mile systems; where Figure 1 
illustrates a summary of the reliability and effectiveness of the mentioned three components. 
Figure 1 Performance summary of the National and Last-Mile components 
 
The overall performance of the “HIH” in Figure 1, synonymous with the National Warning Center, is 
acceptable. However, additional training and drills must be conducted for the staff to be well versed 















with the procedures and to be able to carry out the tasks within the benchmark time. Section 3.2 
discusses gaps in the HIH component. “Pink” components in Figure 17 & 18 contribute the HIH. 
Effectiveness of the “ICT” component in Figure 1 was well below the expected requirements to be 
used as an early warning technology. Although the reliability of the ICT component is relatively high it 
does have several gaps that need to be filled in order to ensure communication certainty and efficiency. 
Section 3.1 discusses the assessment and analysis of the ICT component in terms of reliability and 
effectiveness. “Yellow” components in Figure 17 & 18 are what contribute the ICT segment. 
 
“Community” segment, in Figure 1, needs to be focused on the most. The live-exercises revealed that 
inadequate training and improper notification resulted in unstable behavior. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 
discuss the performance of the Community component. “Blue” components in Figure 17 & 18 are what 
contribute to the Community segment. 
 
With the LM-HWS taking the approach of all-hazards all-media alerting and notification, it is vital that 
unambiguous full CAP messages are issued by the HIH and are received by the Communities. As a 
result it is recommended that policies are implemented to provide formal training and certification of 
the HIH-M and ICT-G to be absolutely competent of communicating with accuracy and follow proper 
procedures. Further exercises must be conducted to realize the true potential of utilizing a Community-
based system; especially for the Last-Mile. Since the data reported is from the first trial of its kind it is 
impossible to adapt methodologies such “Markov Decision Processes” to improve the policies because 
of the insufficiency of probabilistic data to develop transition probability tables to determine the 
effectiveness of the policies in practice. However, through conventional trial and error methodologies 
the pilot project is able to suggest intuitive policies that can strengthen the performance of a National 
Early Warning System (NEWS). 
 
 
3.1. Performance of the ICTs as a Warning Technology 
 
This section combines the analysis of the specific objectives related to the technology: reliability of the 
ICT as a warning technology and effectiveness of the technology as a warning technology. 
Methodology applied to calculate the reliability of the technology in terms of efficiency and certainty 
is described in Technical Annex 7. The 11 indicators used to evaluate the effectiveness of the ICTs are 
discussed in Technical Annex 8.  
 
There is a significant gap between the ICT Reliability as stand alone ICTs and as warning technologies 
in last-mile communities. The “Reliability of ICT”, in Table 47 in Appendix D, presents the findings 
as to whether the technology worked on the day of the drill. The average Reliability of ICT in the Last-
Mile, recorded in Table 47 (ICT Terminal Devices) in Appendix D, reveals as to how the communities 
with the particular ICT performed overall during the drills. The number of ICTs distributed in the 
research matrix (see Tables 44 in Appendix B) is not uniform and also the number of trials conducted 
for each ICT is not equal. 
 
Despite the envisaged light-speed transmissions in the ICTs, a standard message transmission took 
approximately 7 seconds to carry a text message from the HIH to the Community, there were delays 
caused mainly by human errors such as the First-Responder message recipients in the community, 




namely the ICT Guardians (ICT-G) not correctly aligning the antennas of the satellite system, 
accidentally deleting the Java applet on the mobile phone, wrongly configuring the application that 
restricted receipt of certain levels of hazardous events, ICT-G not being close to the wireless terminal 
devices to receive the message on time, or simply the ICT Provider terminating the services for not 
having received a payment for the monthly bill. Tables 67 to 69 in Appendix H show the issues for 
ICTs failing during Silent-Tests due to the same reasons of ICT-G unavailability, disruption to 
services, or Terminal Device not always-on and ready to receive alerts. An unusual occasion was the 
MOP and FXP failing on the day of the exercise as a result of the conflict situation in the North and 
East of the Island; where the Government Military had instructed all commercial wireless operators, 
GSM and CDMA, to shut off cells in the respective battle zones. However, the unidirectional AREA 
satellite based sets functioned in the war-zones when the terrestrial technologies were shut off. As 
mentioned previously communications in English in the rural communities were difficult for the locals 
to comprehend. The Active Alert function was not up to par to grab the attention of the ICT-G. 
Restrictions of the terminal capabilities of carrying a full message caused false information 
propagation in the communities.  
Figure 2 Performance summary of the ICTs deployed in the last-mile 
 
The efficiency outcome of the individual ICTs during live-exercises is given in Table 47, Appendix D. 
Certainty measures of the individual ICTs recorded on the day of the exercise (live-exercises) at each 
location are stated in Table 50, Appendix E. The data pertaining to the effectiveness of the ICT 
Terminal Devices with respect to the 11 indicators is recorded and discussed in Appendix F. Figure 2 
summarizes the reliability and effectiveness of the ICT deployments in the selected communities.  
Comparison of Reliability and Effectiveness of ICT as a 




































         








Figure 2 shows when individual ICTs: AREA, MOP, FXP, RAD, and VSAT are deployed in the 
communities the reliability and effectiveness are quite low. However, when they are coupled such as 
the AREA + MOP and AREA + FXP then the performance is relatively high. The AREA is quite 
ineffective as a result of the one-way capability but is relatively very reliable as a satellite technology. 
The MOP is relatively effective since it is capable of displaying alert text messages in Sinhala, Tamil, 
and English; however, the MOP, as a stand alone, is an unreliable terrestrial technology. When both 
the AREA and MOP are coupled they complement each other in terms of their respective strengths in 
reliability and effectiveness, which is termed as “complementary redundancy”.  
 
The reliability scores for the individual RAD was not available because according to ICT deployment 
in the communities, Table 44 in Appendix B, a stand alone RAD was not deployed in a community. In 
the case of the VSAT the terminals were not deployed for the community to use the ICT during the 
live-exercises. The Control Group was not provided with an ICT by the project. However, the 
communities used available ICTs such a MOPs and FXPs to establish communication with a 
neighboring community in their district that participated in the live-exercises. 
 
Hypothesis: Villages that have ICTs deployed for dissemination of hazard information will respond 
more effectively to hazard warnings than villages that have to rely on their existing channels of 
information for warnings. 
 
Conclusion: All 4 Control Villages that took part in the Live-Exercises had made an alliance with the 
neighboring Sarvodaya community to receive a telephone call by the Community Chairperson 
(potential ICT Guardian). The messages were received over their personal GSM mobile or wireless 
CDMA fixed telephones in the form of a voice call. The Control Villages had prepared in advance to 
receive the messages. The Reliability of the 4 Control Villages lag because they did not receive the 
alert directly from the HIH. It is not sure whether the Control Villages would perform this well if it was 
not a drill or was an unplanned random event. The Reliability of both Communities with ICTs and 
without ICTs was too weak to make a clean comparison between the 2 sets and support the hypothesis. 
 
 
3.2. Contribution of the Training Regime 
 
Training Regime in HIH 
 
The training and operational procedures for the HIH is discussed in Technical Annex 15 – “Guidelines 
for the HIH”. As discussed in Technical Annex 2 and 15, the HIH – Hazard Information Hub (pink 
block in Figure 18) operational procideures are similar to that of a National Early Warning Center 
(pink block of Figure 17) The set of HIH functions are -- downloading bulletines from gloabal/local 
feeds, Acknowledging reciept, generating and EOI (see Datasheet 7 in Appendix I), getting pre-
dissemination approvals, and issuing CAP message. With some procedural improvement and training 
the HIH functions, up to the point of relaying (issuing) the CAP Message, can be made to perform over 
0.90 efficiency. Howevere, the bottleneck is in the final step of issuing the message via the ICT 
interfaces. Some of the delays were caused by login failures as a result of the HIH staff not 
remembering the multiple passwords or the interface access password had expired and needed 




administrative assistance to reset it. As illustrated in Figure 3, the score of 0.69 for the Relay function 
is mainly a result of having to operate a multiple of Single Input Single Output (SISO) message relay 
software interfaces, which is intuitively a cumbersome task. Data shows that the efficiency drops 
exponentially when the number of independent applications the HIH has to use increase as a result of 
repetition of entries. Interfaces that require recording voice messages are a main bottleneck that brings 
down the efficiencies due to the time consuming recording and editing processes.  
Figure 3 HIH functions and respective average efficiency score 
 
Applying the methodology in Technical Annex 5 for measuring reliability as a function of efficiency 
Tables 45 & 46 in Appendix C provide the set of data from which the HIH average reliability is 
calculated. Figure 3 shows the average efficiency for each HIH-M function’s score obtained from all 
the live-exercises; where the Acknowledgement and Relay functions are poorest. The low score of 0.40 
on acknowledgement is mainly due to over excitement during the exercises and the HIH staff 
forgetting to follow standard procedures. Therefore, such important tasks must be made mandatory 
through technology by forcing the staff members to complete the task, else disabling the consequent 
tasks. 
 
Emergency communication text messaging, in the live-exercises, was mainly in English, except for the 
Java enabled Multilanguage mobile phone, which carried Sinhala, Tamil, and English. Therefore, the 
complexity of translating the English CAP messages to Sinhala and Tamil is not reflected in the data 
too well. However, it is intuitive that without any intelligent real-time natural language translator it 
would be very difficult for the HIH-M (HIH staff) to achieve expected the 90% Reliability benchmark; 
especially for all-media all-hazards communications in multiple languages.  
 
EXAMPLE 1: Assuming the duration of a hazard such as a tsunami initiated in the Indian Ocean is 90 
minutes, from the time of detection to the time of impact, by applying the methodology (i.e. equation 



































(3)) for calculating efficiencies, described in Technical Annex 5, an efficiency of 0.78, shown in 
Figure 1 translates to the HIH taking 21.6 minutes, which is too long and takes away valuable time 
from the community to activate their evacuation plans. An efficiency of 0.90 would translate to 9.0 
minutes, which is what is expected from the HIH. In terms of effectiveness the scoring had dropped 
below the 0.90 benchmark because the HIH did not populate essential attributes of the EOI form 
properly. Methodology for evaluating the HIH-M effectiveness is described in Technical Annex 6. 
There were also inconstancies in competency levels among different HIH staff scheduled to participate 
in the respective live-exercises. 
 
 
Training Regime in Community 
 
There are two sets of Community-First-Responders; namely the ICT-G and the ERP-C. The training 
content for the ICT-G and ERP-C is taken from Technical Annex 15 and Technical Annex 16 – 23, 
respectively. The ICT-G simply relay the messages to the ERP-Cs who intern relay the message to the 
community households. ICT-G have a point-to-point communication protocol; where as the ERP-C 
must communicate the message to multiple points (i.e. all the households). Therefore, the reliability 
results, in Table 48, for the ERP-C compared to ICT-G are significantly low because the ERP-C did 
not broadcast the message but distributed the message from house-to-house either by word-of-mouth 
(diffusion effect) or with a mobile Pubic Announcing (PA) system. In some cases they used 
Temple/Church bells and Mosque PA system to broadcast the message. However, these schemes were 
ineffective because the households did not hear the Temple/Church bell and the ERP-C had to repeat 
the dissemination process by sending ERP-C out to inform the households by word-of-mouth. 
Figure 4 Efficiency of Community First-Responders with the presence and absence of ERPs 
 
Once again, evaluation of the Community segment for reliability as a function of efficiency was 
calculated using the methodology discusses in Technical Annex 5. The effectiveness of the ICT-G and 
the ERP Coordinators were measured based on the methodology discussed in Technical Annex 6. 
 
Efficiency of First-Responders in Communities 



















Figure 4 shows that the average efficiency scores of the community First-Responders between 
communities that received formal ERP training versus communities that did not receive ERP training 
does not show a significant disparity. The data for this query is obtained by relating Table 44 in 
Appendix B, of communities that had received formal ERP training versus that didn’t, with a 
combined ICT-G and ERP-C efficiency data in Table 48 in Appendix D. Figure 4 shows that ERP-Cs 
in communities that received formal ERP training rank higher than those communities that did not 
receive ERP training. However, the efficiency scores are not close to the expected 0.90 benchmark. All 
the ICT-Gs received training on operating and up keeping the ICTs but ERP training was only given to 
those who were belonged to the villages that received ERP training. Regardless the performance 
expectation levels were very poor. The ICT-G had to be coached during the live-exercises to get them 
to perform their tasks properly. 
 
Figure 5 Performance summary of ICT-G with respect to the various ICT deployments 
 
Figure 5 shows a comparison of the various ICT deployments in the communities and the efficiency of 
the ICT-G in using the ICTs. ICT-G in communities with an AREA+RAD show a significant reduction 
in the efficiency; where as all other deployments are quite similar and have very little variance in their 
efficiency scores. RAD was the only device that was a prototype innovation introduced to the project 
and field tested for the first time. It is apparent from Figure 5 that off-the-shelf readly available ICTs 
were easily adopted in to the communities; where as the newly introduced RAD was found to be 
cumbersome to adopt; as a result dragged the score of the AREA+RAD deployment significantly 
down. Stand alone AREA is slightly below the 0.90 expected benchmark because the AREA is the 
only device that carried a substantial segment of the CAP text message. Therefore, the ICT-G had to 
spend a few more extra minutes recording the information in the Alert Log (see Datasheet 1 in 
Appendix J) relative to the other ICT Terminal Devices which did not carry a significant amount of the 
CAP message but rather a very short message. Results in Figure 5 imply that the ICTs are 



























unsophisticated and ICT-G can be easily trained to adopt the ICTs as warning device in the 
communities. 
 
ICT-Gs were forced to decode partial CAP messages received by ICT terminals that could not carry a 
full CAP message. Shortcomings of the ICT terminals with respect to displaying full CAP messages 
were a major challenge of Internetworking with CAP for relaying of complete messages. As a result of 
the partial messages, in many of the live-exercise, mutation of information was witnessed. When the 
HIH had issued a “Category 4 Cyclone” alert the communities executed tsunami evacuation plans; i.e. 
running to a higher grounds when they were actually supposed to seek shelter at lower ground. 
According to the information in the alert message and the time the ICT-G received the message, the 
communities had approximately 4-6 hours to prepare for the arrival of the Cyclone. However, the 
communities thought the hazard was a short fuse type hazard (i.e. tsunami) and ordered immediate 
evacuation of the community. 
 
The weakness can be blamed on the quality of the training the community had received in developing 
their ERPs by the Shanthi Sena HazInfo Trainers. It is incorrect to put the blame on the Communities 
because the CAP structure is constructed to lodge all-hazards all-media unambiguous messages; where 
the ICT-G is supposed to provide accurate instruction to the ERP Coordinators in order to execute 
precise ERPs and prevented the community from executing the wrong ERPs. Except for ICT-Gs who 
were equipped exclusively with an AREA, all other ICT-G had bi-directional means to communicate 
with the HIH (upstream communication). Hence, when the ICT-Gs were doubtful of the meaning of 
the message they had the option of contacting the HIH or an alternate source to verify the alert 
communication. In all of the live-exercises none of the ICT-G took the responsibility to either 
acknowledge receipt of message or attempt to obtain full or further instructions from the HIH.  
 
Researchers realize that there is a rather significant liability of false information diffusing rapidly in a 
community if the problem of information mutation at the HIH, ICT-G, and ERP-C stages is not 
corrected. Further acknowledge that a comprehensive study of the problem related to information 
mutation and chaotic behavior due to false information diffusion in a LM-HWS must be studied. Such 
irregular social phenomena can be studied using techniques such as “patterned chaos forecasting” 
techniques. 
 
Hypothesis: Villages that are provided training in recognizing and responding to hazards along with 
deployment of ICTs will respond more effectively to hazard warnings than villages that received no 
training. 
 
Conclusion: The nature of the Live-Exercises could not determine the effectiveness of the training 
regime. Overall, it was observed that the response competency level resulting from training was way 
below expected level. The drills carried out in the communities were predominantly staged by the 
organizers. Since the organizers were the Shanthi Sena HazInfo Trainers the outcomes of the 
simulated exercises were identical in each of the communities and shows nor disparity between the set 
of Trained and Untrained Communities. However, the project found that training was imperative for 
obtain good quality simulation results, reinforcing community emergency planning and raising 
community awareness about hazards and interest in local risk management. 
 






3.3. Contribution of Village Organizational Development 
Figure 6 ICT Guardians with respect to community organization level and ICT deployments. 
 
Originally the proposal had partitioned Sarvodaya Stage 1, 2, & 3 villages as less organized and Stages 
4 & 5 as more organized communities; description of the Sarvodaya Stages can be found in Table 6 in 
Technical Annex 4. However, there were no Stage 5 communities in Sarvodaya in the HazInfo project 
selected coastal districts. Remarkably there were no stage 1 or 3 communities that participated in the 
project either. The development stage of each village can be obtained from Table 44 in Appendix B.  
Since the community comprises the ICT-G and ERP-C activities, a comparison of the efficiencies of 
the two actors are illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
 
The label NA – Not Applicable implies that there were no communities with the ICT deployments in 
communities within the respective organizational category or no data available for those elements. The 
AREA+MOP were deployed in a Stage 2 Community in Jaffna district where live-exercises couldn’t 
be carried out due to the North-East conflict. Both the Stage 4 communities Inidivina in Hambantota 
district and Periyakalar in Batticaloa district did not have the capacity to organize live-exercises and 
participate in the drills. From Figure 6 we may infer that Stage 4 communities are better at adopting a 
combination of ICTs such as an AREA+RAD or AREA+FXP than Stage 2 communities; the inference 
would have been stronger if the case was also true for AREA+MOP. The lack in Stage 2 communities 
adopting the combination of ICTs may be because the AREA and the RAD are a newly introduced ICT 
opposed to the readily available ICTs such as the MOP or FXP and the less organized communities do 
not have the organizational capacity to adopt new technologies. However, the efficiency levels are 
close to benchmark acceptable levels of 0.90. Therefore, it is impossible to draw any conclusions based 
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on the organizational development level of a community and the ability to adopt ICTs for early 
warnings. 
Figure 7 ERP Coordinator efficiencies with respect to community organization and ICT deployments 
 
Form Figure 7 in all cases except for the AREA+MOP and FXP the Stage 4 organized communities 
performed better than the less organized stage 2 communities. On the average the variance between the 
average efficiencies of the set of stage 4 communities and stage 2 communities is approximately 0.14. 
Based on the values from Example 1, a 0.14 efficiency margin implies a 12.6 minute difference. 
However, all the communities with the particular ICT deployments were quite close to the benchmark 
efficiency of 0.60. Deployments where a none readily available novel ICT was introduced such as the 
AREA, AREA+FXP, and AREA+RAD, the efficiency gap between the Stage 2 and Stage 4 
communities are larger relative to the common MOP. Once again the inference could have been 
stronger if similar results were shown in the case of the FXP. The NA – Not Applicable label in the 
case of the FXP and the AREA+MOP are due to unavailability of data. The reasons are similar to the 
case of the North East conflict and lack of organizational capacity disused in the Figure 6. 
 
Hypothesis: Stage 4 & 5 Sarvodaya villages that are more organized, i.e., have a formal structure that 
enables coordination and direction of activities will respond more effectively to hazard warnings than 
less organized stage 1, 2 & 3 villages. 
 
Conclusion: communities with adequate capacity and organizational structure in their respective 
Districts proved effective in organizing all project activities as well as adopting new technologies. 
However, organized communities responded to warnings in the same capacity as the less-organized 
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3.4. Gender Specific Response to Hazard Mitigation Action 
 
Data from Live-exercises reveals that over 72% Adult participants were Female because the 
simulations were conducted between 9am and 12pm where most Men were occupied with their jobs. 
For example, the Fishermen would return home around 11am after selling their catch to the merchants 
and cleaning their nets/boat. Therefore, only the women could participate in the activities. The women 
showed enthusiasm and willingness to participate in all disaster management activities. 
 
In the rural communities females participated more in community level workshops and training. The 
outcome is similar to the split indicated in gender participation accounted during the live-exercises. 
Once again the down fall of male participation levels were due to adult males engaging in “bread-
winner” activities.  
 
Participation of female and male in organizational activities in preparing the communities was equally 
distributed. The volunteers assisting in the organizational activities at the community level were 
Shanthi Sena youth. Membership in the Shanthi Sena community volunteer force male and female 
participation is equal. 
 
Given the cultural aspects of females being overlay protected; between males and female Shanthi Sena 
HazInfo Trainers; i.e. the community ERP trainers, the project found that male trainers were far more 
versatile and effective as they did not face the same cultural barriers as the females. In most occasions 
the ERP trainers had to travel outside of their community to far rural places as well as stay overnight, 
which is not encouraged by parents of female youth trainers. Male trainers were also more vocal and 
aggressive in getting the training completed. 
 
 
3.5. Degree of Integration of ICTs in the daily life of villages 
 
Mobile communication component has functionality that needs to be exploited by the communities. 
The Nokia 6600 Java enabled MOP was used in the project. For instance the “MiDews” applet 
developed by Microimage would be installed by downloading the applet via GPRS on to the handset 
and installing to receive DEWN alerts. Hence, the ICT-G was given access to the internet via GPRS. A 
popular feature was downloading and storing MP3 music files to listen over the MOP. Voice calls was 
the dominant feature used; where the ICT-G would spend approximately USD15 per month on the 
average. 
 
CDMA2000 1x_RTT sets are versatile with FAX, SMS, and Internet capabilities. The Internet 
capabilities have proven to be effective in accessibility, speed, and cost. However, the mobility of the 
CDMA2000 sets is restricted during Internet access because the communication requires AC power. 
Only one ICT-G in Batticaloa district used the facility to access the Internet. The project sees that the 
CDMA2000 sets can be affective in both District Centers and the Community Centers. The Mobile 




Phones are useful for coordinators at all levels.  
 
The WorldSpace Satellite Radios have been effective in providing audio content related to Sarvodaya 
activities directly to the communities. Also the communities have been using the Sarvodaya Talk audio 
channel to express their opinions on the ongoing projects in their Communities. Ampara and Batticaloa 
Districts witnessed power outages during the Live-Exercise but received the alerts over the AREA, 
which was powered by 2 AA Batteries. 
 
The VSAT perhaps is the most highly utilized ICT of the 5 ICTs. It was proven to function on UPS 
battery power during power failures. The Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Centre staff 
used the high bandwidth internet link with an internal hard-wired and wireless network for Skype, 
email, and Internet services necessary to generate and issue alerts. However, VSAT is too expensive 
for a community to operate on their own funds. 
 
Overall every ICT has proven to have a unique feature that contributes to the daily functions of the 
community. Basically if ICT is given and the usage cost is very low then they will use it. 
 
Hypothesis: ICTs that in addition to their hazard function can also be leveraged in other areas to 
enrich the lives of the villages will potentially have lower downtime than ICTs that are poorly 
integrated into the day to day life of the beneficiaries.  
 
Conclusion: The live-exercises were carried out with prior notification. Therefore, the hypothesis 
cannot be challenged because the ICT-G had the ICTs powered on. However, the silent-test reveals 




3.6. Local barriers in responding to alerts 
 
Although the following assessment was not required the researchers believe that indicating the results 
on geographical distribution may be of importance for future planners. The District level summary was 
a query from Table 48 in Appendix D taken by averaging the overall efficiency of the communities in 
each District. The message this section attempts to exemplify is the importance of relaying precise 
hazard information in a timely manner for communities to take proper actions to overcome the barriers 
described in the following paragraph.  
 
Batticaloa district does not have data as they did not participate in the Live-exercises. Households in 
Communities of Ampara, and Hambantota districts are sparsely populated (i.e. scattered and far apart). 
Therefore, the time taken to disseminate the hazard information locally via a Public Announcing (PA) 
system and completing evacuation were timely. Communities in the towns of Kalmunai district are 
densely populated with houses enclosed by high boundary walls. Most houses are trapped in between 
several houses where people have to walk through several back-yards to access the road. Communities 
in the districts of Kalutara, Matara, and Colombo had the obstacle of crossing the “Galle-road”, one of 
the busiest roads. Also the railroad travels alongside the Galle-road. In most cases the people trapped 
between the ocean and the transportation infrastructure did not have a direct path to the inland 




evacuation points but had to traverse along the coast line to find a gap to cross the roads and railway 
tracks to access the evacuation routes. Both Galle and Trincomalee district communities do not face 
these same barriers. In Galle district, both the railway track and the main road are closer to the coast 
line with the houses situated inland. Communities in Trincomalee district do no face the barriers faced 
by the other districts discussed. 
   
Figure 8 Efficiency of Communities grouped by District 
 
Communities in Kalutara district used Church bells and Mosque PA systems as a local dissemination 
method. Both religious facilities were located along the coastline. The wind prevented the sound from 
traveling to the households. People did not hear the local message and delayed in responding. 
Communities in Matara district area community households span along the coast line. The message 
was delivered to the households via a PA system mounted on a three-wheeler (tuk-tuk). The 
households that participated in the live-exercises were stretched along a 10km distance. The three-
wheeler with a PA system was inefficient in disseminating the hazard information at a local level. In 
the real event of a rapid onset hazard such a Tsunami the tuk-tuk with PA will be inefficient because of 
the impracticality of the logistics involved with setting up such a system. Colombo district 
communities have a similar geographical setting and distribution of households as Matara district. 
Colombo district practiced the same local dissemination method as Matara communities and 
experienced the same inefficiencies.  
 



















































4. FULLFILLMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
 
Project Start Date:  01-December-2005 
Project End Date:  31-November-2007 
Project Progress:  92% Completed 
 
 
Table 1 Discussion of project activities and progress 
Activity  









Sarvodaya and LIRNEasia select 32 
villages from the 226 tsunami 
affected Sarvodaya villages that 
reflect geographic, ethnic, 
socioeconomic diversity and different 





Village and ICT allocation 
spreadsheet with 












See Appendix for Village ICT 
allocation table 
The ICT Guardians were 
recommended by the Community 





Village ICT allocation 
spreadsheet with 
Community name and ICT 
Guardian’s Contact details 








Dialog Telekom GSM Mobile 
Communication Research Lab will 
build, test, and deliver 7 units. Since 
the RADs were in their prototype 
stage there were many breakdowns 
and the equipment had to be sent 





Hardware and Software 
Inventory  
(Spreadsheet, Author: 
Jananjaya De Silva) 
 









type and Authors) 
 There were no problems with the 
Java enabled Mobile Phones. There 
were difficulties in remotely 
installing the Java Alerting Applet. 
Microimage-Dialog provides a link to 
access, download, and install the 
applet through the Internet. However, 
the poor strength of the GPRS signal 
made it difficult for the ICT 
Guardians to install the applet in the 
remote villages. Therefore, they had 
to be recalled to Colombo and the 
applet was installed for them at the 
HIH. (100%) 
 
 Administration, Training, 
and User Manual  
(Text Document, Authors: 
S. Rangarajan, 
Shanmugaraja, Dileeka 
Dias, P. Warnakulasuriya,  
Nabil Seddhig) 
 
 CDMA Wireless Fixed Phones with 
1x_RTT capabilities were provided. 
However, the SMS, FAX, and 
Internet capabilities were not enabled 
for the communities. (100%) 
 
All WorldSpace AREA-B systems 
were received were given to the 
Community ICT Guardians and 
District Coordinators after testing 
them all at the HIH. (100%) 
 
The Main VSAT Station was 
installed by Innovative Technologies 
and commissioned in October 2006. 
However, the Community VSAT 
Station was not installed due to major 
delays by the vendor. Therefore, 
Live-exercises could not be carried 
out in the Community intended to 
have a VSAT station. (65%) 
 
 Training workshop for the 
District Coordinators and 
Community ICT 
Guardians 
(Oral and Visual 















type and Authors) 
Creating a hazard 




The Hazard Information Hub (HIH) 
was setup with office furniture, 
workstations, conference room, and 
other peripherals such as photocopy, 
digital camera. Staff was hired and 
trained. Building infrastructure such 
as electricity, water-sanitation, and 




DM Institute Infrastructure 
Inventory (spread sheet, 
Ravindra Ariyawickrama) 
 




Jananjaya De Silva) 
 
Human Resource Roles 
and Responsibilities 




Assessment Report (Text 





HWS   system 
 
Community Resources and District 
Resources were trained at Sarvodaya 
Head Office, at District level, and at 
Community level. The basic training 
involved standard operational 
protocols, ICT maintenance/up-keep, 




Guidelines for HIH and 
Operational zing LM-
HWS 












CAP Profile for Sri Lanka 
(Text Document: Author: 
Gordon Gow) 
 
Guidelines for HIH 
(Text Document, Author: 
Gordon Gow) 















TVEAP, the training partner, trained 
and certified 24 HazInfo Trainers. 
The HazInfo Trainers conducted 
awareness programs in the 
Community and at the District level. 
The HazInfo Trainers advocated the 
development of emergency response 











Training List and 
Assignments 
(Spread sheet, Author: 
Ravindra Kandage) 
 
Plan and Program 
Evaluation 








Silent-Tests were conducted at the 
HIH, District, and Communities 
between May-2006 and October-
2007 
 
Live-Exercises were conducted in the 









Simulation Plans and 
Evaluation Report (Text 










Please see section 5.0 Project Output 
and Dissemination 
 
Sarvodaya Media Department 
documented the activities at the HIH 
and the Communities during the 
assessment of LM-HWS technologies 





Last-Mile Hazard Warning 
System in Sri Lanka: 
Performance of an 
Alerting and Notification 
Message Relay 
(Text Document and 
Power Point Presentations, 
Authors: Nuwan 
Waidyanatha, Gordon 
Gow, Peter Anderson 
 



















LIRNEasia provided overall 
coordination and management 




Project Interim Report 31-
May-2006 
(Text Document, Author: 
Nuwan Waidyanatha) 
 
Project Interim Report 30-
Nov-2006 
(Text Document, Author: 
Nuwan Waidyanatha) 
 
Project Interim Report 31-
Mar-2007 
(Text Document, Author: 
Nuwan Waidyanatha) 
 













HazInfo Project Final 
Technical Report 




5. PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
5.1. Concept of Operations 
 
The LM-HWS project consists of two information reception and dissemination stages:  
• Reception and authentication of external hazard event and warning information by monitors 
located at the Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Centre (SCDMC) Hazard 
Information Hub (HIH) located in Moratuwa (near Colombo) and dissemination to 28 (4 are 
controlled villages) targeted Sarvodaya communities specially equipped with LM-HWS ICTs, 
and  
• Reception and authentication of HIH generated messages by ICT Guardians in LM-HWS 
equipped communities and dissemination of the messages to affected local populations. 
 
When fully implemented, trained and certified monitors at the HIH will monitor, on an around-the-
clock basis, a variety of hazard and warning networks and disseminate alerts and other messages of 
interest to LM-HWS equipped communities.  There are 5 steps to initiating an alert message: recording 
an event of interest, consulting with a Sarvodaya Executive, deciding to send the message, composing 
the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) message, and issuing the message.  Alerts issued by the LM-




HWS are not “public” alerts and are intended only to be distributed to “first responders” who have 
been trained and certified by the SCDMC as ICT Guardians within the LM-HWS Project. 
 
The ICT Guardians are members of the local community and it is they, or their authorized designates, 
who are responsible for determining if a local, community-wide (village) warning is to be issued. Upon 
receiving an alert from the HIH, the ICT Guardian must first acknowledge receipt of the message to 
the HIH and then proceed with notifying local community officials responsible for activating the 
community emergency plan.  
 
 
5.2. LM-HWS five wireless ICTs 
 




Figure 9 Remote Alarm Device 
Dialog Remote Alarm Devices (RADs)  
 
RADs are stand-alone units that incorporate remotely 
activated alarms, flashing lights, a broadcast radio 
receiver to be turned off or on and SMS messages to 
be displayed, as well as self-test, message 





Figure 10 Nokia6600 Mobile Phone 
GSM Java enabled SMS mobile phones (Java 
phones)  
 
Java phones receive text alerts in Sinhala, Tamil and 
English (Java Phone), activate a Java applet to sound 









Figure 11 AREA Receivers 
 
Disaster Warning Recovery and Response 
Addressable Satellite Radio for Emergency Alerts 
(AREA)  
 
AREA is a WorldSpace satellite radio system that can 
issue address hazard information directly to those 
communities at risk. Global Positioning System (GPS) 
technology incorporated into the radio receiver set, 
along with the unique code assigned to every receiver, 
allows for hazard warnings to be issued to sets that are 
within a vulnerable area or just to radio sets with 
specific assigned codes. 
 
 
Figure 12 – VSAT System 
 
Very Small Aperture C-Band Satellite Terminals 
(VSAT).  
 
VSAT terminals have been installed in two communities and 
at the HIH. These facilities provide up to a 512 kbps Internet 
connection and enable testing of the Internet Public Alerting 
System (IPAS). An IPAS client application installed on a 
computer enables pop-up messages to appear on a PC screen 





Figure 13 - CDMA Fixed Phone 
 
CDMA Fixed Wireless Phones (FXPs) 
 
FXP is a CDMA phones with built-in speakerphones to 
provide voice communication via the public switched 




As illustrated in Table 2, each ICT relies upon a particular type of network access and message 
management scheme. 




Table 2 LM-HWS Access and Message Management Attributes 
Device Network Access 
Message 
Creation/disseminat
ion Interface Enabling Partner 
RAD GSM fixed wireless Password protected 
Internet website 
Dialog Telekom Mobile 
Communication 
Laboratory at the 
University 
of Moratuwa, MicroImage 






Telephone CDMA fixed 
wireless 






















5.3. ICT Partners and their Contributions 
 
Dialog Telekom: the largest mobile Telco and University of Moratuwa designed, built and supplied 7 
Remote Alarm Devices (RAD), supplied 12 mobile phones, developed the Alerting software/applets 
and provided a 128kbps microwave leased line for the HazInfo project. The “MIDewn” Java Applet 
for mobile phones, was developed by Microimage (Private) Limited for Dialog Telekom.  
 
Innovative Technologies installed VSAT satellite terminals that have proven to be a strategic tool that 
can be used for high bandwidth TCP/IP communication for District Centers for VoIP, email, and 
internet access during office hours and be available for Coordination of Recovery efforts from a 
District Level. The same link can be the backbone for a Telecenter in the same location. The present 
Sarvodaya organization communication depends on physical meetings and has proven to be a very 
expensive process especially for Sarvodaya Staff in North-East parts of the country to travel to the 
Head Office in Moratuwa (west-coast). A strategically placed set of C-Band VSATs can minimize the 
travel time and accommodate Video Conferencing, technologies that are far more effective tool than 
driving on A4 from Kalmunai to Colombo 362km one way.  
 
Based on the post-Tsunami feedback from the affected countries, WorldSpace has designed emergency 
alert system that incorporates CAP 1.1 formatted message generation, provision for auxiliary audio 
delivery, automatic switchover at the remote sites, selective addressability, geo-referencing and a host 
of other features that derive from a digital satellite radio broadcast system. The scheme has been 




successfully field-tested and ready to be scaled up quickly. In addition to Sri Lanka, WorldSpace has 
been testing their Addressable Radios for Emergency Alerts (AREA) products in India, Thailand, and 
Indonesia. The effectiveness of the AREA system is the Audio and the Data Casting capabilities. 
 
Major technical contributions came to the project via Canadian Experts such as Gordon Gow from 
University of Alberta and Peter Anderson from Simon Fraser University who have been instrumental 
in delivering the “Guidelines for HIH” that lays out the CAP Profile for Sri Lanka and the “ICT 
Assessment and Community Observation Report” that identifies the shortcomings of the system, 
respectively. Solana Networks, a Canadian Company, pro bono provided and managed IPAS services 
for the field trials. This includes: full access to the Solana Networks IPAS server, support for creation 
of public official, ensuring that alerts sent by public officials in Colombo are seamlessly and 
successfully, upgrading and providing LIRNEasia with new IPAS client software technical support for 
IPAS as required. Solana Networks intends to upgrade their IPAS system with improving direct access 
to global sensor networks and adopting CAP for interoperability. 
 
 
5.4. CAP GUIs and CAP Broker 
 
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) was integrated into the project because it is an open standard and 
because of the perceived benefits and advantages of being an open source, XML-based protocol with 
clearly defined elements and capable of supporting data interchange across multiple dissemination 
channels. Ideally with CAP, one input at the central information hub can be translated into multiple 
outputs for downstream alerting. CAP provides a standardized template for submitting observations to 
the central hub (upstream) and thereby supports situational awareness to improve overall management 
of a critical incident. Further, a CAP-enabled system will more easily integrate with other national and 
international information systems (such as regional tsunami and weather alerting services). 
 
An early challenge faced by the project was whether or not the project would need to build a CAP user 
interface (GUI) from scratch, or whether there was an application available that could be borrowed. 
The CAP GUI provides a method (a template) for authorized users to enter data into a computer at the 
HIH and for the transformation of that data into the appropriate CAP XML elements to enable 
standardized content creation and passage to the various ICTs. The CAP broker is a server application 
that provides an intermediary point of interconnection between the Information Hub and the relay 
network to facilitate interconnection of all ICTs and passage of CAP-compliant messages through a 
single software application.   
 
At this stage of the project, both WorldSpace and MicroImage have developed web browser based 
CAP GUIs for the LM-HWS project. The WorldSpace CAP GUI (Anny Network Early Warning 
System or Anny) interfaces with the AREA component and the MicroImage (Disaster Early Warning 
Network or DEWNS) with the Dialog RAD/Java Phone components. Both the WorldSpace satellite 
uplink and Dialog Telekom SMS servers are registered as teleports in their respective CAP alerting 
software.  Presently, the AREA and RAD/SMS CAP software operate independently of each other, but 
in the future, could be integrated and controlled by a single software application (CAP broker).  
Similarly, the VSAT IP gateway could be added as a teleport and integrated into a common CAP 
solution along with other ICTs. 






The VSAT satellite alerting message software also uses web browser based GUI called Internet Public 
Alerting System (IPAS). IPAS in its current form is not CAP-compliant but provides a simple and 




Figure 14 DEWNS Browser SW 
 
Figure 15 ANNY Browser SW 
 
Figure 16 IPAS Browser SW 
 
 
6. PROJECT OUTPUT AND DISSEMINATION 
 
Project acquired a supplementary budget to disseminate the results regionally; the outcomes are 
discussed in a separate report, which was submitted to IDRC along with this report. This section 
documents events prior to the HazInfo dissemination work began.  
 
6.1. Information Sharing and Disseminations 
 
Event Description 










Indonesia. March 5, 
2008  
 
The workshop took place at the Hotel Borobudur in Jakarta, Indonesia 
in partnership with the Indonesian Institute for Disaster Preparedness 
(IIDP). The workshop provided an opportunity to discuss and share the 
findings of the “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Warning Dissemination: 
A Research Project” (HazInfo) with Indonesian counterparts while at 
the same time learning about similar initiatives and community-based 










Nuwan Waidyanatha presented his paper on “Last-Mile Hazard 
Warning System in Sri Lanka: Performance of the ICT First Responder 
Training Regime” and Natasha Udu-gama presented her paper on “A 
Last-Mile Hazard Warning System for disaster risk reduction in Sri 
Lankan villages: Community organization”.  
 







December 11, 2007 
 
The session addressed how an alliance of civil society and private 
sector organizations since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami have been 
striving to develop a robust solution for strengthening community 
resilience in the face of natural disasters. Panelists shared learning for 
regional scaling-up of these pilots through discussion, videos and actual 
equipment demonstrations. The pilots highlighted were the satellite 
radio from WorldSpace and the GSM-based warning device developed 
by Dialog Telekom, University of Moratuwa and MicroImage. 
 






Peter Anderson and Gordon Gow submitted a joint abstract presented 
the HazInfo research results at the symposium. Nuwan Waidyanatha 
was also invited to the event but was unable to attend the symposium. 
“Sharing Knowledge 
on Last-Mile Warning: 
Community-Based 
Last-Mile Warning 
Systems”: New Delhi, 
November 19, 2007 
 
The All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI) and LIRNEasia 
jointly organized the workshop. This workshop proved to be an ideal 
venue for the dissemination of findings from the “Evaluating Last-Mile 
Hazard Information Dissemination” pilot project in India through an 
intimate gathering of practitioners, private sector, international 








Anderson was invited to give a special presentation on the HazInfo 
project at the conference 
 











19th Meeting of the 
Wireless World 
Research Forum: 




Nuwan Waidyanatha presented two papers submitted by LIRNEasia in 
2 different working groups and publication in forum proceedings. The 
first paper titled “Challenges of Optimizing Common Alerting Protocol 
for SMS based GSM Devices”4 was an output of the “Evaluating Last-
Mile Hazard Information Dissemination Project” (or HazInfo Project) 
research findings, which were presented in the WG1: Human 
Perspectives and Service Concepts. The second paper titled “Wireless 
Mesh Networking – as a means of connecting rural communities was 
based on the design considerations of implementing the mesh network 
at Mahavilachchiya, Sri Lanka. 
 
“Sharing Knowledge 







The workshop took place in Dhaka on October 25, 2007. LIRNEasia 
and Bangladesh Network Office for Urban Safety (BNUS) – 
Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology jointly 
organized the Workshop. The Workshop provided an outstanding 
opportunity for researchers, students, practitioners, and policy makers 
in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well as invited international private 
sector participants to address and discuss early warning activities from 
the South Asia Region. 
 




Italy. October 1-2, 
2007 
 
The paper "Community-based Hazard Warnings in Rural Sri Lanka: 
Performance of Alerting and Notification in a Last-Mile Message 
Relay," written by Nuwan Waidyanatha (first author), Gordon Gow – 
University of Alberta, and Peter Anderson from Simon Fraser 
University.  Gordon Gow presented research findings from HazInfo, 
where a subset of indicators is compared for evaluating system design 
and performance of the LM-HWS. 
 
“The Role of Telecom 
Operators and 
Broadcasters in a 
National Public 
Warning System”, 
BMICH, Sri Lanka, 
September 7, 2007 
 
Rohan Samarajiva and Natasha Udu-gama of LIRNEasia organized 
this with the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights 
(MDMHR), with the support of LIRNEasia, held a meeting on “The 
Role of Telecom Operators and Broadcasters in a National Public 
Warning System” with a six of the eight major telecom operators, as 
well as several disaster management-related government agencies 
(NBRO, Irrigation Dept., Meteorology Dept., CCP, etc.), UNDP, and a 









Nuwan Waidyanatha presented Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard 
Information Dissemination: A Research Project, or HazInfo Project, 
research findings were presented during Session 1: Information 
Systems along with 20 other papers that were presented in the same 
session. The HazInfo paper titled “Common Alerting Protocol Message 
Broker for Last-Mile Hazard Warning System in Sri Lanka: An 
Essential Component”, edited by Bartel Van de Walle (bartel@uvt.nl), 





Xiaodi Li (lixiaodi2000@hotmail.com), and Shuyu Zhang, was 1 of 
115 papers published in the workshop proceedings, pages 59-64, 
selected from over 200 submissions.  The residual session themes  were  
–  Business/Organization,  Public Organizations/Government, and 
Mathematical Modeling.  
 
Canadian SSHRC, 
Saskatoon, May 2007 
HazInfo results will also be presented by Gordon Gow as part of the 
Canadian Communication Association Conference at SSHRC Congress 





The paper co-authored by Nuwan Waidyanatha, Gordon Gow and Peter 
Anderson entitled, “Hazard Warnings in Sri Lanka: Challenges of 
Internetworking with Common Alerting Protocol” was peer reviewed 
and accepted for Intelligent Human Computer Systems for Crisis 
Response and Management, Delft, the Netherlands, May 13-16 2007 
and to presented in the session titled – “Flexible Data Structures and 
Services”. Nuwan Waidyanatha was invited to present the paper and 
was granted a Euro 1000 Travel Grant to attend the conference. 
Unfortunately was unable to attend as a result of not receiving a visa to 






The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the League of Arab 
States (LAS) and a number of other United Nations Agencies in 
cooperation with the Arab Academy for Science & Technology & 
Maritime Transport (ITU-D sector member) are organizing a Joint 
Regional Conference. The event is on “Disaster: Relief and 
Management: International Cooperation & Role of ICT”, and will take 
place in Alexandria, Egypt, from 14 to 17 April 2007.  
 




A paper authored by Gordon Gow based on use of CAP for the HazInfo 
project titled – “Implementing Common Alerting Protocol in Sri 
Lanka” was accepted and published in the Journal of Emergency 






Colombo, Friday 30th 
March, 2007 
 
The Media Conference is following an open public forum, and is being 
held to enlighten the media and the General Public of the progress 
made on disaster warning with a focus on community based last-mile 
warning system. All key stakeholders of the project will attend and will 
engage with the press in educating them with the lessons learned. 
Sarvodaya Head 
Quarters, Moratuwa, 
Wednesday 28 & 
Forum: “Sharing Knowledge on Disaster Warning, with a focus on 
Community-based Last-Mile Warning Systems” brought together 
knowledge from the South Asia Region to Sarvodaya for a forum on 





Thursday 29 March, 
2007 
 
practical solutions for communicating risk information to rural 
communities; learn about end-to-end hazard detection and alerting 
systems that serve grassroots communities in the South Asia Region; 
obtain feedback on the outputs of “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard 
Warning Dissemination: A Research Project” and the Sarvodaya 
Community Disaster Management Center “Public/Private Partnership 




Warning, Haida Gwaii 
Communities, Queen 
Charlotte Island in 
North Pacific, January 
2007 
 
Experience in applying Sri Lankan ‘last mile’ warning techniques is 
being shared with coastal villages along the Pacific coast of B.C, 
Canada, and within the B.C. Tsunami Integrated Preparedness Project 
(TIP), the main multi-stakeholder tsunami planning group. Prof. 
Anderson provides regular updates to TIP on progress of the HazInfo 
project. In January 2007, just before returning to Sri Lanka, he gave 
presentations and conducted consultations in seven Haida Gwaii 
communities (Queen Charlotte Islands in northern Pacific) on 
emergency communications and tsunami warning drawing upon on 






The conference was aimed at addressing interoperability between 
communication systems, public network utilization for emergencies, 
required enhancements for public infrastructure, and recent technology 
changes. Participants also defined the requirements for public warning 
as well as identifying possible solutions/features of technologies to be 
used for emergency telecommunications. Prof. Peter Anderson (Simon 
Fraser University) and Dr. S. Rangarajan (WorldSpace) attended the 
sessions and presented the HazInfo project and the AREA solutions at 
the conference. 
 
CBC Radio One, 
Edmonton, Canada, 
December 26, 2006 
 
Professor Rohan Samarajiva and Dr. Gordon Gow were interviewed on 
CBC’s “As it Happens” program. 
Bridging the Long 
‘Lat-Mile’ in Sri 
Lanka3
Media Development journal has published Mr. Nalaka 
Gunawarndene’s essay titled Bridging the Long 'Last Mile' in Sri Lanka 
in its latest issue (2006/4) which is thematically focused on disasters 
and communication. This is a non-technical description of what we are 
trying to do in the HazInfo Project. Nalaka Gunawardene is the Chief 
Executive Officer of TVE Asia Pacific (Private) limited a lead partner 
in this project. TVE Asia Pacific conducted the Training-of-Trainers 
program for the HazInfo project. 
: Media 
Development Journal, 
UK, 17 November, 
2006 
                                                 
3 The paper can be found here -- 
http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/publications/media_development/2006_4/bridging_the_long_last_mile_in_sri_lanka 







and Demonstration on 
Advances in ICT 
Standards for Public 
Warning: 
Dr. Gordon Gow, Communications Consultant for the HazInfo project 
presented the CAP initiative in Sri Lanka to the International 
Telecommunications Union in Geneva. This paper presents the 
preliminary findings that involve the implementation of the CAP 
standard to support a local all-hazards warning system in Sri Lanka. In 
particular, it describes the challenges of implementing a CAP-based 
information system for managing multi-lingual warnings across a set of 
five technologies in 32 tsunami-affected villages along the southern and 








Nuwan Waidyanatha presented the HazInfo Project initiative at the 
USAID sponsored forum. Under the USAID-funded US Indian Ocean 
Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) Program, Coastal Community 
Resilience (CCR) is a focused initiative that promotes tsunami and 
other hazard readiness through active collaboration of national and 
local emergency management agencies, coastal managers, training 
institutions, and local communities. Building on local knowledge and 
needs, this effort supports integrated and more standardized hazard 
awareness and mitigation efforts that improve public safety during 
emergencies and builds preparedness against recurring disasters. 
 
Institute of Policy 
Studies Sri Lanka and 
Oxfam America 
Disaster Management 
Forum: TAJ Hotel, 
Colombo, 17 
September, 2006 
This workshop was conducted to bring to together stakeholders and 
share the findings of the review of “Disaster Management: Policy and 
Practice” undertaken by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) of Sri 
Lanka with financial and logistical support from Oxfam America.  The 
IPS report is intended to assist the government, NGOs and other 
stakeholders to improve disaster management in Sri Lanka.  It is just 
over a year since the Parliamentary Select Committee on Natural 
Disasters presented their recommendations and it seems timely to 
review whether these have been implemented in practice.  
 
Using ICTs for 
Disaster Management:  
Heritance Hotel, 
Ahungalla, 17 June, 
2006 
 
The Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization of UK held a 3 
day conference in Ahungalle, Sri Lanka, which brought together 
predominantly Asia Pacific Region and a few International delegates in 
the field of Disaster Management to present the ongoing projects and 
initiatives for risk reduction. Rohan Samarajiva was the Keynote 
speaker and Chair for day one. Nuwan Waidyanatha presented the Last-
Mile Hazard Warning Dissemination: A Research Project. 
 
Protocol (CAP) 
Teleconference for a 
Last Mile-Hazard 
Warning System in Sri 
The purpose of this discussion was to provide a common point of 
reference for those parties that will be meeting to discuss the 
implementation of Common Alerting Protocol within the 
Sarvodaya/LIRNEasia “Last Mile Hazard Warning System” (LM-





Lanka, 22 March 2006 
 
HWS) project. The scope confined to the implementation of Common 
Alerting Protocol (CAP) for the project.  
 






LIRNEasia issued invitations and ensured participation by all partners 
other than Sarvodaya. Sarvodaya, being the provider of the location, 
took charge of the organizational responsibilities; arrange the actual 
meeting location, interpretation, etc. LIRNEasia ensured background 
material was distributed beforehand. The program ensured that all 
partners have common understanding of the project; achieve common 
understanding of the ethical issues and our approach; obtain fullest 
participation by and input from partners on the actual work plan of the 
project. A task matrix with deadlines and responsibilities were prepared 
and clearly agreed upon by all partners engaging in the LM-HWS 
project. Please see Annex 1 – Planning Workshop Program. 
 
 
6.2. Knowledge Creation 
 
Event Description 
Public Lecture: Sri 
Lanka Foundation 
Institute, Colombo, 20 
July, 2006 
The lecture was free and was open to the public. The lecture with title: 
Responsive Innovation for Disaster Mitigation addressed all-hazards 
warning and the use of the Common Alerting Protocol in disaster 
mitigation. Gordon Gow is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of 
Extensions at the University of Alberta, Canada. Co-author of the book: 
“Mobile and Wireless Communication: An Introduction” and most 
current book: “Policymaking for Critical Infrastructure”. Moreover, he 
is the communication systems consultant for “Evaluating a last-mile 






Program, July 2007  
 
A special international certificate program in tsunami warning is being 
designed for and offered to emergency managers and policy makers 
from the Indian Ocean Region by a consortium of international experts 
and key warning agencies under the coordination of NOAA. Prof. 
Anderson is a member of the Certificate Program Advisory Board and 
an invited instructor for the Program’s first course offering in July 
2007. He will be leading a special session on ‘last mile’ warning 
techniques and challenges and will base his presentation largely on the 
Sri Lankan experience. 
International 
Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)  
Prof. Gordon is currently working with ITU-D (Development Sector) 
on a set of international guidelines for public alerting that will include 
an entire section devoted to results from the project in Sri Lanka.  
 













All ICT Guardians, HazInfo Trainers, District Coordinators, and HIH 
staff participated in a workshop to discuss the procedures for the Live 
Simulations. The Workshop was chaired by Prof. Peter Anderson 
(School of Communication, Simon and Frasier University). Prof. 
Anderson is the consultant monitoring the simulations and evaluating 
the HIH. HazInfo Trainers were educated on how to lead a team in 
observing the community simulations, collecting data, and preparing 
the simulation evaluation reports for each of the communities. District 
Coordinators are to oversee the simulation exercises of the 
communities belonging to their districts. The Divisional Coordinators 
will assist the District Coordinator and take the responsibility of 
formally informing the local Government, Police, Medical Officer 








Shanthi Sena of Sarvodaya organized for the HazInfo Trainers to gather 
at the Head Quarters to get a refresher course on Training Villages. At 
the same time the HazInfo Trainers were motivated to by providing an 
incentive scheme to complete the Simulations. Dr. Buddhi 
Weerasinghe, Ms. Natasha Udu-gama, and Nandana Jayasinghe made 






Lanka, 03 April 2006 
 
This was a residential workshop where accommodation was arranged 
for all participants, and some resource persons, at the venue itself. All 
meals were provided. The entire training event was conducted in an 
informal, yet structured manner. Participation in all sessions was 
mandatory for all participants. “Lecture Presentation”: This involved a 
PowerPoint presentation by resource person/s, sometimes supported by 
video clips. There was time and opportunity for discussions in all such 
presentations. “Group work”: Most sessions had a specific time for 
participants to divide themselves into 3 – 4 groups to engage in parallel 
activities as briefed by the resource team. “Group presentations”: This 
harnessed a short, summarized presentation by the groups through a 
member of each group selected as rapporteur. “Video presentations”: 
These carefully selected video films integral to the workshop content 
were shown; preceded and followed by targeted discussions by the 
resource team. Synopses of videos given towards the end of this note. 
 
Common Alerting Awareness to village Information and Communication Technology 






Part II:  
HQ, Moratuwa, 13 
September, 2006 
 
guardians and District     Coordinators of each Information and 
Communication Technologies are evaluating in Last Mile Hazard 
Warning System (Research Project).  
 
Hazard Information 




Center, Moratuwa, 10 
August - 20 
September, 2006 
This is a course for the training and certification of the hazard 
Information Hub Monitors. Basis of the course is the Common Alerting 
Protocol4
 
 (CAP) for Risk Information Communication. The alert 
messages are issued by an “authorized user” through the Sarvodaya 
Disaster Risk Management Center Hazard Information Hub (HIH). By 
the end of the course the Monitors were able to -- 1) Identify an Event 
of Interest; 2) Confirm EOIs with an Executive; 3) Construct a CAP 
Message 4) Relay the CAP message. Content emphasized, in the event 
the government of Sri Lanka issues a public warning, how the Monitor 
will relay this message directly through its network. If the government 
does not issue CAP-compliant messages, the Monitor will need to 
develop a system for translating or reformatting these messages quickly 
and accurately.  
Common Alerting 
Protocol Workshop I:  
Sarvodaya HQ, 
Moratuwa, 21 July, 
2006 
 
Ensure that all participants, namely Sarvodaya First Responders (ICT-
Guardians), have a good understanding of the Common Alerting 
Protocol. Provide ICT Administration and User training to all Village 
and District First-Responders. Introduce the Hazard Information Hub 
Help Desk functions to the participants. Give the technology partners 
who designed and developed the ICTs an opportunity to demonstrate 
their solutions. Handover the ICTs to the Village First-responders. 








Moratuwa, 07 June, 
2006 
 
Dr. S Rangarajan (Vice President Engineering) and Dr. Wilson Baker 
(Vice President International Projects) conducted one-day training on 
standard operational procedures (2 person authentication rule), 
configuring DAMB-R2 Receivers, and using ANNY Network software 




                                                 
4 http://www.incident.com/cookbook/index.php/Welcome_to_the_CAP_Cookbook  




7. CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
7.1. Local Research and Development 
 
On the ICT development side, the project significantly helped to strengthen and mobilize local 
research capacity by working with local laboratories such as Lanka Software Foundation (LSF), 
Dialog-University-of-Moratuwa Communication Research Laboratory and Microimage.  
 
LSF is the advocate of “Sahana”, meaning Relief. Sahana is a Free and Open Source Disaster 
Management Software developed Disaster Management Practitioners in the World and a core Software 
Engineering Team of the Lanka Software Foundation based at the University of Colombo. The Sahana 
Team developed the Messaging Module for Sahana and included the CAP component in there. A 
Demo5
 
 of the current version is deployed in the demo release of Sahana. 
 
7.2. Hazard Information Hub Monitor Course 
 
In August 2006, HIH staff were given training for certification as Hazard Information Hub Monitors 
and “authorized users” (HIH Monitors).  The core element of the course used the Common Alerting 
Protocol for supporting message creation and communication. By the end of the course, the HIH 
Monitors were able to: 1) identify an Event of Interest (EOI), 2) confirm the EOIs with a member of the 
Sarvodaya Executive, 3) construct a CAP Message, and 4) relay the CAP message to designated 
communities using a particular combination of LM-HWS ICT devices. 
 
The training also emphasized, in the event the government of Sri Lanka issues a public warning, how 
the HIH Monitor should relay this message directly through the LM-HWS network. If the government 
does not issue CAP-compliant messages, the Monitor will translate or reformat these messages quickly 
and accurately into a LM-HWS CAP-compliant message.  
 
Technical Annex 15 contains the training material and the procedural guidelines for the HIH. 
 
 
7.3. Village Training of Community First-Responders 
 
Training at the village level consists of two training components: 1) general disaster preparedness 
training for village trainers and 2) specific training for ICT Guardians. 
 
Training of Trainers 
 
The Training of Trainers (TOT) component forms the education component envisaged in LM-HWS as 
the underpinning training to instill an effective warning response. Those trained (known as HIH 
                                                 
5  To access Sahana Demo -- http://demo.sahana.lk/  




Trainers), in turn, are to train ICT Guardians and others at the community level. 
 
The newly trained trainers are expected to be able to: 
 Instill awareness of hazards, vulnerability, and risk. 
 Conduct community based hazard mapping, resource mapping, risk assessment and identification 
of vulnerable households and groups of people in the community. 
 Create awareness of the early warning mechanism in place and the response activities that need to 
be undertaken. 
 Enable the identification of appropriate dissemination mechanisms to vulnerable households. 
 Enable formulation of a response plan, which includes an evacuation plan with clear actions, roles 
and responsibilities and identify resources needed. 
 Instill the competency to conduct an evacuation drill which is comprehensive. 
 Provide the ability to measure the effectiveness of response plans carried out as simulations. 
 
TOT took place in Bandaragama in April 2006 and February 2007 and was conducted by the training 
partner – TVE Asia Pacific. Currently, 16 of the 32 participating communities received training as part 
of a controlled group in the pilot study. Technical Annex 16 – 23 contains the course material used in 
the 8 training sessions. 
 
 
ICT Guardian Training 
 
In July, 2006, a workshop was held at Sarvodaya in Moratuwa to train the Sarvodaya Village and 
District first responders with the objectives of: 
 Ensuring that all participants, namely Sarvodaya first responders, have a good understanding of the 
Common Alerting Protocol. 
 Providing ICT administration and user training to all village and district first responders. 
 Introducing the Hazard Information Hub Help Desk functions to the participants. 
 Giving the technology partners who designed and developed the ICTs an opportunity to 
demonstrate their solutions. 
 Handing over the ICTs to the Village first responders. Those responsible for their operation were 
designated as “ICT Guardians”. 
 
This training was supplemented through district level workshops conducted prior to community 
simulation exercises from November 2006 through March 2007. 
 
Another change in the project was the decision to Train the Untrained Communities. This would 
happen shortly after the completion of simulations. This way it wouldn’t affect the research results and 
all participating villages will be trained to the same level and all villages will have improved their 
alerting and response capacity.  
 
 




8. PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
 
The Last Mile Hazard Information Dissemination Project was a multi-partner, civil society initiative to 
complement other action being taken at national and regional levels. However, both private sector and 
public sector participation was under-represented. Only WorldSpace and TVEAP took a large interest 
in the project; all others gave a lower priority to the project. Hence, there were delays in activities, 
additional expenditures of time and resources to achieve goals, and overall a lower level of outcome 
relative to expected results. The media partners (except TVEAP) had failed to deliver. The VSAT 
partner was slow in delivering; the project had no choice but to use the exclusive vendor available in 
the market, and to bow to the vendors’ time line. Although, this turnkey component was slower in 
being inaugurated, the quality of service of the VSAT provider has been excellent. 
 
The Sri Lanka “North-East” Conflict between the Liberation Tamil Tigers for Elam and the Sri Lanka 
Government has forced the project from running Live-Exercises in Jaffna District.  Similarly, the 
Hambantota District was affected by floods and damn breaks, giving people enough to worry about 
than concentrate of Live-Exercises. The drills were completed later in May 2007. At least 1 Silent-Test 
with the ICT-Guardian was conducted by the HIH-Monitor initiating the Silent-Test.  Table 6 below 
defines the allocation of ICTs and the participating communities with the specific ICT. 
 
Project Management in Sri Lanka requires plenty of buffer time because of anticipated delays. The Sri 
Lankan society is not used to working according to plans, nor do they adhere to concept of deadlines. 
The reason being Sri Lankan society is used to giving excuses for not being able achieve the targets 
opposed to concentrating on the tasks and striving to provide solutions. As a result the 2-year project 
was re-planned with multiple parallel tasks over a 1-year period. The outcome of this tight-plan was 
that the project completed all activities in 18 months. 
 
The Project Plan was constructed anticipating all tasks would be delivered on time. Therefore, the 
Training began immediately following the planning meeting anticipating that the ICTs would be 
delivered and commissioned on time. However, this assumption backfired causing a huge gap between 
the training period and the delivery of equipment. Therefore, the communities had to be given a 
refresher cause after all the ICTs were delivered. The delay in ICT delivery caused the simulations to 
be delayed as well. The communities had been trained at the beginning of the project and they had 
developed their ERPs at that time. Because the simulations happened only 8 months after, most 
communities had forgotten their emergency response plans. In the future, it is important to wait for the 
delivery of equipment and services before providing the training at the last moment. 
 
Originally the Sarvodaya District Coordinators and Division Coordinators were trained at workshops 
to take the training in to the communities to ready them for the simulation activities. However, this 
strategy failed and multiple field visits had to be made to motivate and train the communities to engage 
in the simulations. Also the Sarvodaya District Coordinators, Divisional Coordinators, and Volunteers 
had to be given monitory incentives in order to motivate them to conduct project activities. The 
incentives were based on the delivery of community simulation progress report, which consisted of 
assessments provided to them by the project. 
 
 




The original budget of the project had to be restructured to fit the actual requirements. Otherwise, it 
would have been impossible to take the project forward. The major components were reallocating 
funds for much needed Workshops for capacity building and reducing the number of VSAT stations. 
Dialog Telekom, GSM technology Partner, donated time and equipment. Therefore, the project was 
able to reallocate money set aside for this equipment towards Workshops. The number of VSATs had 
to be reduced because the money allocated in the original budget was for Ku-band VSATs, which have 
proven to be very unreliable in the tropical climate of Sri Lanka. Therefore, slightly more expensive C-
band VSATs had to be used in the project. Also Infrastructure, Office-equipment and IT Hardware that 
were allocated for all 5 VSAT Stations were reallocated towards Workshops because the project was 
able to use IT Hardware and Infrastructure that was already available for Sarvodaya through other 
projects. 
 
Simulations were first scheduled to be conducted over a 6 week period starting in November and 
Finishing in December. This strategy failed because the Sarvodaya District Coordinators could note 
agree to the dates due to commitments to other project activities. North-East (NE) District 
Coordinators were tied up with the Internally Displace People (IDP) as a result of the NE conflict. A 
couple of the Communities and District Centers had Organizational dysfunctional issues. The HIH did 






Last-Mile Communities realize the potential of the LM-HWS to help them sleep easy at night. 
Revoking it without enhancing it based on the research findings and also expanding into the remaining 
15000+ Communities in Sri Lanka would jeopardize the trust they have in Sarvodaya. The 
communities strongly requested that the DM programs be continued and not let them subside as most 
things do. All Sarvodaya trained villages had started an “Emergency Disaster Management 
Committee”. In most cases the committee comprises members of the Sarvodaya Shanthi Sena 
Volunteers. Table top exercises revealed that all communities needed guidance and assistance to 
strengthen the resilience in their neighborhoods. 
 
Sri Lankan Government is only now firming the mechanisms of early warning and dissemination and 
the experiences of the Last Mile HazInfo Project may be invaluable in this process in the coming years.  
 
The research aims of the project were not always apparent to those involved at the grassroots level 
delivery of project services or to the beneficiaries themselves. This led to unrealistic expectations in 
some cases, for example when certain communities wanted the VSAT rather than an ordinary fixed 
phone or mobile phone. A common psychology among communities is to regard a more complex (and 
expensive) technology tool as somehow more important than a ubiquitous one. 
 
The disadvantages encounter in the project may convert itself into strengths in the future as lessons 
learnt at community level would certainly enrich the next phase of the project that is being envisaged. 
 




A critical drawback of the project was that most of these village-trainers and HIH Monitors could not 
be retained with the project due to various personal factors. As such, some left when they gained paid 
employment. The second batch of volunteers, although given some orientation and guidance, did not 
receive the same intensive training that was directed to the first batch. This caused a loss of some 
momentum and motivation, but it was unavoidable. Such a level of turn over in personnel may cause 
an imbalance in the integrity of the system. As a result the LM-HWS may not be able to provide the 
expected level of services the communities require. 
 
 
10.  OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
 
In general, the project revealed that with the recommended enhancements described in this report, the 
five tested ICTs can be incorporated into the communities and form a critical infrastructure.  However, 
most importantly, from a technical perspective, all ICTs used in the HazInfo Pilot must be upgraded to 
receive Complete Full-CAP Messages before they can be used in the Last-Mile Communities of Sri 
Lanka. Further, before the CAP Profile can be implemented in such a last mile system, the system must 
first develop the Human Capacity: HIH-Monitors, ICT Guardians, and ERP Coordinators, in order to 
supplement the deficiencies of an end-to-end fully-automatic early warning system. Thereafter, 
simulated drills must be conducted regularly to develop the Cognitive Framework to ensure all ERPs 
can be smoothly carried out without confusion. 
 
From the simulations is apparent that given proper training of HIH staff, timely access to external 
hazard event information and the appropriate ICT, the time taken to process and disseminate an alert 
from the Hazard Information Hub (HIH) can be absolutely minimal. This can give the communities, 
the majority of the time (75% or more between the time of receiving the event information at the HIH 
and the estimated time of hazard impact) to execute their ERPs. However, the project sees that this 
timing advantages can only be effectively achieved by a “CAP Broker” that will integrate and improve 
interoperability among the ICT CAP systems and provide the single input - multiple output facility that 
HIH Monitors need to speed up the capturing of event information, get authorization and disseminate 
CAP messages efficiently and accurately. The CAP Broker can be developed by redesigning the 
existing tested WorldSpace ANNY, Dialog-University-of-Moratuwa-Microimage DEWNS, and 
Solana Network’s IPAS software systems. In addition the CAP Broker would require a Geological 
Information Systems (GIS) based Graphic User Interface (GUI). 
 
A disadvantage was that the absence of a culture of last mile dissemination of early warnings in Sri 
Lanka – in this sense, HazInfo project was breaking new ground. The practice until now has been for 
information to be ‘broadcast’ to the whole country in a central manner. Introducing Addressability and 
the community-based approach was a challenge, and gathering momentum in the field was at times 
slow due to this reason.  
 
 






11.1. Message formatting - the HIH and the Government 
 
In the event the government of Sri Lanka issues a public warning, the HIH will relay this message 
directly through its network. Local first responders will act on the message as they see fit, based on 
local response plans and any instructions provided by the government in the initial message or in 
subsequent public communications (e.g., official messages broadcast by the media). 
 
If the government does not issue CAP-compliant messages, the HIH will need to develop a system for 
translating or reformatting these messages quickly and accurately. If government messages are issued 
in another standard format it might be possible to automate this process. However, in no case should 
personnel at the HIH modify or otherwise revise the contents government message, except to ensure 
that it is capable of being relayed over the HazInfo network. 
 
It is recommended that an element in the CAP data definition document (the Profile Document) be 
assigned to indicate that a warning message has been issued directly from the government of Sri 
Lanka. 
 
In fact, it is advisable that the selected CAP data element be able to contain the entire government 
message as a single payload that can be copied and pasted into a CAP message, rather than asking HIH 




11.2.  Further Test ICT Assessment Tools and Methodologies 
 
In addition to the core activities, the Partnership for Public Warning (PPW) has identified a list of 
recommended best practices (RBPs) to consider when devising a warning strategy. These RBPs can be 
applied to each of the three core activities to produce a matrix with specific recommendations for the 
HazInfo initiative. The first column on the left lists 39 RBPs based on those identified by the PPW. 
The second column lists operational issues related to the RBPs. The third column lists approximately 
120 specific recommendations for the design and implementation of a HazInfo system. These are 




11.3.  Table Top Exercise for Selected Members in Community 
 
It is recommended that all villages participating in the project benefit equally from training 
opportunities offered by the HazInfo Project. After consultation with HazInfo Project Districts and 
Villages at the pre-simulation workshop, consensus was reached that it would not be appropriate to 
fully exercise villages that are not trained, to avoid creating confusion among residents about the 
intended purpose of the simulation. Further, there are public safety considerations that must be 




considered in advance whenever public participation is sought in such exercises. There was a change 
of strategy to engage untrained villages in the simulation exercise. Although the simulation exercise 
proceeded as originally planned and untrained villages did not receive additional training up to the 
time of receipt of the alert message from the HIH, at each untrained village HIH trainers and District 
coordinators conducted a “table top exercise”; with relevant officials at the village location where the 
Last Mile alerts would arrive. The table top exercise was in the form of an around-the-table discussion 
about what steps the village would take in the event the alert message was real, followed by HIH 
trainers taking participants through an introduction to disaster planning; to be followed by a full 
training workshop at a future date. In this way, shortly after the completion of simulations all 
participating villages would be trained to the same level and all villages have improved their alerting 
and response capacity. 
 
This procedure provides a model for future expansion of the project. A slightly modified version of 
this table top process can also be applied in trained villages where circumstances prevent them from 
conducting full community simulations. All villages, trained and untrained, will also be able to 
complete the HIH-to-village Last Mile technical simulations. 
 
 
11.4.  Training and Certification of HIH Monitors 
 
It is recommended that an authorization procedure be developed for HIH staff members to qualify 
them as “Authorized Users” with the authority (and related responsibilities) to compose and issue 
warning messages over the HazInfo system. 
 
All new HazInfo personnel should be required to attend a training session provided by the 
HIH/Sarvodaya.  In addition all authorized users should be required to attend regular refresher training 
to maintain their status.  Regular training sessions could be scheduled prior to the cyclone season in 
November.  In addition, authorized users should be required to complete monthly practice sessions 
composing and initiating messages using the system.  To promote compliance, the HIH computers 
could be designed to log these monthly sessions. 
 
 
11.5.  Training of ICT Guardians 
 
It is recommended that HIH develop a series of basic HazInfo set up, operational and maintenance 
checklists and guidelines, and that they be distributed in all appropriate languages. It is further 
recommended that HIH examine how HazInfo components could be used to deliver regular updates to 
ICT Guardians – especially the AREA audio service and that refresher and advanced user courses be 




11.6. Community-based Emergency Communications Planning and Training 
 
It is recommended that a new module be added in the next phase of the project that would include 




community-based emergency communications planning incorporating communications needs 
assessments based upon community emergency response plan concepts of operation, an inventory of 
communication means, communications capacity and vulnerability assessment and gap analysis, along 
with operational training. 
 
 
11.7. Contribution to CAP Research through Working Groups 
 
It is recommended that a special R&D working group be established and retained to pursue further 
development of CAP and its integration with the project’s and other emerging ICTs that can support 
hazard warning and situation awareness. 
 
A major component of the project is the use of the Common Alerting Protocol to enable data 
interchange between the HIH and a range of technologies. However, there are many issues remaining 
to be resolved in order to fully operationalize CAP. These include interoperability, language and 
message display capacity and are further discussed below. Because of the global characteristics of 
these implementation issues, the CAP component of the study could make an important contribution 
regionally and perhaps worldwide for the deployment of this relatively new standard for emergency 
alerting. As such, considerable attention should be paid to the CAP implementation methodology and 
to documentation of the implementation process. 
 
Some decisions are also concerned with localizing CAP for the specific Sri Lankan context (e.g., 
language, geographical regions, hazards, etc.). Other decisions are concerned with information 
management requirements that stem from the use of CAP and the long term path dependencies 
associated with future expansion of CAP within Sri Lanka and in the Indian Ocean region. 
 
The decision-making process is also an important component of the pilot study, as it will provide 
lessons learned for implementing CAP in other organizations in Sri Lanka and in other countries. For 
this reason, it is important to preserve a record of events during the implementation and testing stages 
and to encourage broader participation through a working group. 
 
 
11.8. Enhance and Test ICTs with Complete and Full CAP Features 
 
It is recommended that all HazInfo ICTs be capable of full CAP featured and multilingual message 
display. In this project, a Complete Full-CAP Message is defined as one that complies with the CAP 
Profile for Sri Lanka, contains all three languages: Sinhala, Tamil, and English, and also is 
disseminated in modes of Audio (i.e. Voice) and Text. The final rating is the multiplication of the 
values obtained from Tables 2, 3, & 4.  
 
Presently, the HazInfo project does not employ a multi-langauge device that is capable of displaying 
the entire CAP message. The WorldSpace optional Alert Box is the only device that can display the 
entire CAP message. However, it is currently configured for English language character only. 
Therefore, ICT-Guardians have had to learn to interpret the English partial CAP Messages. 
Considering the low level of English language usage especially in rural Sri Lanka, ideally, the devices 








Of the five ICTs used in the project, only three make use of the CAP message format (AREA, RAD 
and MOP). However, each is only capable of displaying a limited number of the CAP elements, 
limiting the amount of alert message content. Consequently, during simulations ICT-Guardians 
restricted their CAP message content creation to recording only a few elements such as the 
<msgType> and <Event> and did not include <urgency>, <severity>, and <certainty> to enable ICT-
Guardians to gage the Priority. One reason particular reason for doing so was that only the WorldSpace 
AREA units could display these qualifier elements. Although, the RAD and MOP devices use the 
<Description> element that could also carry this information, they are restricted to an overall message 
content limit of 130 characters. 
 
 
11.9. Free and Open Source Software CAP Broker 
 
It is recommended that a free and open source software program (CAP Broker) be developed to 
integrate the project’s individual CAP message generators and processors to serve as a single non-
repetitive data input and import/export function. 
 
An early challenge faced by the project was whether or not the project would need to build a CAP user 
interface (GUI) from scratch, or whether there was an application available that could be borrowed. 
The CAP GUI provides a method (a template) for authorized users to enter data into a computer at the 
HIH and for the transformation of that data into the appropriate CAP XML elements to enable 
standardized content creation and passage to the various ICTs. The CAP broker is a server application 
that provides an intermediary point of interconnection between the Information Hub and the relay 
network to facilitate interconnection of all ICTs and passage of CAP-compliant messages through a 
single software application.   
 
At this stage of the project, both WorldSpace and MicroImage have developed web browser based 
CAP GUIs for the HazInfo project. The WorldSpace CAP GUI (Anny Network Early Warning System 
or Anny) interfaces with the AREA component and the MicroImage (Disaster Early Warning Network 
or DEWNS) with the Dialog RAD/Java Phone components. Both the WorldSpace satellite uplink and 
Dialog Telekom SMS servers are registered as teleports in their respective CAP alerting software.  
Presently, the AREA and RAD/SMS CAP software operate independently of each other, but in the 
future, could be integrated and controlled by a single software application (CAP broker).  Similarly, 
the VSAT IP gateway could be added as a teleport and integrated into a common CAP solution along 
with other ICTs. 
 
The VSAT satellite alerting message software also uses web browser based GUI called Internet Public 
                                                 
6  A report by Anderson, Peter [1] describes in detail the shortcomings of the ICTs and recommends enhancements to make the 
ICTs usable in the last-mile of Sri Lanka. The report further proposes an integrated software system that can automate some of the HIH 
processes to make it easy on the HIH Monitors to minimize the dissemination times. 
 




Alerting System (IPAS). IPAS in its current form is not CAP-compliant but provides a simple and 
effective means to test sending IP based alerts to PC screens and audio systems. 
 
Global hazard monitoring organizations such as United States Geological Survey (USGS) and Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) also issue CAP format messages. However, throughout the project, 
it was discovered that not all organizations, including USGS and PTWC, use the same OASIS CAP 
version making it difficult to automatically import their CAP Messages into the HazInfo CAP readers 
and thus requiring manual transfer of data for relaying timely Events of Interest. 
 
For the HazInfo CAP Broker, the current inputs will come in the form of text and voice. The message 
editor should be capable of transforming the audio and/or text to fit the defined CAP format. In most 
cases the message will be entered by the user. In a few cases the interface to external sources will be 
direct without any user interference. 
 
A natural language translator will take a CAP input in any language and translate the message to select 
other languages. The user should be able to switch between languages as and when needed. Hence, the 
GUI must also change to fit the localization requirement; i.e. switch to the selected language. The user 
can then enter the CAP message in their language of choice.  
Thereafter, the translator in the Message Relay component will convert the message to the specified 
languages and file formats. 
 
After the messages are generated using the editor and the CAP message is saved, then the Relay 
component will generate the necessary and sufficient outputs in the specified file formats. Thereafter, 
these files will be relayed to the registered gateways. In most cases it will be a TCP/IP file transfer that 
will be picked up by the provider. The module will provide means to configure the message relay 
component. This will entail mapping the CAP message file formats with the respective Gateways. 
Hence, this component will also allow the user to register and configure the gateway (teleport). The 
providers will deliver the messages to the last-mile. 
 
 
11.10. Closed User Group Digital Audio Broadcasting 
 
It is recommended that Sarvodaya explore the feasibility of establishing its own national radio network 
as a value added programming service to the WorldSpace component of the HazInfo Project. 
 
This project highly emphasizes “Early Warning” stage communications. However, the project also sees 
importance in the HIH being able to function before and during response and recovery stages of 
disasters. A number of the ICTs rely upon terrestrial infrastructure backbone networks that could be 
impacted by hazards.  Two ICTs provide alternate means to communicate between the HIH and 
villages and are not dependent upon terrestrial networks. These are the expensive VSAT system and 
the WorldSpace satellite systems. Of particular interest are the WorldSpace audio broadcast 
capabilities. The project has tested a digital radio channel for normal programming including test 
transmissions in Sinhala, Tamil, and English with instructions that can be easily recorded and 
transmitted via the project’s own, “Sarvodaya Talk” 950 World Space audio channel. 
 




Initial tests indicate that it’s feasible for Sarvodaya to operate the “Sarvodaya Talk” audio channel on a 
24/7 basis; particularly for communicating to villages during response and recovery phases of a 
disaster. The difficulty is absorbing the high cost of the WorldSpace channel. However, if Sarvodaya 
can devise an appropriate business plan, it may be able to recover the cost from the various Sarvodaya 
Units such as “Information Technology Unit”, “Economic Enterprise Development Services”, “Shanthi 
Sena”, “Suwadana Centers” and other Sarvodaya programs by charging a nominal fee to broadcast 
news and their educational and other programs directly to the communities based on fixed weekly-
program. For example, the SNeHA Project is an effort to strengthen health services in Sri Lanka by 
establishing ICT infrastructure for eHealth and enhancing capacity of healthcare workers in over a 
dozen of the districts. The project used a WorldSpace solution, namely the AREA-A with datacasting, 
in its eLearning Design and Development component. The system has proven to work well for 
conducting distance education. The project foresees using the AREA-A units in the Sarvodaya District 
Centers for conducting distance learning programs that can also be conducted from the HIH or any 
location with high-speed internet. Some of the cost can also be absorbed from the users.  
 
To facilitate this technically, a small audio mixer and recording system needs to be installed in the HIH 
control room to ensure high quality and consistent recording levels. HIH staff also requires basic 
training in audio production techniques including scripting, audio recording and editing, announcing 
and on-air presence. 




12. TECHNICAL ANNEX 1: LIST ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Table 3 List of acronyms and abbreviations used in this report 
AC Alternate Current 
AREA Addressable Radio for Emergency Alerts 
CAD Canadian Dollars 
CAP Common Alerting Protocol 
CB Cell Broadcasting 
CBM Cell Broadcast Message 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
dB Decibels 
DB Database 
dBm Decibels referenced to one mill watt 
DC Direct Current 
DEWN Disaster and Emergency Warning Networks 
DEWNS Disaster and Emergency Warning Network Software 
DRC Disaster Risk Communication 
DWRR Disaster Warning Recovery and Response 
EOI Event of Interest 
ERP Emergency Response Plan 
ERP-C Emergency Response Plan Coordinator 
FXP Fixed Phone 
GSM Global Standard for Mobile Communications 
HIH Hazard Information Hub 
HIH-M Hazard Information Hub Monitor 
HW Hardware 
ICT Information Communication Technology 
ICT-G Information Communication Technology Guardian 
IPAS Internet Public Alerting System 
J2ME Java 2 Micro Edition 
KASP Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, and Practice 
LKR Sri Lanka Rupees 
LM-HWS Last-Mile Hazard Warning System 
MOP Mobile Phone 




NEWS National Early Warning System 
NEWS:SL National Early Warning System Sri Lanka 
PC Personal Computer 
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PSTN Public Switch Telephone Network 
RAD Remote Alarm Device 
SCDMC Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Center 
SMS Short Message Service 
SMSC Short Message Service Center 
SW Software 
TOT Training of Trainers 
USD United States Dollars 
VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal 
WiFi Wireless Fidelity 
 




13. TECHNICAL ANNEX 2: WHAT IS A COMMUNITY-BASED LM-HWS 
 
Figure 17 illustrates the systems of an end-to-end early warning system. The paper noted that although 
the issuing of public hazard warnings was the responsibility of the government, it is unlikely that the 
Last-Mile of such a system can be provided solely by government. Rather, it requires a partnership of 
all concerned including government, private and non-government sectors.  
Figure 17 System architecture of an end-to-end hazard detection and warning chain of systems 
 
The LM-HWS architecture depicted in Figure 18 complements the traditional public alerting system 
design usually established by local and/or national governments.  A traditional public alerting system 
issues warnings directly to communities via broadcast media such as television and radio, or through 
designated public address (PA) systems.  By contrast, the LM-HWS project architecture establishes a 
closed user group of first responders, who are equipped with addressable wireless devices for receiving 
bulletins issued from Sarvodaya’s Hazard Information Hub. 
Figure 18 Community-based Alert and Notification communication architecture 
 
For testing purposes the LM-HWS was to design to replicate the components of the typical NEWS; i.e. 
a system equivalent to an end-to-end early warning system excluding the “detection and modeling 
system”, illustrated in Figure 17. The reader can map the components in Figure 18 to the subsystems in 
Figure 17 using the color scheme used to exemplify the identities. For research purposes the closed 
user group based system illustrated in Figure 2 will provide the identical functions of the NEWS, 









































which is an aggregate of the National and Last-Mile Systems. Hence, the model in Figure 2 is an ideal 
replica to test the functional performance of envisaged NEWS. 
 
A simplified information flow for the LM-HWS is as follows: staff members (HIH-Monitors) at the 
HIH monitor hazard events around-the-clock using the Internet.  When a potential threat is detected by 
an HIH-Monitor (HIH-M), the HIH activates its Emergency Response Plan (ERP) by issuing a 
message to the n -number of communities at risk using a combination of wireless ICTs to reach local 
first responders (denoted by the arrow between the HIH and ICT-G blocks in Figure 10). Each 
community has assigned a person or persons to be responsible for managing the wireless device and 
monitoring it for incoming warning messages.  This person has received training from Sarvodaya and 
is designated as a community ICT-Guardian (ICT-G).  When the ICT-G receives a warning message at 
the HIH, they are responsible for activating the community-level ERP.  The community response will 
vary depending on the content of the message, including its priority level.  During activation, the ICT-
G informs the m -number of ERP Coordinators (ERP-C), consisting of a First-Aid team, Evacuation 
team, Security team, and Message Dissemination team.  The Message Dissemination team then relays 
the message village-wide through various methods, including as word-of-mouth, ringing local temple 
bells, loudspeaker, and so forth. 
 
Message content is encoded using Common Alerting Protocol (CAP), an open source data interchange 
standard that includes numerous fields intended to provide consistent and complete messages across 
different technologies.  The implementation of CAP in the LM-HWS is an important aspect of the 
project because it is key in establishing an “all-media” warning capability. Section V describes the 
implementation strategy of CAP in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
14. TECHNICAL ANNEX 3: INTERNETWORKING PIPES, AND GATEWAYS 
 
 
Figure 19 Microwave Internet link 
 
Figure 20 VSAT Internet Link 
 
Initiating point of internetworking is the HIH. The message composed by the authorized user: HIH 
Monitor is delivered by Internet Browser based applications or telephony. There are two internet 
access paths: 203.888.69.241 Speedcast VSAT, Figure 20, or 202.69.197.113 Dialog Microwave links, 
Figure 19. The VSAT 2.4m satellite sits 2m above ground in the front of the SCDMC building and the 
Microwave antenna erected 7m above ground at the back of the SCDMC building. VSAT faces east 




towards the AsiaSat II satellite and the Microwave antenna faces North towards the closest base station 
in Kalubowila. Both links are connected to the 16 port CISCO Layer 3 switch sitting inside the HIH 
and they are patched such that the HIH PCs operate through the VSAT link and the rest of the users in 
the SDCMC building use the Microwave link.  In the event the VSAT link goes down then the 
microwave link can be patched to HIH PCs. VSAT provides 512Kbps capacity and the Microwave link 
offers a 228Kbps capacity. The VSAT hopes from the HIH avoiding any other communications 
infrastructure in Sri Lank to Hong Kong. The VSAT has been proven to work on UPS power when 
main grid power had been halted. Figure 21 illustrates the primary internet access gateways; i.e. the 
yellow boxes. 
 
Figure 21 ICT providers, gateways, and technologies linking HIH with the Last-Mile 
 
Through the Web based applications: ANNY, DEWN, and IPAS the HIH can issue text messages to 
the WorldSpace, Dialog, and Solana Networks gateways. The HIH also has Landline, CDMA and 
GSM telephony for voice communication or issuing of fax. In the event the Internet fails then the HIH 
 




will use the telephony to reach the overseas hubs such as the WorldSpace stations in India or 
Singapore, Solana Networks in Canada to help issue the messages. The internet based IPAS would still 
fail if Internet in the entire country is ill-fated. However, the satellite based WorldSpace receivers will 
still be functional. Same applies to the Dialog system, which can be accessed by an overseas of 
authorized party with access to the internet and the application can issue a message, which can be 
received on the RAD and Mobile Phones as they both work on the SMS platform. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 21 the WorldSpace system has several redundant paths and gateways to uplink 
the alert messages to the AsiaStar satellite. Once released from the satellite, as long as the terminal 
devices on ground are operational, the messages will be received within 7 seconds. The Dialog system 
uses their terrestrial GSM network to deliver the alert messages to each of the targeted RAD and 
Mobile hand held. Solana Networks uses the TCP/IP internet to send and receive alert messages. The 
CDMA telephony system uses the PSTN and the CDMA terrestrial network to communicate via voice. 
 
  
15. TECHNICAL ANNEX 4: RESEARCH MATRIX AND ICT ALLOCATIONS 
 
Table 4 Village categorization relative to the training regime and organizational ranking 
Quadrant Village characteristics 
Upper Left - Given ERP Training and they are Less Organized (level 1,2,3) Communities 
Upper 
Right   - Not given ERP Training and they are Less Organized (level 1,2,3) Communities 
Lower Left  - Given ERP Training and they are Organized (level 4) communities 
Lower 
Right  - Not given ERP Training and they are Organized (level 4) communities 
 
 


















































































































































Communities (District defined in parenthesis) that participated in the Last-Mile HazInfo Project. Table 
is subdivided in to 4 quadrants with 8 villages in each. VSAT – very small aperture terminal, MOP – 
mobile phone, FXP – fixed phone, AREA – Addressable radio for emergency alerts, RAD – remote 
alarm device, and Control Village – community without an ICT. The other literals that are different 
from the acronyms: VSAT, MOP, FXP, AREA, and RAD along with the Control Villages in Table 5 are 
the names of the community; where the literal in the “( )“ is the name of the District the community 
belongs to. A combination of the ICTs were tested among 28 ICT-G (32 communities minus 4 control 
villages). This allows the project to scrutinize the most user friendly combination of ICT for the ICT-G 
in Sri Lanka; where the performance of the HIH-M and ICT-G is not restricted to 1 ICT. 
 
Table 6 Synopsis of Sarvodaya development stages 
Development 
Stage Description of organizational (development) level 
Stage 1 Inquiry from the village and organization of an introductory shramadana camp for the 
village, during which problems are analyzed together and needs identified. 
Stage 2 Establishment of various groups (children’s, youngsters, mothers’ and farmers’ 
groups), construction of a child development center, and training of staff. 
Stage 3 Program for meeting the basic needs and setting up institutions (including the 
founding of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Society, which is responsible for the village’s 
development initiatives);  
Stage 4 Measures to produce income and employment; establishment of complete self-
reliance and self-financing;  
Stage 5 Support for other village communities. 
 
 
16. TECHNICAL ANNEX 5: CALCULATING THE EFFICIENCY OF PROCESSES 
 
Let it be the time of process ,2,1=i  is actually initiated; where ( )itE  is the expected time at which the 
process should have been initiated and 'it  is the time process i  is terminated and ( )itE ′  is the time the 
process is expected to be terminated. Further introduce a varaible indicated in equations (1) and (2): 
is the time interval taken to complete process i ; where  
Figure 22 illustrates the three main time intervals 210 ,, TTT  evaluated in this project. The difference of 
the hazard initiating time and the hazard impact time is defined as the period T , which varies for the 
iii ttT −′=     (1) 
( ) ( )iii ttETE −′=    (2). 




combination of each hazard-category and event. Usually the event information will inform the hazard 
travel time. A good message will contain the event information such as the vector (speed and direction) 
of hazard as well as the time and location of the event. Therefore, the calculation of the minimal 
allowable period is obtained by appying equation (3): 
s
dT =   (3) 
where d is the minimum distance between epicenter and impact area and s  is the speed at which the 
hazard is travelling. 
 
Reliability of the processes are measured as a function of time that it takes to complete the sequence of 
processes such as the HIH Monitor relaying alerts to the Last-Mile, Community-First-Responder 
relaying alerts to the ERP-Coordinators, and activiating local ERP as illustrated in Figure 18. 










R iii 1   (4) 
when ( )ii TET > ; otherwise 1=iR  because the process was completed prior to the anticipated time. 
Similarly, the other extreme is for two consecutive processes (example: 21 =<= ji ) from the set of 
processs; when ji tt > , then 0=iR  because the process has surpassed the maximum allowable time for 
that process to cpmplete.  
 
Figure 22 illustrates the sequence of functions invloved with issuing an alert message to the last-mile 
communities. The had segregated the entire communication sequence of functions in to three 
processes: HIH Monitor, ICT, and Community. As labeled in Figure 22, the time periods 210 ,, TTT  
correspond to the three procceses. The time stamps were recorded at several intervals of the sequence 
to estimate the efficeincy of each of the processes. 
 






























17. TECHNICAL ANNEX 6: MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HIH AND 
COMMUNITY 
 
Effectiveness of the HIH and Community is a measure of the HIH-M and ICT-G capability to encode 
and decode a CAP message. In the case of the HIH-M they should be capable of transforming any 
bulletin received from an external source to fit the form of a CAP message. This task is done with the 
aid of a form called the “EOI” (Event of Interest) shown in Appendix J. The EOI form contains all the 
attributes of a CAP message and is concarted in a way to assist the HIH-M with the task of encoding a 
CAP message. The form has a set of check boxes for each of the CAP “qualifier” elements (i.e. header 
of the <alert> segment, see Figure 41). By simply ticking the correct check boxes that correspond to 
the set of predefined values, the HIH-M can determine the appropriate values to pupulate the qualifier 
elements. The difficulty is in populating the <info> segment for each of the languages in the CAP 
Profile (see Figure 41). The <info> segment cannot be neglected because it carries the important 
elements that describe the priority of the alert message. Although the CAP ontology allows the <info> 
section to be optional the CAP Profile for Sri Lanka makes it a mandetory element. HIH-M will extract 
this information from the bulletines to the best of their ability. Never the less, in all cases the entire 
payload of the bulletin received at the HIH will be implanted in the <description> element. Apply 
Table 9 in section 20.2 to obtain a real valued score for the HIH-M’s effectiveness to complete the CAP 
message with the essential elements. 
 
The ICT-G must be capable of interpreting the CAP message received from the HIH and most 
importantly be able to determine the priority of the message, which is determined by reading the 
<urgency>, <sevierity>, and <certainity> elements embeded in  the CAP <info> segment. In the 
absence of the <urgency>, <sevierity>, and <certainty> elements, the ICT-G must be capable of 
identifying the information for these elements from the <description> element of the CAP message. 
ICT-G were provided with a paper form: Alert Log (Datasheet 1 in Appendix J), which contained the 
essential elements needed for documenting the CAP message. The same Alert Log would provide them 
with the tools to extract the priority and description of the alert message. Once again by applying the 
methodology described in section 20.2, a real valued measure for the ICT-G effectiveness can be 
obtained from Table 9. 
 
ERP-C are expected to activate all their ERPs with respect to the Hazadous event invloving the 
activation of the local dissemination teams, first-aid teams, security teams, and evacuation teams. They 
are further expected to clearly and accurately deliver the information related to the incident as well as 
cover all the households in their juresdiction. 
 
 
18. TECHNICAL ANNEX 7: CALCULATING RELIABILITY OF ICT 
 
The basic question governing the reliability measure is “did the ICT based system work on the day of 
the live-exercise?”  Reliability, denoted by R  can be measured in at least two aspects: certainty and 
efficiency; denoted by cR  and eR  respectively.  Whereas certainty refers to the operational state of a 
device on the day of the exercise, efficiency measures the time taken to complete the transmission of a 
message in relation to the anticipated hazard risk (i.e., will the message be received with enough 
advance warning to take action?).  





Applying equations (4) for efficiency to the ICT segment of the sequence and equation (6) for the 
certainty of ICT, the overall reliability R  of the wireless ICT in a LM-HWS is computed as functions 
of the certainty and efficiency of the ICTs; as given by equation (5): 
ec RRR ×=    (5) 
 
 
18.1. Certainty of Message Receipt 
Figure 23 Graph for calculating the effectiveness based on signal strength 
 
In some situations the ICT failed on the day of the exercise and was given a reliability score of 0 in 
terms of certainty.  It was evident that the strength of the signal coverage was catalyst to an ICT-G 
undoubtedly receiving an alert. Signal coverage measures the certainty of a message reaching an ICT-
G recipient at various times of day and is intended to reflect the variability between mobile, nomadic, 
and fixed wireless devices.  Signal strength is important for the Alerting feature because if the signal is 
weak then some data can get lost.  As a result the terminal device may not get the full bit string, 
causing failure to activate some of its active alerting function sensory features that are triggered by 
designated bits in the data string.   
 
Wireless signal is usually measured as a function of the power of the signal in decibels (dB) then 
referenced to 1 mill watt (dBm).  The signal strength was measured at the ICT-Gs home or the location 
where equipment was installed.  A GSM mobile phone can function on -104 to -47 dBm range, 
Satellites operates on -127 to -60 dBm range, and CDMA phone operates on -106 to -48 dBm range.  
All the devices used in the project display their signal strength using illumination of histogram bars (or 
LEDs) that are a function relative to the dBm range of the device.   
Enumaeration of the Effectiveness Parameter: 
















































miny y maxy  
Figure 24 Example of signal strength bars 
 
Given the device has a total of maxy  bars, at a particular location such as the ICT-G’s home, the device 
may have maxyy ≤  number of bars illuminated; where y is a real number.   
 
EXAMPLE 2: A particular terminal device may have the bars color coded; where a green bar implies full 
strength, amber bar implies half strength, and red bar implies zero strength.  As illustrated in Figure 24, 
a color coding for a device with a maximum of 8 bars having 3 green bars, 1 amber bar, and 4 red bars 
illuminated may imply signal strength of 5.3=y .   
 
For a particular application of the ICT (e.g. application of sending and receiving SMS) to work 
properly the service provider can specify a minimum requirement for the signal strength (such as 1 
bar).  Let us denote this minimum strength by miny .  The device is given a score based on the signal 


















eR yyc   (6) 
 
The exponential function defined in equation (6) and shown Figure 23 will give a score between 0 and 
1 for certainty. When minyy =  the score will be 0.5, implying that with the terminal device indicating 
minimum signal strength there is only a 50% chance that the alert message will come through without 
any doubt. As the number of signal strength bars: minyy >  increase the score will reach a value of 1 at 
an exponential rate. Similarly as the number of bars decrease below the minimum number of bars 
needed the probability of receiving the alert drops below 50 percent.  
 
The calculation takes in to consideration that 5minmax ≈− yy  because all of the ICT terminal devices 
tested in this project had either a 5 bar or 7 bar signal strength display; where all of the devices with 5 
bars required approximately minimum application specific requirement of 2 bars and the devices with 
a 7 bar display required approximately a 3 bar minimum requirement. It is evident that the signal 
strength scoring equation (6) has to be refined and generalized for all ICT terminal devices. For the 
purpose of this research equation (6) was sufficient. The authors recognize that equation (6) does not 
take in to considerations of uncertainties caused due to operator (human) mishaps that are discussed in 
section 3.1. 
 




18.2. Efficiency Measure of Transmission 
 
Equation (4) estimates the efficiency of the ICTs in terms of a time taken to transmit the message from 
the HIH to the ICT-G. The time period begins when the HIH-M starts entering the message in the web 
based application or started dialing the phone and the time period ends when the ICT-G guardian 
completes recording the message in the Alert Log (Datasheet 1, Appendix J). 
 
 
19. TECHNICAL ANNEX 8: MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICT 
 
19.1. Effectiveness of the Individual ICTs 
 
Effectiveness was measured as a function of a set of discrete parameters.  The project has defined 11 
such discrete parameters: language diversity, full CAP capability, audio and text medium availability, 
bi-directionality, total cost of ownership, DC power consumption, daily utilization, acknowledgement 
of message receipt, active alerting functionality, weight of wireless ICT, and volume of terminal 
device.  Each parameter is denoted by a literal 1121 ,,, qqq  . A continuous function or “Liken” type 
rating (i.e. discrete function) is defined and applied to obtain a real valued score between 0 and 1 for 
each literal, which is denoted by ( )iqP  for 111=i .  A conjunction of the literals 1121 qqq ∧∧∧   defines 
the design requirement for an effective ICT in a LM-HWS. Hence, a single score for the 
effectiveness G  of the deployed wireless ICT configuration is obtained by multiplying the real valued 
score of all the literals, as stated in equation (7). 
( ) ( ) ( )1121 qGqGqGG ×××=     (7) 
 
The 11 parameters are further grouped in to 5 cliques: CAP Completeness, Two-way, Adoptability, 
Miniaturization, and Alerting; as shown in Table 7, which is not listed in any particular order as their 
contribution to effectiveness in a Community-based LM-HWS is equally important.  
 
Table 7 Cliques and the set of corresponding parameters 
Clique Parameter description Abbreviation 
Adoptability Integration in to daily life or development practices Utilization 
 Total cost of ownership of ICT services and terminal 
device 
Affordability 
Alerting Acknowledgement of message receipt Accountability 
 Active alerting function Wakeup 
CAP Complete Language diversity Ethnicity 
 Full CAP capability All-media All-hazards 
 Audio and Text mediums of communication Multimedia 
Miniaturization Weight of wireless ICT terminal devices Weight 
 Dimension of wireless ICT terminal devices Volume 
 DC power consumption Longevity 








The researchers believe that it is better to scrutinize the effectiveness in terms of discrete cliques: 
54321 ,,,, GGGGG  opposed a single real value G  because in cases such as the AREA which is one-way 
broadcast technology would score a 0 in terms of two-way capability and would drive the overall 
effectiveness score 0=G  and hide the true capabilities in which the effectiveness of the technology 
ranks very high in all other capabilities. 
 
 
19.2. Effectiveness of a Combination of ICTs 
 
As shown in Table 5 of the research matrix, fourteen communities were equipped with two ICTs. 
When measuring the effectiveness for the combination of ICTs (i.e. two or more) the maximum value 
of the particular parameter of the set of ICTs is taken as the value for the set. Let mj ,,2,1 =   be the set 
of ICTs; where ( )ij qG  be the real value effectiveness measure for literal iq . Then 
( )( ){ }mjqGMax ij ,,2,1 =  is the effectiveness measure for the combination of ICTs. 
 
 
20. TECHNICAL ANNEX 9: FUZZIFICATION OF FULL CAP COMPLETENESS 
 
In this project we define a Complete Full-CAP Message to be one that complies with the CAP Profile 
for Sri Lanka, contains all three languages: Sinhala, Tamil, and English, and also is disseminated in 
modes of Audio (i.e. Voice) and Text. The final rating is the multiplication of the values obtained from 
Tables 2, 3, & 4.  
 
 
20.1. CAP Profile for Sri Lanka 
 
CAP adopts a Document Type Definition (DTD) Extensible Markup Language (XML) data structure 
that consist of a main element <Alert> and subelements <Info>, <Area>, and <Resources> as 
illustrated in Figure 41 in Technical Annex 15. The <urgency> code denotes the time to impact of the 
event. <severity> codes denotes the scale of impact of the event. <certainty> Code denotes the 
probability of the event. These 3 elements define the Priority of the <event>. The Priority is a higher 
order function that maps Urgency, Severity, and Certainty values to a distinct Priority: Urgent, High, 
Medium, or Low. The mapping is discussed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 Matrix to determine Message Priority with CAP elements 
Priority <urgency> <severity> <certainty> 
Urgent Immediate Extreme Observed 
High Expected Severe Observed 
Medium Expected Moderate Observed 
Low Expected Unknown Likely 
 
The reader may refer to the “Guidelines for the HIH in Technical Annex 15 to fully comprehend the 
CAP Profile for Sri Lanka, which elaborates each of the elements and defines the set of predifined 
values for the for the elements with fixed set of values. 




20.2. Compulsory Elements of the CAP Profile 
 
A CAP message is defined to have a high effectiveness value of 1 if the message contains all CAP 
elements described in Tables 20 - 23 in Technical Annex 15. The lower end value 0 is when the 
message is an empty CAP message; i.e. dead air or text elements with null values. The compulsory 
Elements of the CAP Profile include elements in the <Alert> “qualifier” elements: <Incident>, 
<Identifier>, <Sender>, <Sent>, <Status>, <msgType>, <Scope>, and the “sub” elements: <Info>, 
<Resource>, and <Area>. Table 9 defines the discrete function which enumerates the capability of a 
technology.   
 
Table 9 Scaling function for Full-CAP Capabilities 
Value Fuzzy Rules 
1.00 All sub elements that are contained in the <Alert> element, which includes all the 
qualifier elements and <info> element as well as the <resource> and <area> sub 
elements 
0.95 Mandatory elements described in the Profile for Sri Lanka, which are qualifier elements 
in the <alert> segment and the sub elements of the <Info> element with at least the 
<urgency>, <severity>, <certainty>, and <description> 
0.85 Elements of the <alert> segment and the <info> sub element <description> only 
0.70 <description> only 
0.50 Elements <category> and <event> only 




20.3. Language Diversity in Sri Lanka 
 
The function to enumerate the language diversity is obtained by applying basic set theory. The [ ]n  set 
of linguistics recognized and used in a area (community, state, province, country, or region) with a 
population set X , the literals ( )XLi  define the subset of the overall population that can speak, read, and 
write the language i ; where ni ,,2,1 = . For two languages { } ( ) ( )XLXLnji ji ∪∈ :,,2,1,   is the subset of 
the total population that can speak, read, and write either or both languages. The ideal case is the 
technology having the capability to carry alert messages in all the languages covering the entire 
population in the targeted area; consequently would score 1. The lower end score of 0 is given to a 
technology that would cover none of the languages applicable to the area in which the alert messages 
are issued to. Let [ ] [ ]nm ⊆  be the set of linguistics of the universal set for linguistics applicable to the 
area. The real value calculated from equation (8) gives a score between 0 and 1 indicating the fraction 
of population “covered” by the subset of language relative to the overall population. 
( )[ ]
X
XLmj j ∈    (8) 
 
The rules in Table 11 are constructed from equation (8) by applying the Ethnicity Statistics7
                                                 
7  Statistics used in the explanation was obtained from -- 
 obtained 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/census2001/population/district/t001c.htm ; the 




from the Census Bureau of Sri Lanka; approximately 82% are Sinhalese, 17.3% are Tamil (Sri Lanka 
Moor, Sri Lanka Tamil and Indian Tamil), and the rest, 0.7% are Other (Burgher, Malay, Sri Lanka 
Chetty, Bharatha, etc). “Other” ethnic groups are literate in English and in a major portion of them can 
speak and read either Sinhala or Tamil. The Census Bureau provides data on the ability of an ethnic 
group’s literacy in the secondary languages. Table 10 is an extract of the data distribution by ethnic 
group, which is used to generate a Venn diagram to obtain the necessary counts for the language sets: 
Sinhala, Tamil, and English. Since the percentage of the population who are literate in all 3 languages 
is relative very small, an assumption is made that the size of this set is 0.  
 
 
Table 10 Percentage of population by ethnic group (race) literacy in the second languages 
Race  Sinhala Tamil Other 
Literate in  Tamil English Sinhala English Sinhala Tamil 
Percentage  3.00 9.83 15.00 5.00 0 0 
 
The percentage3 calculated in Table 10 is with respect to the overall population and not relative to the 
race. The statistics relative to each race is given in the data sheet provided by the census bureau. The 
notation in the column fuzzy rule: Sinhala + Tamil + English imply the set union of the populations 
speaking Sinhala, Tamil, or English. 
 
Table 11 Scaling Function for Language Diversity 
Value Fuzzy Rule 
1.00 Sinhala + Tamil + English 
0.99 Sinhala + Tamil 
0.95 Sinhala + English 
0.80 Sinhala Only 
0.38 Tamil + English 
0.28 Tamil Only 




20.4. Mix of Pictorial, Audio and Text Communication Mediums  
 
The project used Table 12 to weight the ICT as a function of the capability to disseminate pictorial, 
audio or text messages. The context of pictorial refers to a message depicted by a photograph, digital 
image, or non alphanumeric symbol that can be interpreted clearly and accurately as a warning 
message. The message must be able to provide the necessary and sufficient set of risk information or 
guide towards an alternate source to fetch the full set of information. The picture may contain text in 
one or more languages to describe the scenario. A simple example is a Satellite image of cyclone on a 
map with the direction of movement indicated by an arrow and the category indicated by a color. An 
audible message such as what one would receive from a radio broadcast, public announcing system, or 
television news cast are considered as audio messages. The medium of text is the use of alpha numeric 
                                                                                                                                                                       
values used for Rural and Urban as a collective. 




characters (numbers and language alphabet) to communicate the alert message. Computers use a 
standard called Unicode to define characters of a particular language where the Unicode maps to a 
hexadecimal value that can be interpreted by any electronic processor. 
 
Television is a terminal device that is capable of simultaneously communicating via all three mediums. 
Digital radios such as the AREA device used in this project can deliver both audio and text. The SMS 
based alerting technique via mobile phone is only capable of text messaging. 
 
 
Table 12 Scaling Function for Audio and Text Communication Mediums 
Value Fuzzy Rule 
1.00 Pictorial + Audio + Text 
0.95 Pictorial + Audio 
0.90 Audio + Text 
0.80 Audio 
0.70 Pictorial + Text 
0.60 Pictorial 





21. TECHNICAL ANNEX 10: FUZZIFICATION OF ALERTING PROCESS 
 
The project defines alerting to be a function where a pictorial (image), written (text) or voice (audio) 
message is relayed to a Community-First-Responder (person manning the ICT device); in this project it 
would be via an ICT device belonging to the Community-First-Responder. Simple issuing the message 
alone is inadequate. Therefore, the Alerting function is complete if the message is received by the 
Community-First-Responder and the Community-First-Responder returns an acknowledgement 
message via same or alternate path to the Sender at the Message-Relay. 
 
The sequence of functions are 1) Hub Relays a message in CAP format to the ICT Providers 2) ICT 
Provider resolves message and transmits to the respective devices 3) devices receive alert 4) device 
activates wakeup function 5) Community-First-Responder acknowledges message by turning off 
wakeup function 6) device auto-transmits or Community-First-Responder sends acknowledgement to 
ICT Provider’s database 7) on demand Acknowledgement Report made available for Message Sender. 
Figure 22 in Technical Annex 4 illustrate the sequence of functions and the actors: HIH Monitors and 
ICT Guardians associated with carrying out the function. 
 
As described by the cliques in Table 7 in Technical Annex 8 the project has defined the following 
functional indicators: Message Receipt Acknowledgement (accountability) and active alerting 
(wakeup) to assess the effectiveness of the ICT as an Alerting tool. 
 
 




21.1. Acknowledgement of Message Receipt 
 
Message receipt acknowledgement is vital for the message Community-First-Responders to inform the 
Sender that the message was received. In the context of Alerting the acknowledgement must be 
initiated by a human. Hence, the devices must have a method in place to send an acknowledgement as 
soon as the Community-First-Responder accepts the message. The Message Receipt an 
Acknowledgement is a Probability function anchored on the time taken between Alerting functions 1) 
and 7). The device would score 1.0 if the acknowledgement was reported in less than 1.0 minutes; 
score 0.95 if it took less than 5.0minutes; score 0.85 if it took less than 10.0 minutes; score 0.70 if it 
took less than 20.0 minutes; score 0.50 if it took less than 45.0 minutes; score 0.25 if it took less than 
90.0 minutes. The probability density function defines a sigmoid shaped discrete scaling function; 
where the score is higher if the time taken to report acknowledgement was al most instantaneous. 
 
Table 13 Scaling Function for Acknowledgement of Message Receipt 
Value Fuzzy Rules 
1.00 <   1.0 min   
0.95 <   5.0 min   
0.85 < 10.0 min   
0.70 <  20.0 min   
0.50 <  45.0 min   
0.25 <  90.0 min   




21.2. Wakeup function to gain attention 
 
Wakeup function is designed to draw the attention of the targeted Community-First-Responders with a 
combination of attention-getters: sounding-sirens, flashing-lights, or mechanical-vibrations. Basically 
the Wakeup feature should actuate the aural, visual, and sensual sensors of the Community-First-
Responder. The ICT device scores 1.0 if it has all three attention getters; scores 0.95 if it has a Siren 
and Light because this combination does not require the device to be attached to the Community-First-
Responder in any way; scores 0.85 if it sounds a siren only; scores 0.70 if it sounds a siren and 
vibrates; scores 0.50 is it activates a flashing-light and vibrates; scores 0.25 activates only one a 
flashing-light or vibrates; scores 0 otherwise. For a person fast a sleep simply a flashing light alone 
will not get the attention of the sleeping person and needs an “Alarm” sound to wake them up. When 
defining the wakeup function for people with disabilities then the manufacturer must use the best 
attention getter to suit the requirement. Figure 26 describes the function for enumerating the ICT’s 
effectiveness to wakeup the ICT-G based on the visual, audio, and tactile sensory.  




Enumeration of the Effectiveness 
















































Figure 25 Enumeration function for wake up function 
 
 
22. TECHNICAL ANNEX 11: FUZZIFICATION OF TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION 
 
22.1. Bi-Directionality for Upstream and Downstream Communication 
 
Bi-Directionality is an indicator to measure the ability of the device to permit upstream 
communications from local communities to the Message Relay as well as downstream communication 
from the Message Relay to the Communities.  The upstream communication is mainly for Last-Mile 
Communities to inquire-of and report situations affecting their communities. The MOP, FXP, and 
VSAT allow both upstream and downstream communication without any restriction. The RAD has 
limited the upstream communication such that the user can “call back” only when an alert is received. 
The AREA does not allow any upstream communication at all. Once again each of the devices is given 
a score on a scale of 0 to 1 such that if it has no restrictions then it scores a 1.0 and a lower score for all 
other combinations giving prominence to (i.e. higher score) for downstream communication over 
upstream communication in the domain of community-based alert and notification. Table 14 provides a 
discrete enumeration method to give a real valued score to an ICT based on the upstream and 
downstream communication capabilities. 
 
 




Table 14 Scaling Function for Bi-directionality 
Value Rules 
1.00 Upstream and Downstream No restrictions 
0.95 Downstream and restricted Upstream  
0.85 Downstream only 
0.70 Restricted Downstream and Upstream 
0.50 Upstream only 





23. TECHNICAL ANNEX 12: FUZZIFICATION OF ADOPTABILITY 
 
23.1. Integration of ICT in to Community daily life 
 
Integration in to daily life is basically a utilization measure. Utilization can be quantitatively measured 
in terms of time spent or monthly cost or both. However, there are non holistic measures that can give 
greater value to the ICT being adopted such as the WorldSpace radio channel that can be used for 
community development, which may have a greater impact to the entire community opposed to a 
mobile phone also adoptable for community development but on an individual basis. Similarly the 
VSAT that gives access to the internet, email, and VoIP cannot be measured on time alone because the 
utility is based on several applications that cannot be ranked on importance. 
 
To measure the utilization the Communities were given a daily journal to record the usage. The main 




23.2. Total Cost of Ownership 
 
There is a hardware and service cost associated with owning and operating a personal communications 
technology. The hardware and service costs are further partitioned as fixed cost and variable cost, 
which gives rise to four parameters as described in Table 15. Although the hardware can guarantee 
usage for five years, it is standard business practice to linearly depreciate electronic hardware over 
three years. Therefore, the total cost of ownership is anchored on the hardware and service costs over a 
three year period. In the Community-base hazard information dissemination model a single ICT 
deployment, comprising one or two terminal devices, is to cover the entire community. Therefore, the 










Table 15 Parameters associated with calculating TOC 
 Fixed cost Variable cost (per month) 
Hardware 
Purchasing the terminal device: fcH ; 
brand new or second hand cost of the 
ICT 
Warranty, maintenance, licensing fees: vcH ; 
i.e. usually there is some kind of a recurring 
cost, let say the owner decided to insure the 
hand set pay a premium on a monthly basis 
Service 
Entry fees or setup fees: fcS ; person has 
to purchase a sim card, assume they 
throw away the sim when they throw 
away the phone in 3 years 
Periodic subscription or rental charges: vcS ; 
assuming it is a pre paid, the person has to 
top it up on a monthly basis 
 
In the attempt to devise a method to calculate the TCO the following assumptions are taken in to 
consideration: 
1) “Community-based” early warning systems are for developing nations where governments in 
these nations neither have the capacity nor have the motive to deliver the public good to their 
citizens; therefore, the community takes the initiative to link with an alternate source through 
ICTs 
2) More than 50% of the population in developing nations are in socio economic classes D & E; 
therefore, the solutions proposed must be affordable to them 
3)  Calculating the TCO based on the data available for D & E provides a good lower bound for 
the average TCO for an ICT in a community-based early warning system for that nation 
4) The minimum number of households per community is 100=N  
5) Equation (9) is an appropriate formula to calculate the TCO for a community for a period of  3 
year 
Per household three year TCO = ( )( )N
SHSH vcvcfcfc 36×+++  (9) 
 
EXAMPLE 3: The project extracted the values for the fixed and variable costs for the hardware and 
service variables from the paper “Teleuse on a Shoestring”8 95=fcH; , 0=vcH , 15=fcS , and 23.7=vcS . 
The information is based on year 2006 survey data. The average monthly expenditure vcS  for Sri Lanka 
is calculated as an average of pre-paid mobile owners, post-paid mobile owners, and home fixed 
phones. From the figures in the survey we can obtain that the price of a brand new unit is USD 95. One 
time entry fee to obtain a service is USD10. For the real data and applying equation (9) we obtain the 
TCO to be USD 3.70 per community house hold over a period of three years. The TCO lower bound is 
obtained from information related telephony, which may seem unbiased when using the TCO value to 
weigh ICTs such as the VSAT or AREA.  
 
Let us assume the benchmark TCO per community to be ( )CE ; where ( ) 70.3=CE  as calculated in 
Example 3.  Let C  denote the TCO of the particular ICT. Equation (9) defines a penalty function, 
which describes a quantified effectiveness score for the TCO: 
                                                 
8 H. de Silva, A. Zainudeen, (January 2007), “Teleuse on a Shoestring: Beyond Universal Access”, CPRsouth, can be found 
here -- http://www.cprsouth.org/index.html/files/Session%205,%20Paper%201,%20January%2019,%202007%20-
%20Ayesha%20Zainudeen.pdf  
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  (10) 
The graph in Figure 27 describes the basic shape of the function defined by equation (9) for the Sri 
Lankan case. 
 





















24. TECHNICAL ANNEX 13: FUZZIFICATION OF MINIATURERIZATION 
 
The Community-based early warning equipment are not restricted to alert and notification but are 
expected to be a valuable communication source throughout the entire disaster management cycle of 
mitigation, relief, and recovery. Relief workers are often called upon to perform their duties in remote 
areas which are not served by telecommunications or where networks have been destroyed. 
Coordinating aid efforts and keeping in touch with fellow workers, informing central authorities the 
state of affairs of the community are vital to the rapid delivery of assistance where it is most needed. 
Hence, the project belief is that the terminal devices used for alert and notification must be easily 
portable to strategic locations and be rapidly deployable. The trend in the world is to build electronics 
as small and practical as possible. The same notion is envisaged in terminal devices designed for 
communication in disaster management. As a result the project has identified weight, volume, and 
longevity as parameters that measure what is termed as miniaturization. The key factor of 
transportability is a function of the parameters weight and volume of the communications device. 
Where as rapid deployment (free of infrastructure) and uninterrupted service becomes a function of the 
longevity (available power). 
 
 



















Figure 27 Graph of the equation (11) for weights above 20Kg 
 
The weight must be below what an average adult human being is capable of carrying. The project sets 
a standard for the load a human being, without special skills, can carry to be 20 kilograms. If the 
terminal device is over 20Kg, then the effectiveness of the device in terms of weight is penalized and 
given a score between 1 and 0. If the device weighs less than or equal to 20Kg then it will receive a 
full score of 1. A weight of 30Kg is bearable and a single person can carry. However, when the weight 
is beyond 40Kg it becomes intolerable for a single person to carry. The project devised a penalty 
function that exponentially decreases the effectiveness score as the weight increases beyond 20Kg.  















WG W   (11) 
The penalty function, described by equation (11), is devised in a way to reduce the effectiveness 
exponentially because the intention is to minimize the number of resources allocated to the tasks such 
as transporting and operationalizing the communications during a crisis situation When the weight is 
30Kg the effectiveness is 0.6 above 0.5 and as the weight is beyond 35Kg the effectiveness score 
depreciates below 0.5 and approaches 0 rapidly there on. The reciprocal of the effectiveness score can 
be interpret as the number of people required to carry the equipment; i.e. when the weight is over 
35Kg, ( ) 212.2351 ≈=G , at least 2 people are need to carry the equipment. 
 
 
24.2. Volume of terminal device and peripherals 
 
The Volume parameter will be associated with the mathematical context of a “packing”; where the 
object with a specific volume must meet certain criteria and as a result would score a high or low 
probabilistic value. Volume dimensions of the entire device, including all parts necessary for it to be 
fully functional, must be such that the device can be placed in a space without extra long pieces 




protruding making it difficult to transport or place in an indoor/outdoor environment. For example, 
there are standard set of dimensions that go to make up a total volume of 114cm where length, width, 
and height, approximately, is 56 x 35 x 23 cm, respectively, for airline carryon luggage. Similarly, a 
constraint is set that the dimensions terminal device with shapes like a prism, a cuboid, a sphere, or 
ellipse, must be less than or equal to 0.5 meters. The value 0.5 is chosen such that the object (terminal 
device) can easily fit in a suitcase or backpack that can be easily carried by hand or on the shoulder in a 
back pack.  
Figure 28 Graph of equation (12) for volume above 0.125m3 
 
Since it is inappropriate to compare two objects, the diameter of a sphere against the diagonal length of 
a cuboid, for example, to judge a winner, the project has chosen to compare the volume given that that 
any dimensions contributing to the volume must be less than or equal to 0.5 meters. Thus the 
maximum volume of a spherical object will be approximately 0.06m3 or the maximum volume of a 
cuboid will be 0.125m3. From geometry or packing theory it is known that amongst three dimensional 
objects the cube with length l  has the largest volume of all the geometries such as a prism, sphere, or 
ellipse with same dimension of maximum size l . Similar to the weigh penalty function described by 
equation (11), the linear penalty function (12) is devised for the volume: 
 










VG V   (12) 
Any thing in between 0.125 and 0.250 will get a score between 0 and 1 depicting the effectiveness in 
terms of volume. The same argument as in the case of the weight applies here; where ( )VG1  implies the 
number of individual maximum volume containers: suitcase or backpack required to haul the 




















24.3. Longevity of operational state 
 
Longevity is included as part of the set measuring miniaturization because the operational life span is 
dependent upon the rate of power consumption and capacity of the power source of the wireless 
technologies. All the electronics of the communications devices work on Direct Current (DC) power. 
The duration of the DC power source is relative to the capacity of the battery powering the device and 
the rate at which the power is consumed by the circuitry. All ICTs except the VSAT, tested in the 
project, were equipped with rechargeable batteries, which could be charged via Alternate Current (AC) 
from the main power grid or via solar power. The 20 – 40 watt VSAT modems can be powered by high 
capacity batteries. A device powered by AC can be regarded as having an infinite longevity 
(immortal), assuming the service of power is uninterrupted. AC is converted to DC before electricity 
flows through the electronics. When main grid AC power is interrupted then the device will switch to 
the charged battery power.  
 
Manufacturers are compelled by IEEE standards to specify the input voltage, acceptable range of the 
current, and the power consumed by the apparatus. From the theory of electricity it is known that 
power is equal to the voltage multiplied by the current. Moreover, current is the rate at which a charge 
flows though a point in a electric circuit. Given the capacity of the battery, the utilization time of the 
battery (i.e. battery life) can be calculated. 
 
The project set the standard that each wireless device must function for a minimum of 16 hours on 
battery. Assuming the battery can be charged using solar during daylight and the minimum 
requirement for the strength of sunlight is available for 8 hours, the unit must function for the 
remaining 16 hours on battery over the 24 hour period.  
Figure 29 Graph of equation (13) from 0 to 16 hours 
 
Let L  be the battery life and ( )LG  be the effectiveness measure for operational longevity of the ICT; 
where ( ) 0=LG  if the battery has 0 capacity; i.e. 16 hours and ( ) 1=LG  if the battery life is over 16 




































LG   (13) 
Equation (9) is linear because the battery power is assumed to drain uniformly. As shown in Figure 7 
the reciprocal of the effectiveness ( )LG1  can be interpreted as the number of batteries required to 
sustain the ICT for 16 hours. A battery with a 4 hour life span: ( ) 441 =G  implies that 4 batteries are 
required to keep the ICT operational for 16 hours. 
 
 
25. TECHNICAL ANNEX 14: EXPECTED PERFORMANCE OF THE ICT 
 




There are two types of satellite transponders onboard the WS satellites, one transparent and the other 
on-board processed. The Transparent Repeater repeats Time Division Multiplexed (TDM) carriers sent 
to the satellite from large earth stations at X-band onto downlink carriers at L-band. Each satellite has 
three spot beams with each beam containing two TDM carriers centered at different frequencies in the 
band 1452-1492 MHz. Each beam covers a large geographical area and with the six beams on the two 
satellites in service, the coverage extends to more than 130 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. 
 
Each TDM carries 1.536 Mbps, divided into 96 Prime Rate Channels (PRC) each of 16kbps. A basic 
audio program can use just one PRC and achieve an audio quality better than analog short wave as WS 
uses efficient audio coding scheme MPEG Layer-3. As many as 8 PRCs can form one Broadcast 
Channel (BC) depending on the desired quality. The WS digital format incorporates interleaving, 255, 
223 Reed-Solomon block coder and Rate ½ Vitterbi convolution encoding technologies to protect the 
service against transmission errors. At any given geographical location, typically 30-40 subscribable 
audio channels are available, giving the listener enough choice. 
 
 
AREA Terminal Device Components 
 
The receiver, called DAMB-R2, is a low-memory radio with a small display and a limited processing 
power. DAMB-R2 features dual channel reception with one of the channels designated as a data 
channel called OAAC (Over Air Activation Channel). Through the OAAC channel the alert provider 
can send an alert message. DAMB-R2 has the capability to monitor the alert, validate the message and 
perform the specified action. The action could range from activating a relay for a siren, turning 
on/switch to a WS channel for audio messages and displaying text regarding the alert.  
 
An external box can be fitted via a USB to the DAMB-R2 to enhance the display with a larger digital 
display as well as couple other peripherals such as an audible siren and GPS receiver. A palm-sized 
linear patch antenna was used to receive the services. All WS specific processing including MPEG 
decoding is handled by the StarMan chipset, which is incorporated in all the receivers. Each radio 




receiver features a BC digital output connector allowing to access to the full content of the selected BC 
from an external appliance. Figure 30 illustrates all the components associated with the AREA system. 
 
Figure 30 Components of the AREA Terminal device 
 
 
States of the AREA Receiver 
Figure 31 State transition diagram for the AREA systems 
 
After power is supplied,  AREA (B,C & M) can be initiated from the Power Off state to the Power On. 
At this point any of the available channels can be tuned and  it starts Playing Audio. The AREA 
receiver is now ready to receive alerts. Once an alert is received, the AREA normally Sound Siren and 
Display Text of the mandatory elements of the CAP message. In the case the channel ID (BCID) is 
specified in the CAP message, then DAMB-R2 can be automatically preset to that channel and this can 
be chosen as the Emergency Warning (EW) broadcast channel.  Once the alert cancellation is received, 
it stops displaying the text and the tuner once again becomes active for selection of the available 
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ANNY Network Interface 
 
The uplink segment includes a special, secure, web interface, hosted at one or more of the designated 
centers from where the Emergency Warning message is generated; see Figure 14. Additionally, the 
interface incorporates procedures for authentication and logging of the alerts, generation, uploading 
and scheduling of transmission of content for the supplementary audio channel that WS supports once 
an alert is announced, updating an announced alert, canceling the alert, periodic end-to-end testing of 
the entire system.  
 
 
25.2. Dialog Disaster and Emergency Warning System 
Figure 32 High level architecture of the DEWNS with network and Terminal Devices 
 
The Disaster Emergency Warning Network (DEWN) is based entirely on widely available mobile 
communications technologies such as Short Messages (SMS) and Cell Broadcast Messages (CBM), 
aimed at rendering a cost effective and reliable mass alert system. The system is compliant with CAP. 
As shown in Figure 32, DEWN comprises of two basic elements – i.e. the DEWN Server and DEWN 
Clients. The DEWN Server will reside in a secure facility and will be used by authorized persons to 
generate warning messages via SMS or CBM. The DEWN Clients are the intended recipients of the 
above mentioned messages. Upon reception of the messages the clients will take necessary measures to 
inform the users of the system about the warning. The DEWN Clients are twofold. They are a 
Java/Symbion application for mobile phones developed by Microimage and the Remote Alarm Device 
discussed developed by University-of-Moratuwa Dialog Mobile Communications Research Lab. 
 




Messaging Software Application 
 
At this stage of the project, MicroImage has developed a web browser based CAP GUI; namely the 
Disaster and Emergency Warning Network Software (DEWNS). The GUI interfaces with the GSM 
and the Dialog SMS components. The Dialog Telekom SMS servers are registered as teleports in their 
respective CAP alerting software. SW application for issuing alert messages is accessed via an Internet 
web-based connection. The authorized user logs in and proceeds through a sequential 3-screen process 
to create and compose a CAP-compliant message. Presently, the RAD/SMS CAP software, shown in 
Figure 15, operates independently of other LM-HWS components.  
 
 
Remote Alarm Device 
 
RAD is based entirely on widely available mobile communications technologies Short Messages 
(SMS) and Cell Broadcast Messages (CBM). SMS Based alerting is used to activate selected or 
individual RADs, while the CBM is used to activate all RADs.  These terminal devices are stand-alone 
units that incorporate remotely activated alarms, flashing lights, a broadcast FM radio receiver to be 
turned off or on as directed by the message, the displaying of the SMS messages on LCD panel, a self-
test button, message acknowledgement and a dynamic hotline GSM call-back feature for user to 
acquire additional information.  Five push button switches labeled as Call, Ack, LCD, Test, and Radio 
control the operational states of the device. The GSM Alarm Device is a product of the University of 
Moratuwa Dialog9
 
 Communication Research Lab.  
 
Figure 33 Circuit level system architecture of the RAD 
 
The Microcontroller and the GSM module are the key components of the Alarm Device. The system 
components are illustrated in Figure 33. The microcontroller houses a multitude of peripheral devices 
such as internal program flash memory, Data Memory, general purpose I/O, and USARTS.  Once in 
                                                 
9 Dialog Telekom url on the Disaster and Emergency Warning Network – 
http://www.dialog.lk/en/corporate/cr/ourapproach/innovationinclusion/dewn.html  




operation, the GSM module listens for any incoming SMS messages or CBMs. CBM-based warning 
messages will be broadcast on a predetermined dedicated logical broadcast channel.  Upon the 
reception of a CBM or an SMS, a notification will be sent by the GSM module to the microcontroller.  
The Microcontroller in turn will read and processes the message.  If the message is from an authorized 
source (in case of SMS) and conforms to a given format the Alarm Device will be triggered.  The RAD 
is designed to power up from the mains supply but is equipped with a seven hour back up battery as a 
secondary power source. 
 
HazInfo project was the first to field test the RADs.  Hence usability and effectiveness of the devices 
were questionable from the beginning.  Having disregarded the issue faced by congestion in SMS 
applications the units were found to be exceptionally reliable during Lab tests.  The external turning-
indicator type flashing light used in vehicles and 40watt speaker ranked the RAD to be the unit to have 
the most forceful active alerting functions.  The 160 character limited display designed for English text 
messaging only established the device to have very low effectiveness.  Since the GSM signals cover 
only 60% of Sri Lanka the units would be limited to locations with good signal coverage. The sets had 




J2ME Applet embedded Mobile Phone 
 
The research used Nokia 6600 MOP that are powered by a 104MHz ARM processor, and is based 
around Symbian’s Series 60 platform. Microimage10
 
 developed a J2ME applet that sits on Symbian 
Operating System.  The MOPs are activated by a SMS sent from an Internet Application that can be 
configured to send alerts to all or a group of MOP handsets. The GSM Java enabled SMS mobile 
phones receive text alerts in Sinhala, Tamil and English, sounds an alarm, and has a hotline GSM call-
back feature. 
Given that the MOP had java based client software that fulfilled all three features of the active alerting 
function, as well as text messaging in all three national languages the devices was expected to perform 
the best with very high effectiveness.  Since SMS messaging requires less signal strength opposed to 
voice the MOP based solution was, further, trusted to be highly effective. The ubiquitous technology 
with a device that can be alongside the ICT-G at all times and could be easily integrated in to their 
daily village life would prove to be most reliable device of the lot. 
 
 
Operational States of the GSM devices 
 
Power On -- the RAD is powered by 240v 60Hz AC and when the main power is down it is run by a 
Matrix 7v DC Lithium Battery. The Nokia 6600 has a rechargeable 9v Battery. At this point the GSM 
Module in both devices listen to SMS of the type that are Alerts and be on Standby. SMS Alert is a 
specific SMS with a known header that triggers the device to initiate the Alerting Sequence. The total 
message is the size of 2 SMS messages; i.e. 2 x 140 7bit characters. Siren On, Light On, and Text 
                                                 
10 Microimage website – http://www.microimage.com  




Display are instantaneous. The User can press the “Acknowledge button” to turn the Siren Off and 
Light off. The User then uses GSM Telephony by pressing the “Callback button” to dial the Alert 
Sender for direct conversation or to receive a voicemail of the CAP message. Final step is pressing the 
Radio On to listen to an FM Emergency Broadcast Station (not available in the Nokia 6600). This 
completes the cycle of operational states of the 2 GSM based Terminal devices. Figure 34 shows all 
the operational states of the MOP and RAD. 
Figure 34 Expected operational states of the RAD & MOP 
 
Encoding and Transmission of CAP Messages 
 
CAP message is entered via an Internet based application: Disaster and Emergency Warning Network 
(DEWN); namely a HTTP Software Application. The HTTP server strips the <msgType> and 
<description> elements of the CAP message. The data is then transformed and packed in to 2 SMS 
packets and delivers to the Short Message Service Controller (SMSC). This truncated CAP message is 
then forwarded to the GSM Terminating device: RAD or MOP via the Dialog GSM network.  
 
 
Reception and Decoding of CAP Messages 
 
The first 140 character 8 bit special SMS text message contains a header code of 10 characters, which 
is decoded by the RAD’s Microcontroller and by the MOP’s J2ME Applet. Remaining 130 characters 
contain the text message taken from the <msgType> and <description> of the original CAP message. 
The software in the devices activates the alarms of the devices and display the text tripped from the 
specially encoded SMS packets. The RADs displays only the English portion of the text message; 





















VSAT Technology is predominantly used in Sri Lanka for high speed 2-way data exchange, especially 
satellite Internet access.  The LM-HWS uses a star network topology to connect the Sarvodaya 
Community Disaster Management Center’s Hazard Information Hub (HIH) in Moratuwa, serving as 
the central gateway to interconnect earth stations in Urawatta and Hambantota that serve as nodes. 
However, the setup also allows any location to serve as the central gateway and, thereby, serving as a 
back hub site. 
 
The Antenna used at the HIH is a CHANNEL MASTER 2.4 M C-Band linear antenna. The other 
ground stations use 1.8M C-Band linear antennas. Each antenna are aligned with AsiaSat and are fitted 
with an AGILIS C-Band BUC and LNB. Two co-axial cables running from the BUCs and LNBs are 
connected to iDirect 3000 series modems/routers and local network switches.  
 
Internet access via the VSAT system is provided by Speedcast Limited (Speedcast).  Headquartered in 
Hong Kong, Speedcast offers satellite based value added telecommunications services to over 25 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Speedcast has its regional Network Operations Centre (NOC) 
located in Hong Kong. The Speedcast NOC is equipped with performance monitoring and network 
management systems to facilitate problem resolution and is staffed with engineers working 24 hours, 7 
days a week, 365 days a year to ensure continuity of services. 
 Figure 35 Rear of BUC ALB and Front/Rear of iDerct Modem 
 
 
IPAS Alerting Software Application 
 
Although not CAP-compliant in its present form, IPAS possesses some similar features to CAP. Like 
CAP-based systems, the IPAS GUI is accessed through a web-based form. The authorized sender logs 
in and can then select the “Issue Alert” page to begin composing an alert message. Among the features, 
users can set the send time, duration of the alert, geographic target area, type of message, level of alert, 
and compose an alert message. The message box feature is equivalent to the message description in the 
CAP template.  
 
The IPAS Server GUI also allows authorized users to issue hierarchical alerts to subscribers via the 
Internet. That is to say, alerts can be issued on a national, regional or community wide basis.  Further, 
IPAS alerts can be issued according to a scale of severity from 1 to 5 (5 being the highest severity).  
 





For receiving alerts, IPAS utilizes an alert window, visual and audio approach. Users download and 
install a Java applet on their computers and then register for the types of emergency alert notifications 
that they want and can filter them according to geographic scope and severity. In the event of an 
emergency alert broadcast, the alert message will pop-up in a window on the subscribed user's 
computer screen with an audible alarm. 
 
 
IPAS Computer Operational States 
 
IPAS Message Clients were always tested on a Desktop or Notebook computer (PC). The computers 
were preloaded with Windows XP or Windows Vista Operating Systems. The software is configured 
to be activated upon PC power up. Thereafter, the IPAS Client prompts the user to Log In. After 
logging in, the IPAS Client runs as a service in the background and is on Standby listening to dedicated 
communication ports for any alerts messages. When an IPAS Alert is received, if configured to Siren 
On , immediately sends a siren sound to the PC speakers and a Text Display window pops up on the 
screen with an Alert Message. After 10 seconds the sound is set to Siren Off. The end-users can cancel 
the Text Display and set the IPAS Client back on standby mode. If the user does not wish to receive 
alerts then the user can Log Out. Also if the PC is being powered down the operating system will force 
IPAS to Log Out before turning the PC Power off. 
Figure 36 Operational States of the IPAS on a Personal Computer (PC). 
 
 
25.4. Sri Lanka Telecom Nomadic Telephony System 
 
CDMA Nomadic Phone 
 
The original intention of the project was to use fixed Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) lines. 
However, the infrastructure and capacity does not exist in the rural areas if Sri Lanka; i.e. fixed line 
















 solution called City Link for telephony mainly for Rural Sri Lanka.  The phone sets 
also provide 1xRTT capabilities with Voice, SMS, Fax, and Internet connectivity (54Kbps), which 
transmit on the 8.5 KHz and 18.5 KHz frequency spectrums.  CDMA Fixed Wireless Phones with 
built-in speakerphones to provide voice communication via the PSTN FXPs. 
The alerting for was a simple voice call, which would allow for an alert message to be voiced in any 
language. However, the language diversity of the staff at the HIH would limit the multilingual 
capabilities. With CDMA coverage spanning all most the entire country it would be highly reliable 
solution. Loud ring tone is a definite attention getter. However, the nomadic terminal device requires 
that the ICT-G be in close proximity. Also the if the call is received by the ICT-G, then 
acknowledgment is instantaneous. 
 
The Internet access of the 1xRTT capabilities were tested from a remote location; where a prepaid card 
has to be purchased from an SLT outlet and registered through the SLT web portal over the internet. 
The dilemma is to access the internet via the CDMA phone one must access the internet via an 
alternate mean to registered the prepaid access information. The CDMA Terminal Device is coupled to 
a computer via a RS232 serial connector. The TCP/IP must be configured to use “dialup” though a 
short code. Once connected the bandwidth varies from 36 – 54kbps depending on the signal strength. 
In order to use the 1xRTT capabilities the Terminal Device must be supplied AC power through the 
adopter or a 12v DC supply and does not function off the rechargeable battery.  
 
SMS was not tested since the subscribed service package was limited to voice and SMS was not 
activated. Therefore, the project did not have the opportunity to test alerting over SMS to the FXPs. 
 
 
Operational States of CDMA 2000 1xRTT Device 
 
In order to power up the CDMA2000 1xRTT terminal device, the unit must be plugged in to the main 
AC power or the battery must be charged and have minimal capacity. The signal strength must be at 
least 2-3 bars in order to make a voice call. The standard phone ringing tone gets the attention of the 
call recipient. The unit has the option of setting 3 different ring tones. When the phone rings (i.e. a call 
connection being requested) the user picks up the handset receiver with microphone and speaker to talk 
to the calling party on the other end of the connection; once call is complete either the calling party or 
receiving party can terminate the call. The terminal unit is on standby waiting to receive a call. The 
unit can also receive SMS when on standby mode. When a text message is received a ring tone alerts 
the recipient that a message has arrived. The user can view the message, reply, delete, or navigate away 
from the SMS display. The user can connect to the internet. While being connected the FXP unit can 
receive both SMS and Voice calls. Similarly, when on a voice call the FXP can receive a SMS as well 
as stay connected to the internet. When running on battery power, if the battery capacity is below the 
minimum charge level, the unit will automatically power off.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Sri Lanka Telecom website – http://www.slt.lk  
























The LM-HWS is a system for creating and issuing alert messages through the Disaster Management 
Institute Hazard Information Hub (HIH) to villages belonging the Sarvodaya’s Sri Lanka network. It is 
important to note that alerts issued by the LM-HWS are not “public” alerts.  Instead, the HIH issues 
alerts to members of a closed user group.  The members of the closed user group are designated “first 
responders” that have been given training by Sarvodaya Shanti Sena (Peace Brigade) and have been 
trained and certified in conjunction with the Last Mile Hazard Information Dissemination Project. 
Local first responders are members of the local community and it is they, or their authorized 
designates, who are responsible for determining if a local, community-wide (village) warning is to be 
issued. This flow of communications means that the LM-HWS is a two-stage relay network that 
disseminates information to alert local first responders.  These guidelines attend to the First Stage of 
the LM-HWS only.  Training and response plans for local villages are intended to deal with the Second 













Figure 38 The LM-HWS depicted as a two-stage relay network




26.2. The LM-HWS and its Responsibilities for Issuing Alerts 
 
The HIH and the government 
 
In the event the government of Sri Lanka issues a public warning, the Hazard Information Hub (HIH) 
will relay this message directly through its network.  Local first responders will act on the message as 
they see fit, but these actions should be based on local response plans and any instructions provided by 
the government in the initial message or in subsequent public communications (e.g., official messages 
broadcast by the media). 
 
If the government does not issue CAP-compliant messages, the HIH will need to convert these 
messages into the CAP format quickly and accurately.  If government messages are issued in a 
standard protocol other than CAP it might be possible to automate the conversion process. 
 
However, in no case should staff at the HIH modify or otherwise revise the contents government 
message, except to ensure that it is capable of being relayed over the LM-HWS network.  In certain 
cases, the HIH Executive (see below) may direct an Authorized User at the HIH to issue 
supplementary messages in conjunction with official government warnings.  
 
It is recommended that the optional CAP element <description> be used to relay government warnings 
in their entirety—if possible, copied and pasted into a CAP message—rather than asking HIH 
personnel to interpret or to transcribe the message and risk introducing errors in the transcription 
process. 
 
The HIH and local first responders 
 
The HIH will not issue messages that provide specific instructions to local first responders, except 
those that might be relayed directly from the government. 
 
Instead, all HIH-originated messages should contain enough information to enable a local first 
responder to decide if s/he should activate their local response plan based on their training and 
judgment.  
 
It is the responsibility of the HIH to ensure that all messages sent through the LM-HWS are authorized 
and conform to an agreed upon CAP Profile Document.  These guidelines also establish a CAP Profile 
Document for the LM-HWS. 
 
Any proposed changes made to the CAP Profile Document that might affect the warning message, or 
its display on any communications device, must be discussed with training personnel and others 
involved in the First Stage relay network (including service providers and technology partners). 
 
In the longer term it is anticipated that local first responders will maintain a state of observational 
readiness and provide information updates to the HIH.  These updates will include local reports of 
hazard impacts or other environmental indicators will serve to provide an upstream flow to support 
situational awareness at the HIH. 





It is also anticipated that a network of automated sensors placed in local communities and other 
strategic locations will provide some of these upstream flows.  In all cases, it is expected that both 
downstream and upstream messages will be CAP compliant. 
 
Further details on the upstream component will be developed in due course and attached as an 
addendum to these guidelines. 
 
Local first responders and their communities 
 
It is the responsibility of local first responders to maintain a state of readiness in order to be able to 
receive messages from the HIH.  This state of readiness includes a number of responsibilities.  Local 
first responders must 
 
 Ensure that their local communications equipment is in good operating condition and that 
battery-operated equipment is adequately charged. 
 Ensure that their local communications equipment is “on” and ready to receive messages from 
the HIH on a 24x7 basis. 
 Ensure that at least one authorized person is responsible for monitoring the local 
communications channel(s) for incoming messages at all times. 
 
It is also the responsibility of local first responders to decide on appropriate action when a message is 
received.  Appropriate action will depend on the information content of the message and the local 
community response plan.  For example, an urgent tsunami warning for the west coast of Sri Lanka 
might prompt some local villages to activate their evacuation plans while in neighboring villages they 
activate plans in preparation to receive evacuees. 
 
Again, the HIH will not issue specific instructions to each community but will instead strive to include 
enough information in its messages to enable local first responders to instigate appropriate action with 
respect to local response plans. 
 




26.3. Staffing and Training at the HIH 
 







Figure 39 Organizational structure of the HIH 
 
The HIH Executive is responsible for taking decisions to issue or not issue warning messages from the 
HIH.  Members of the executive are senior managers or directors from key stakeholder groups. 
 
The HIH Coordinator is responsible for day-to-day operations of the HIH, as well as for taking a lead 
role when a decision has been taken to issue warning messages.  The Coordinator will be qualified as 
an “Authorized User” and has the authority to issue warning messages when first approved by the 
Executive. 
 
The Assistant supports the Coordinator in his/her responsibilities and may or may not be qualified as 
an Authorized User of the system. 
 
The Monitors are those staff members responsible for tracking and recording details from the various 
information feeds provided at the HIH.  The HIH will be staffed on a continuous basis by at least one 
Monitor.  Monitors will normally also be qualified “Authorized Users,” meaning that they have the 
authority to compose and issue warning messages when a request to issue a warning is first approved 
by the Executive. 
 
Support staff include those responsible for upkeep of technology and other equipment at the HIH, as 
well as those who might be called in to the HIH to provide additional assistance during emergency 
events (e.g., telephone support) or on an as-needed basis (e.g., during exercises).  Support staff may or 
may not be qualified as “Authorized Users.” 
 
 




Initiating a warning message 
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Figure 40 Simplified procedure for issuing warning messages from the HIH 
 
 




Step 1: Event of interest (EOI) 
 
When a staff member receives information that is potential cause for concern, it is first verified by the 
staff member and the source, time, and other pertinent details are recorded in the HIH database as an 
“event of interest” (EOI).  See Annex B for guidelines to documenting an EOI. 
 
The HIH database automatically assigns an incident identifier to the entry even if it is eventually 
decided not to issue an alert message.  In this way, all events of interest are assigned unique identifiers 
for recordkeeping purposes. 
 
In the event an alert is actually issued by the LM-HWS, the incident identifier can be used to collate 
multiple messages that refer to different aspects of the same incident.  For example, if a large 
earthquake is reported off the coast of Indonesia and the HIH staff member decides it is an event of 
interest (EOI), then the details are entered into the HIH database and the event is assigned a unique 
identifier compatible with the CAP <incidents> element. 
 
No other CAP elements are specified until a decision to issue an alert has been made. 
 
If an alert is issued based on the EOI, then the assigned unique identifier serves as a common referent 
for all subsequent messages based on that event, including messages of varying priorities targeted for 
different communities, as well as initial alerts and any follow up messages. 
 
The EOI is terminated on a decision by the HIH Executive to “close” the case.  When this occurs the 
unique identifier assigned to the EOI is retired.  Subsequent EOI are assigned new unique identifiers 
compatible with the CAP <incidents> element. 
 
 
Step 2: Consultation with HIH executive 
 
Having recorded the event of interest (EOI) in the HIH database, the staff member then contacts a 
member of the HIH executive by telephone. 
 
It is imperative that a current and complete list of telephone numbers of the members of the Executive 
is maintained and available the HIH for this purpose.  The current list of contacts is provided as Annex 
A to these guidelines.  Annex A should undergo regular review and updates to ensure the contact list 
remains current. 
 
The staff member will provide details of the EOI to the members of the Executive and conduct any 
follow up inquiry as directed by the Executive. 
 
The members of the Executive will take a decision as to whether to initiate a warning message and any 
related details pertaining to that message, such as geographic specificity, priority level, special 
instructions, and so forth. 
 
 




Step 3: Decision to send message 
 
Having reached a decision, the members of the Executive will provide details to the staff member who 
will then enter those into the HIH database under the incident identifier established for that EOI: 
 
1. Time that a decision was requested of the Executive. 
2. Executive member(s) with whom the EOI was discussed 
3. Time that the Executive issued a decision. 
4. Details of the decision and/or further instructions from the Executive. 
 
Step 4: Message composition 
 
Having entered the details of the Executive’s decision into the HIH database, the staff member will 
then take immediate action based on the details of the decision. 
 
The following points indicate possible scenarios: 
 
• Decision not to issue a warning and close the case (EOI is terminated). 
• Decision not to issue a warning but to remain vigilant (EOI remains open). 
• Decision not to issue a warning but to obtain more information and report back to the Executive 
(EOI remains open). 
 
• Decision to issue a low priority warning and to remain vigilant. 
• Decision to issue a medium priority warning, to obtain more information and report back to the 
Executive. 
• Decision to issue a high priority warning and to provide continuous updates to the Executive 
and/or the HIH Coordinator. 
 
If the staff member has been directed to issue a warning then it is important that they follow the pre-
defined process for composing messages in conjunction with any steps defined by the CAP interface 
application.  If the staff member does not have the authority to issue a warning message, then they 
must contact an “Authorized User” immediately to complete this step. 
 
In cases of extreme urgency, the HIH Coordinator may grant to another staff member temporary 
authority to issue a warning on their behalf.  For example, if there are no Authorized Users on-site at 
the HIH during a critical moment, a staff member may obtain verbal authorization from the 
Coordinator to issue a warning (provided that the Executive has been consulted and has approved the 
warning).   
 
See the following sections on “Training” “Activation” for further details regarding Authorized Users 
and message composition. 
 
The resulting CAP message will be assigned (either automatically or manually) the same unique 
incident identifier as the EOI file that spawned the decision to issue a warning. 





In the case that there is a discrepancy or any uncertainty on the part with regard to message 
composition (e.g., details of content) then the Authorized User must contact the HIH Coordinator or 
HIH Executive immediately for advice before issuing the message. 
 
 
Step 5: Issuing a Message  
 
Having composed the warning message using the CAP interface application, the Authorized User will 
issue that message immediately by following the appropriate procedures to ensure it is presented to all 
designated channels (i.e., telephone, VSAT, ADSR, etc.). 
 
The Authorized User will then immediately contact the HIH Coordinator by telephone to report that a 
message(s) has been issued. 
 
Any known problems or delays must be reported to the HIH Coordinator immediately. 
 
When a message is issued over the LM-HWS the Authorized User is required to complete a post-






It is recommended that an authorization procedure be developed for HIH staff members to qualify 
them as “Authorized Users” with the authority (and related responsibilities) to compose and issue 
warning messages over the LM-HWS. 
 
All new LM-HWS personnel should be required to attend a training session provided by the 
HIH/Sarvodaya.  In addition all authorized users should be required to attend regular refresher training 
to maintain their status.  Regular training sessions could be scheduled prior to the cyclone season in 
November.  In addition, authorized users should be required to complete monthly practice sessions 
composing and initiating messages using the system.  To promote compliance, the HIH computers 
could be designed to log these monthly sessions. 
 
Each initial and refresher training session should include: 
 
 An LM-HWS presentation that explains the importance of the system and how it is intended to 
operate. 
 A detailed description of activation criteria and procedures for the LM-HWS. 
 An overview of likely risks and hazards in the communities, histories of disasters, and examples of 
activation scenarios. 
 Training in working with information technology at the HIH. 
 Training in interpretation of the data feeds at the HIH. 
 Demonstration of LM-HWS activation. 




 Hands-on practice in recordkeeping and message composition using both a practice sheet and with 
the actual software. 
 Testing and certification. 
 
Upon completion of the training session, candidates should be asked to sign an “HIH Authorized User” 
form, which serves as a contract to bind the staff member to the HIH Guidelines.  This contract should 
address a number of matters related to the operational and security dimensions of the HIH: 
 
 Authorized users should agree to be responsible for the security of any passwords or access codes 
or keys issued to them. 
 Authorized users should agree to complete monthly practice sessions on using the system (these 
could be logged on the HIH computer system). 
 Authorized users should agree to attend regular refresher training courses and other professional 
development as directed by the HIH Coordinator. 
 Authorized users should agree to follow established HIH procedures and guidelines for monitoring 
data feeds and “on call” responsibilities. 
 Authorized users should agree to follow established HIH procedures and guidelines for composing 
warning messages. 
 Authorized users should agree to follow established HIH procedures for initiating warning 
messages. 
 Authorized users should agree to disclose all actions taken, communications given and all other 





The HIH maintains data feeds from a number sources.  Duty personnel are responsible for ensuring 
that these sources are active and to immediately report any problems to the HIH Coordinator. 
 
The HIH will be staffed on a 24/7 basis, with the Coordinator and at least one member of the Executive 
remaining “on call” at all times. 
 
An active set of data feeds will be maintained at the HIH to identify potential events of interest across 
a range of hazards.  The LM-HWS is intended as an “all-hazards” system and the following list 





• Volcano (ash fall) 
• Flooding 
• Landslide 
• Dam break 
• Coastal/marine events 
• Fire 





• Civil disturbances 
 
In addition to its data feeds, the HIH is to maintain a current list of contact information of secondary 
sources that might be helpful to confirm or otherwise obtain further details on any Events of Interest.  
The HIH Coordinator is responsible for the upkeep of this list and it should be reviewed regularly.   
 
The current list of secondary source contacts is found in Annex C. 
  
The HIH should also maintain one or more incoming telephone lines (“hotlines”) to receive reports 
from outside agencies or organizations (including local communities that might have observed a 
hazard event).  This number should not be public but instead be made available to those agencies and 
community groups that are likely to be able to provide advance notice of a hazard event (e.g., Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Centre, local first responders). 
 





The HIH should develop a checklist and procedures for duty personnel who are responsible for 
monitoring the data feeds.  This list should include the following items: 
 
• Ensure all communications equipment (incoming/outgoing) is in good working order. 
• Establish a procedure for conducting a regular “sweep” of all primary data sources” (perhaps 2-
3 times per hour). 
• Identify any recordkeeping requirements (equipment out of order, report on data feeds, etc.) 
• Establish a procedure for temporary replacement/substitution of duty personnel (e.g., sick 
days). 
• Establish a procedure for off-site monitoring of data feeds (if applicable). 





Off-duty personnel may be called in to provide support at the HIH in the event a warning message has 














When reporting an event of interest (EOI) an authorized user may request the HIH Executive to issue 
an Urgent Priority warning message when one or more of the following threat conditions are present: 
 
 The life or safety of groups, communities or villages is at immediate risk. 
 The danger to the community is impending and widespread. 
 The potential impact to the community is catastrophic. 
Local first responders needs to be informed of critical, life saving information and be advised to 
activate their local response plans. 
 
The following table contains recommended CAP values for <urgency>, <severity>, and <certainty> 
elements in an urgent priority message. 
 
Table 16 CAP values for an urgent priority message 
CAP <info> element Value (recommended) Interpretation 
Urgency “Immediate” or “Expected” Immediate responsive action 
should be taken 
Severity “Extreme” or “severe” Hazard presents an 
extraordinary threat to life or 
property 
Certainty “Observed” or “likely” The hazard event has occurred 
or is ongoing (or, > 50%). 
 
 
Alternately, an authorized user may request the HIH Executive to issue a High Priority warning 
message when one or more of the following threat conditions are present: 
 
• The life or safety of communities or villages is possibly at risk. 
• Neighboring communities or villages have been issued an urgent priority warning. 
• Residents of the community may see/hear/smell (detect) signs of the hazard and may perceive a 
danger or health risk. 
• Local first responders need to be informed of the hazard situation to provide information to 
community members. 
• Local first responders must be advised to standby to activate their local response plans. 
 
The following table contains recommended CAP values for <urgency>, <severity>, and <certainty> 









Table 17 CAP values for a high priority message 
CAP <info> element Value (recommended) Interpretation 
Urgency “Expected” or “Future” or 
“Unknown” 
Responsive action might need 
to be taken in near future. 
Severity “Severe” or “Moderate” or 
“Unknown” 
Hazard presents a significant 
threat to life or property. 
Certainty “Observed” or “Likely” The hazard event has occurred 
or is ongoing (or, > 50%). 
 
An authorized user may request the HIH Executive to issue a Low Priority warning message when 
one or more of the following conditions are present: 
 
• The life or safety of a community might be at risk due to a developing hazard. 
• A neighboring community has been issued a high priority warning. 
• Residents of the community may see/hear/smell (detect) signs of a hazard or nearby response 
effort and may be curious. 
• Local first responders need to be informed of the hazard situation to provide information to 
community members. 
• Local first responders must be advised to standby for further information. 
 
The following table contains recommended CAP values for <urgency>, <severity>, and <certainty> 
elements in a low priority message. 
 
 
Table 18 CAP values for a low priority message 
CAP <info> element Value (recommended) Interpretation 
Urgency “Future” or “Unknown” Responsive action might need 
to be taken in near future. 
Severity “Moderate” or “Minor” Hazard presents a minimal 
threat to life or property. 
Certainty “Possible” or “Unknown” The hazard event is possible 





To minimize error and to maintain consistency, authorized users are to compose warning messages 
using the standard format and procedure established at the HIH. 
 
All messages issued over the LM-HWS will be compliant with Common Alerting Protocol (CAP 
version 1.1), as specified in the OASIS Open Source Standards document.12
                                                 
12 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/14759/emergency-CAPv1.1.pdf 
 





CAP standard specifies that alert messages are composed of an <alert> segment with may contain one 
or more <info> segments, each of which may contain one or more <area> segments.   
 
Warnings issued by the LM-HWS will be multilingual (Tamil, Sinhalese, and English) and may 
contain multiple area segments.   
 
The following diagram shows a recommended structure for CAP-compliant multilingual messages to 
be issued by the LM-HWS.  Each <alert> will include three <info> segments providing identical 
information in Tamil (ta), Sinhalese (si) and English (en).  Each of the three info segments will contain 












































Figure 41 CAP message structure for LM-HWS 
 
 
To ensure CAP compliance, all messages should be composed using the CAP interface tool, with the 








Table 19 CAP <alert> sub-elements 
<Alert> sub-element Description Implementation remarks 
<incidents> Unique identifier of the EOI  This is assigned prior to 
decision to issue warning and 
is a common referent for all 
messages issued with respect 
to the same EOI. 
 
<identifier> A unique identifier of the 
message. 
Each message has a unique 
identifier, but different 
messages can refer to the same 
<incidents> reference.  
Automatically assigned by the 
CAP software 
 
<sender> Identifies the originator of this 
message.   
Should specify HIH as 
organization and the 
Authorized User that issued 
the message.  Assigned 
automatically based on the log-
in ID of the Authorized User. 
 
<sent> Date and time the message was 
transmitted. 
Automatically assigned by the 
CAP software at the moment 
the message is transmitted. 
 
<status> Code that denotes appropriate 
handling of the message. 
See the section on “Message 
Status” for further details. 
 
<msgType> Code that denotes the nature of 
the message 
See the section on “Message 
Type” for further details. 
 
<scope> Code that denotes the intended 
distribution of the message. 
See the section on “Message 
Scope” for further details. 





Table 20 CAP <info> sub-elements 
<Info> sub-element Description Implementation remarks 
<language> Code that denotes the 
language of the info sub-
element of the message 
Two digit ISO 639-2 codes are 
used to specify language of the 
message: ta/si/en 
<category> Code that denotes the category 
of the event referred to by the 
message. 
 
See the section on “Message 
Category” for further details. 
<event> Text that denotes the type of 
event. 
 
See the section on “Message 
Event” for further details. 
<urgency> Code that denotes the time to 
impact of the event. 
 
See the section “Message 
Priority” for further details. 
<severity> Codes that denotes the scale of 
impact of the event. 
 
See the section “Message 
Priority” for further details. 
<certainty> Code that denotes the 
probability of the event. 
See the section “Message 
Priority” for further details. 
<description> Text to describe the subject of 
the event. 
To be used primarily for 
relaying complete text of 
government warnings within a 
CAP message.  Event element 
should be “Government 
warning.” 
 
Table 21 CAP <resource> sub-element 
<Resource> 
sub-element 
Description Implementation remarks 
<resourceDesc> Text that describes the type 
and content of a resource 
attached to the message such as 
an audio or image file. 
See the section “Message 




Table 22 CAP <area> sub-element 
<Area> sub-element Description  Implementation remarks 
<areaDesc> Text that describes the affected 
area of the alert message. 
See the section “Area 










CAP has a required sub-element <status> to specify the appropriate handling of an alert message.  The 
CAP standard specifies several values for this sub-element, and the following table describes the 
recommended implementation for the LM-HWS. 
 
Table 23 CAP message <status> values 
Value Implementation remarks 
“Actual” To be used when the message refers to a real event and when all 
recipients are to take action. 
 
“Exercise” To be used when the message is transmitted as part of a scheduled or 
unscheduled exercise.  An exercise identifier could be added to the 
optional <note> sub-element in the CAP message. 
 
“System” Not to be used for LM-HWS. 
 
“Test” To be used when testing internal technical parameters of the system.  
Recipients are to disregard the message.  Messages that specify “test” in 
the <status> element should not be relayed to local first responders.  
Software filters should be designed to recognize these messages as such 
and to prevent them from being relayed to local first responders. 
 
“Draft” Refers to templates that can be stored on a HIH database to expedite 
message composition.  Software filters at the HIH should be designed to 
prevent the transmission of messages that specify “Draft” in the <status> 
element. 
 






CAP has a required sub-element <msgType> to specify the nature of an alert message.  The CAP 
standard specifies several values for this sub-element, and the following table describes the 
recommended implementation for the LM-HWS. 
 
Table 24 CAP message <type> values 
Value Implementation remarks 
“Alert” To be used for initial information only.   
“Update” To be used to indicate new information.  The message content of an 
update supersedes that of earlier messages. 
“Cancel” To be used to cancel earlier messages. 
“Ack” Not to be used for LM-HWS. 
“Error” Not to be used for LM-HWS. 
 
Updates and cancellations can specify earlier messages identified in <references> if this optional sub-
element is implemented in the system. 
 
The sub-element <references> provides a place for an extended message identifier (in the form sender, 
identifier, sent) to specify earlier messages that might be issued with respect to an EOI. 
 
For example, if a tsunami event were to trigger a low priority message for one region and a high 
priority message for another region, the <references> sub-element can refer to the extended identifier 





CAP has a required sub-element <scope> to denote the distribution of an alert message.  The CAP 
standard specifies several values for this sub-element but because the LM-HWS is a closed network 
only the “Restricted” value should be implemented. 
 
Table 25 CAP message <scope> values 
Value Implementation remarks 
“Public” Not to be used. 
“Restricted” To be used to specify a closed user group of recipients.  Designated local 
first responders represent this closed user group. 
“Private” Not to be used. 
 
In future, if the LM-HWS becomes integrated with larger systems, the optional <restriction> sub-
element can provide addressability to distinguish between different user groups within the network. 
 






CAP has a required sub-element <category> to denote the category of the subject event of an alert 
message.  The CAP standard specifies several values for this sub-element, and the following table 
describes the recommended implementation for the LM-HWS. 
 
Table 26 CAP message <category> values 
Value Implementation remarks 
“Geo” To be used for geophysical hazard events, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
landslides. 
“Met” To be used for weather hazard events, such as cyclones, flash floods, 
lightning. 
“Safety” To be used for general emergency and public safety. 
“Security” To be used for civil disturbances. 
“Rescue” Not to be used. 
“Fire” To be used for fire hazard events. 
“Health” To be used for medical or health hazard events (e.g., disease outbreak, 
water contamination). 
“Env” To be used for pollution or other environmental hazard events (e.g., air 
quality). 
“Transport” Not to be used. 
“Infra” To be used for infrastructure hazard events (e.g., dam failure). 
“CBRNE” Not to be used. 
“Other” To be used for other events. 
 
The CAP standard specifies that multiple instances may occur within a single <info> block, which 
means that several values may be used to classify an event. 
 
It is not clear at this point in time as to how important this sub-element will be for the LM-HWS or for 
information management at the HIH.  However, it is strongly recommended that a value for the sub-





CAP has a required sub-element <event> to denote the subject event of an alert message.  The CAP 
standard does not specify values for this sub-element but the following list provides basic terminology 
for naming events and suggested <category> for each, including a special event for government 
warnings.   
 
Table 27 CAP message <event> values 
Event Category 
Boil water warning Health 
Child abduction Other 
Civil danger Security 




Coastal flood Met 
Contagious disease outbreak Health 
Dam break Infra 
Cyclone Met 
Earthquake Geo 
Flash flood Met 
Flood Met 
Food contamination warning Health 
Government warning Other 
Hazardous materials warning Env 
High wind Met 
Landslide Geo 
Missing person Other 
Power outage Infra 
Problem animal Other 
Special weather statement Met 
Severe thunderstorm Met 
Tornado Met 





This list is not intended to be exhaustive.  For the sake of consistency and clarity, the HIH should 
ensure a reasonable degree of standardization for naming of events. 
 
The event “Government warning” should be used when relaying messages from the government of Sri 
Lanka, with the full text of the warning included in the <description> element of the CAP message. 
 
 
Message Attachments (Resource) 
 
CAP has a required sub-element <resourceDesc> to refer to additional file(s) with supplemental 
information related to the <info> element, such as an audio or image file.  Multiple occurrences are 
permitted in CAP (version 1.1). 
 
 Messages composed at the HIH will include audio files recorded in Tamil, Sinhalese and English.  
Audio files will be used principally for the satellite radio component of the network but could be used 
for telephone or other devices if necessary. 
 
Either of two methods for creating the audio files can be employed: 
 
 A staff member at the HIH composes three audio versions of the message (Tamil, Sinhalese, and 
English) and then reads them into a voice-recording device and saving them as one or more digital 
files. 





 An application automatically converts the CAP message into three audio versions (English, 
Sinhalese, Tamil) using text-to-voice software, saving them as one or more digital files. 
 
Audio messages will include certain elements set out in the CAP message, effectively matching the 
text version of any warning message issued by the HIH.  Certain CAP sub-elements may not be 
relevant for audio versions. 
 
How the CAP elements will be scripted may vary depending on which method is used to record the 
audio files.  The following is one example of a script for an urgent priority tsunami warning that is 
integrated with some of the CAP required elements. 
 
It is important to note that some of these elements may not translate easily using text-to-voice software 






Your attention please!  This is an activation of the Sarvodaya Hazard Warning System.  The following 
emergency <msgType>alert</msgType> may affect your village.  This is an 
<status>actual</status>event. Listen carefully and prepare to take appropriate action based on your 
village’s response plan. 
 
Message content: 
At <sent>0800hrs local time on July 1, 2006</sent> the <sender>Sarvodaya Disaster Management 
Centre </sender> has been informed of a large magnitude earthquake off the coast of Indonesia.  This 
event is <certainty>likely</certainty> to produce a <event>tsunami</event> and presents an 
<urgency>immediate</urgency> and <severity>extreme</severity> risk for the <areaDesc>village of 
Gurathwa and the Galle District</areaDesc>.  
 
To repeat: an <urgency>immediate</urgency> <event>tsunami</event> 




This message was issued by the Sarvodaya Hazard Warning System. If your area is affected, it is 
important that you take appropriate action based on your local response plan.  Listen to local radio or 
television for further updates. 
   
Figure 42 Sample script based on CAP elements 
 
Further discussion will need to take place before message scripting, formatting of the audio files, and 
transport options for the <resource> element can be finalized. 
 




A key concern is whether the resource file is to be included in the CAP message itself <derefUri> or 
whether it will reside on a server for subsequent retrieval <uri>.  See CAP standard, section 3.2.3 <uri> 





To the fullest extent possible, messages issued by the HIH should clearly specify the area of impact 
and CAP has a required sub-element <areaDesc> for this purpose.   
 
For the purpose of the first phase of the LM-HWS this sub-element will be defined according to the 
selected districts and villages participating in the pilot study. 
 
Geographical specificity is particularly important when multiple areas may have differing levels of 
priority. Therefore multiple messages should be issued by the HIH when it is determined that the event 
could have a range of severity values.  For example, villages in the direct path of a hazard event may 
receive urgent priority messages, while neighboring communities are issued high or low priority 
messages. 
 
The table on the following page specifies Districts and Villages  to be used in specifying the 
<areaDesc> sub-element for the first phase of the LM-HWS. 
 
Messages may be directed to an entire district (e.g., “Ampara District”) or to a specific village within a 
district (e.g., “Ampara, Panama North”).  
 
Further geocoding of CAP messages is possible with the <polygon> <circle> and <geocode> sub-
elements.  The HIH will need to determine if this method is to be implemented in the LM-HWS. 
 
Table 28 message <areaDesc> values 
District Village 
Ampara [District] 
Ampara Abeyasinghe Pura 

























Kalmunai Kalmunai II 
Kalmunai Oluville 











Matara Mirissa South 
Matara Thallala South 







Having composed the message, the HIH staff member then issues a warning by transmitting that 
message over the LM-HWS.  Software located at the HIH converts the CAP elements into suitable 
transport formats and relays them to the appropriate gateways. 
 
In the event of a known failure in transmission, the HIH staff member is to attempt to reach the 
affected areas by alternate means.  A list of alternate telephone numbers should be maintained at the 
HIH for this purpose. 
 
In some cases, the HIH staff member may need to contact the first responder in a neighboring village 












During an incident the danger level to local villages may change over time.  If the danger level begins 
to increase in any of the following circumstances, additional messages should be issued only after the 
HIH executive has provided authorization to do so: 
 
• A potential secondary impact to the first event creates new hazards to the affected area or to 
neighboring villages. 
• If new information comes to light that suggests the situation is more certain, severe, or urgent 
than initially indicated in a previous message. 





It is not recommended that the LM-HWS send “all-clear” messages over the system to the local first 
responders.  Instead, local first responders in consultation with Sarvodaya should develop a local 





Having successfully issued the message, the authorized user will then immediately contact the HIH 
Coordinator to confirm the activation and to request further instructions. 
 
The HIH Coordinator will in turn contact the HIH Executive and provide them with a situation report.  
The HIH Coordinator will also determine if support staff will be needed to handle follow-up activities. 
 
The Authorized User is required to complete an Activation Report following activation of the LM-
HWS.  The report is signed by the HIH Coordinator and submitted to the HIH Executive.  Details of 
the report should include the following: 
 
• Name of authorized user, position within the HIH 
• Name of person in the HIH Executive that authorized the activation. 
• Time and date of the activation. 
• Details of the activation, including all elements specified in the CAP messages issued (copies 
of the CAP messages should be attached to the report). 









26.6. Prohibited Practices 
 
There are situations when it is not appropriate to activate the LM-HWS.  The HIH Executive will 
ultimately decide on when to issue a warning message but a number of principles will generally be 
followed. 
 
The LM-HWS should not be used for: 
 
• Transmission of messages to the general public. 
• The transmission of “all clear” messages. 
• General information on disaster related services and response plans.  This is to be provided in 
response plans held and maintained by local first responders. 
• Any circumstance when life or safety is not threatened. 
 
A process for guarding against system misuse or abuse should be put in place at the HIH.  All cases of 
accidental activation or misuse must be reported immediately to the HIH Coordinator and to the HIH 
Executive. 
 
Effective training is the most important safeguard against misuse and abuse in the first instance.  
However, when dealing with a case of misuse by an authorized user, the HIH Coordinator should 
consider several options depending on the severity of the case: 
 
• Re-training without probation. 
• Re-training with probation. 
• Suspension of authorized user status. 





The LM-HWS must be tested on a regular basis.  The following table presents various testing modes 
and the CAP <status> values to be used in message composition. 
 
Table 29 CAP status for test categories 
Live Test Silent Test 
Closed simulation 






Internal HIH test 
(no messages 
















Live Tests may be scheduled or unscheduled.  It is recommended that all village-wide live tests be 
scheduled. 












The HIH Coordinator will submit a “head-end” report immediately following any test of the system.  
This report should include details of the test message, reliability of various elements of the system, 
problems encountered during the test, other observations. 
 
Local first responders, supported by Sarvodaya, should submit a “reception” report immediately 
following any Live Test of the system.  This report should include details of the test message (time 
received, message details, etc.), reliability of the reception device, problems encountered during the 
test, and other observations. 
 
Support partners (e.g., Dialog, WorldSpace) should be encouraged to submit an “interoperability” 
report following any Silent Test that involves their network.  This report should identify any problems 
encountered during the test or other relevant observations. 
 
It is recommended that the HIH Coordinator compile results of the head-end, reception, and system 
interoperability reports into a summary report and recommendations for submission to the HIH 
Executive within one week of any Live or Silent Test. 
 
 











HIH Support staff 
 










26.9. Annex B: Guidelines for documenting an EOI 
 
 Incident Identifier: must be compatible with CAP standard for <incident> element 
 Staff member ID: 
 Date observed:  dd/mm/yy 
 Time observed:  hh:mm (24hr, local time) 
 Event description: (see “Event” list if necessary) 
 Location of event: (country, region, ocean, etc.) 
 Information source: website, telephone call, etc.; include all details of the source 
 Estimated time of arrival (urgency):  Hours?  Minutes? 
 Estimated severity:  Extreme?  Severe?  Moderate?  Minor? Unknown? 
 Has the Sri Lanka government issued a warning for this event?  Yes/No/Unknown 
 If so, do you have a copy of the complete text of this warning? 
 Have any other governments issued a warning for this event? Yes/No/Unknown 
 If so, which governments? 
 Have you verified the information with a secondary source?  Yes/No 
 If yes, then indicate the source: 
 Time that the Executive was contacted:  hh:mm (24hr, local) 
 What are the instructions of the Executive? 
o Close the case 
o Remain vigilant 
o Obtain more information 
o Issue an alert 
 Details of the Executive’s instructions: 
 Time that a decision was taken:  hh:mm (24hr, local time) 
 
 
26.10. Annex C: Secondary sources for confirming Events of Interest 
 
This list must be kept up to date and should be reviewed regularly by the HIH Coordinator. 
 
Table 30 Contact database for confirming events 
Last Update:  
Event type Primary contact (name, 
organization, telephone) 

















































26.11. Annex D: Telephone “hotline” number for contacting the HIH 
 
The following number is to be made available to local first responders and other organizations at the 
discretion of the HIH Coordinator. 
 
The intent of the “hotline” is to provide a telephone link to the HIH for providing advance notice of a 
hazard event or for other emergency purposes. 
 
HIH hotline:  +94 (x)xxx xxx xxx 
 




26.12. Annex F: CAP alert message example 
 
The following is a speculative example of an urgent priority tsunami warning issued using the LM-
HWS CAP profile in the form of an XML message. 
 
 
<?xml version = “1.0” encoding = “UTF-8”?> 
<alert xmlns = “urn:oasis:names:tc:emergency:cap:1.1”> 
    <incidents>120321072006</incidents> 
    <identifier>HIH0001</identifier> 
   <sender>nwaidyanatha@hih.sarvodaya.org</sender> 
   <sent>2006-07-21T13:40:01+05:30</sent> 
   <status>Actual</status> 
   <msgType>Alert</msgType> 
   <scope>Restricted</scope> 
   <info> 
       <language>en</language> 
       <category>Geo</category> 
       <event>Tsunami</event> 
       <urgency>Immediate</urgency> 
       <severity>Extreme</severity> 
       <certainty>Observed</certainty> 
        <description>A large magnitude earthquake off the east coast of Indonesia occurred at 12:00hrs 
local time generating a tsunami wave that is expected to reach the coast of Sri Lanka by 13:30hrs local 
time.  The tsunami wave presents an immediate and extreme hazard to all coastal regions of Sri 
Lanka</description> 
        <resource> 
             <resourceDesc>audio file (mpg)</resourceDesc> 
              <uri>http://www.hih.sarvodaya.org/getalertaudio_en</uri> 
         </resource> 
         <area> 
              <areaDesc>All coastal regions of Sri Lanka</areaDesc> 
         </area> 












27. TECHNICAL ANNEX 16: TRAINING – HAZARDS 
 
Goal (Session 1) 
 
To impart an understanding of the concepts of hazards, multiple hazards and disaster and to develop 




 After completing this session, the participant will be able to perform a hazard identification and 




Participant will learn to -- 
 Distinguish between the concepts of hazard, hazard event, secondary hazards, multiple hazards 
and disaster      
 Classify and describe types of hazards     
 Explain hazard characteristics such as magnitude, frequency, intensity and rate of onset and their 
importance     




27.1. Definition of Hazards 
 
Standards Australia (2000) defines a hazard as - ‘A source of potential harm or a situation with a 
potential to cause loss.’  
     
Another definition can be - A natural event that has the potential to cause harm or loss. A Hazard is a 
threat. A future source of danger. It has the potential to cause harm to -- 
  People - death, injury, disease and stress 
  Human activity – economic, educational etc. 
  Property - property damage, economic loss of  
  Environment - loss fauna and flora, pollution, loss of amenities.  
Some examples of hazards in Sri Lanka are cyclones, floods, landslides, droughts, tsunami and 









27.2. Hazard Events 
 
Environmental events become hazards once they threaten to affect society and/or the environment 
adversely. A physical event, such as a volcanic eruption, that does not affect human beings is a natural 
phenomenon but not a natural hazard. A natural phenomenon that occurs in a populated area is a 
hazardous event.  
 
A hazardous event that causes unacceptably large numbers of fatalities and/or overwhelming property 
damage is a natural disaster. In areas where there are no human interests, natural phenomena do not 
constitute hazards nor do they result in disasters.     
       
Magnitude is an important characteristic for analyzing hazards since only occurrences exceeding some 
defined level of magnitude are considered hazardous.  
 The level of harm is governed by  
 Magnitude of the hazard  
 Frequency of hazard or recurrence  
 Intensity at the impact point  
 
 
27.3. Multiple Hazards 
 
When more than one hazard event impacts the same area, there arises a multiple hazard situation. 
These different hazard events may occur at the same time or may be spaced out in time. The planning 
process in development areas does not usually include measures to reduce hazards, and as a 
consequence, natural disasters cause needless human suffering and economic losses. From the early 
stages, planners should assess natural hazards as they prepare investment projects and should promote 
ways of avoiding or mitigating damage caused by hazards. Adequate planning can minimize damage.  
 
 
27.4. The Return Period 
 
Majority of hazards have return periods on a human time-scale. Examples are five-year flood, fifty-
year flood and a hundred year flood. This reflects a statistical measure of how often a hazard event of a 
given magnitude and intensity will occur. The frequency is measured in terms of a hazard’s recurrence 
interval.  
 
For example, a recurrence interval of 100 years for a flood suggests that in any year, a flood of that 
magnitude has a 1% chance of occurring.  
 
Such extreme events have very low frequencies but very high magnitudes in terms of destructive 
capacity. This means that an event considered being a hundred year flood would cause severe damage 








27.5. Classification of Hazards 
       
Are hazards natural? 
 
There are many different ways of classifying hazards. One is to consider the extent to which hazards 
are natural. Natural hazards such as earthquakes or floods arise from purely natural processes in the 
environment. Quasi-natural hazards such as smog or desertification arise through the interaction of 
natural processes and human activities.  
 
Technological (or man-made) hazards such as the toxicity of pesticides to fauna, accidental release of 
chemicals or radiation from a nuclear plant. These arise directly as a result of human activities. 
 
A typology based on Hewitt and Burton (1971) would appear as follows. 
1. Atmospheric   Atmospheric 
  Single element   Combined elements/events  
    Excess rainfall     Hurricanes 
    Freezing rain (glaze)     ‘Glaze’ storms 
    Hail     Thunderstorms 
    Heavy snowfalls     Blizzards 
    High wind speeds     Tornadoes 
    Extreme temperatures     Heat/cold stress  
2. Hydrologic 3. Geologic 
    Floods – river and coastal   Mass-movement 
    Wave action     Landslides 
    Drought     Mudslides 
    Rapid glacier advance     Avalanches 
        Earthquake 
        Volcanic eruption 
        Rapid sediment movement 
4. Biologic 5. Technologic  
  Epidemic in humans   Transport accidents 
  Epidemic in plants   Industrial explosions and fires 
  Epidemic in animals   Accidental release of toxic  
  Locusts   chemicals 
      Nuclear accidents 
        Collapse of public buildings 
     
      
Natural hazards and human intervention 
 
Although humans can do little or nothing to change the incidence or intensity of most natural 
phenomena, they have an important role to play in ensuring that natural events are not converted into 
disasters by their own actions. It is important to understand that Human intervention can increase the 
frequency and severity of natural hazards.  




For example, when the toe of a landslide is removed to make room for a settlement, the earth can move 
again and bury the settlement.  
 
Human intervention may also cause natural hazards where none existed before. Volcanoes erupt 
periodically, but it is not until the rich soils formed on their eject are occupied by farms and human 
settlements that they are considered hazardous. 
 
Human intervention reduces the mitigating effect of natural ecosystems. Destruction of coral reefs, 
which removes the shore's first line of defense against ocean currents and storm surges, is a clear 
example of an intervention that diminishes the ability of an ecosystem to protect itself. An extreme 
case of destructive human intervention into an ecosystem is desertification, which, by its very 
definition, is a human-induced "natural" hazard. Quasi-natural and na-tech are terms used to denote 
such hybrids. 
 
If human activities can cause or aggravate the destructive effects of natural phenomena, they can also 
eliminate or reduce them. 
    
  
Controllable events vs. immutable events 
 
For some types of hazards the actual dimensions of the occurrence may be altered if appropriate 
measures are taken. For others, no known technology can effectively alter the occurrence itself. For 
example, construction of levees on both sides of a stream can reduce the extent of inundations, but 
nothing can moderate the ground shaking produced by an earthquake.      
 
 
27.6. More Hazard Terminology 
    
Secondary hazards  
 
These are hazards that follow as a result of other hazard events. Hazards secondary to an earthquake 
may be listed as follows to illustrate the concept. Primary hazard is the earthquake. Secondary hazards 
are 
 Building collapse 
 Dam failure  
 Fire  
 Hazardous material spill  
 Interruption of power/ water supply/ communication/ transportation/ waste disposal  
 Landslide  
 Soil liquefaction  
 Tsunami (tidal wave) 
 Water pollution  
     
   
      




Rate of onset  
 
Include rapid-onset and slower-acting (slow onset) natural hazards. 
 
The speed of onset of a hazard is an important variable since it conditions warning time. At one 
extreme, earthquake, landslides, and flash floods give virtually no warning. Less extreme are tsunamis, 
which typically have warning periods of minutes or hours, and hurricanes and floods, where the 
likelihood of occurrence is known for several hours or days in advance. Volcanoes can erupt suddenly 
and surprisingly, but usually give indications of an eruption weeks or months in advance. (Colombia's 
Volcán Ruiz gave warnings for more than a year before its destructive eruption in 1985.)  
 
Other hazards such as drought, desertification, and subsidence act slowly over a period of months or 
years. Hazards such as erosion/sedimentation have varying lead times: damage may occur suddenly as 
the result of a storm or may develop over many years.      
 
 
27.7. Hazard Identification and Assessment 
 
If you are living in an area exposed to multiple hazards, for each hazard, ask yourself the following 
questions and try to answer them. The answers are usually based on past experience of hazard events. 
They may be recorded or may be gathered through interviews. They could give you a reasonable 
indication of the threat posed by the hazard for the area you live in. 
 Could this hazard affect the area you live in? 
 Is this hazard a significant threat there? 
 How often does it pose a threat? E.g. Once every 5 years? 10 years? 
 What is a close estimate of the population size that could be affected by this hazard event? Give a 
rating. Very high? High? Medium? Low? 
 What is the expected duration of the hazard? 
 What is the expected damage from the hazard event? Give a rating. Very high? High? Medium? 
Low? 
 What is the expected intensity of impact expected? Give a rating.  
 Very high? High? Medium? Low? 
 How predictable is the threat? 
 Can the effect of the event be reduced? 
     
Hazard Assessment is sometimes called Hazard Evaluation or Hazard Analysis (UNDRO, 1991). 
There seems to be a lack of consistency in the use of this terminology.     
 
Hazard Assessment is the process of estimating, for defined areas, the probabilities of the occurrence 
of potentially-damaging phenomenon of given magnitude within a specified period of time. 
UNDRO   
        
Governments mostly carry out hazard reduction measures without much enthusiasm and within 
economic constraints. In order to compete for limited expenditure and resources hazard reduction 
proposals must find justification. This is facilitated by the collection of information about  




 Local hazards - Location & Probability  
 The extent to which they threaten local populations - Severity  
 Ease with which their effects can be averted - Manageability  
 
The severity of a natural hazard is quantified in terms of the magnitude of occurrence, which is an 
event parameter. It can also be done in terms of the effect of the occurrence at a particular location. 
This is called a site parameter. Both parameters may be combined in certain situations. Parameters for 
selected hazards are listed below. 
 
Table 31 Event and site parameters of selected Hazards 
Natural Hazard Event Parameter Site Parameter 
Cyclone Wind speed - km/h Area affected 
Earthquake Magnitude – Richter Scale Intensity –Modified Mercalli Scale 
Flood Area flooded – 
km2Volume of water – 
m3Speed 
Depth of flood water - meters 
Landslide Volume of material 
dislodged, Area affected 
Ground displacement - meters 
Tsunami Height of wave crest Depth of flood water 
Volcano Eruption size and duration Ash fall – meterLava flow - area 
     
        
Hazard assessment approaches 
 
The process of collecting this information is called hazard assessment. 
These studies rely heavily on  
 Available scientific information, including geologic, geomorphic, and soil maps; climate and 
hydrological data; and topographic maps, aerial photographs, and satellite imagery. 
 Historical information, both written reports and oral accounts from long-term residents. These 
may include myths and legends. 
 
For assessment of most natural phenomenon, one cannot expect complete data required to carry out a 
comprehensive assessment. Depending on the situation, various methods are used with obvious 
variations in the degree of accuracy.     
    
     
Quantitative approach 
 
Here mathematical functions are used to denote relationships between variable considered to quantify 
the hazard. Numerical data can be fed in to assess the impact of the hazard event. An example is the 
probable flood that a particular rainfall could cause within a watershed area. Flood dimensions such as 
depth of flood and area of inundation would depend on the volume of water that flows into the stream. 
Surface run-off, soil permeability, vegetation cover etc would determine this. The empirical data 
collected from historical records as well as theoretical data from basic principles of physics are used to 
derive the relationship between variables. The mathematical expression so derived could be used to 




forecast future events. However, quantitative assessment may not be possible for all hazard events.
     
        
Qualitative approach 
 
This method uses ranking such as ‘high’, ‘moderate’ and ‘low ‘to assess a hazard event. Where there is 
a lack of sufficient data for quantitative evaluation, or where certain variables cannot be expressed 





After identifying the hazards that affect the planning area and assessment of the impacts from those 
hazards, a probability analysis is undertaken. It provides an estimate of the probability of each hazard 
affecting an area or region. 
Probability for each hazard may be categorized as ‘high’, ‘moderate’ or ‘low’. 
Probability of occurrence can be calculated through research on past events.      
        
The Outcome 
 
The outcome is natural hazards information, which denotes the presence and effect of natural 
phenomena. Hazard assessment is the first step for hazard mitigation planning. It prioritizes hazards so 
that a community or a government may use discretion to plan and implement hazard mitigation action. 
This information should ideally include the location, severity, frequency, and probability of occurrence 
of a hazardous event. Location is the easiest for planners to find; the rest can often be obtained from 
sectoral agencies, natural hazard research and monitoring centers and integrated development planning 
studies.  
 
It could have information on natural ecosystems (e.g., slopes and slope stability, river flow capacity, 
vegetation cover), which provides the basis for estimating the effect natural hazards can have on these 
systems. Change in the ecosystem may create, modify, accelerate, and/or retard the occurrence of a 
natural event.  
 
Large-scale data describing lifeline infrastructure and human settlements for example, are critical 
elements for preparing vulnerability assessments and for initiating disaster preparedness and response 
activities.     
   
     
Hazard Mapping 
        
This is the process of establishing geographically where and to what extent particular phenomenon is 
likely to pose a threat to people, property, infrastructure and economic activities. -UNDRO 
   
        




Probability of hazard occurrence varies from place to place. The use of mapping to synthesize data on 
natural hazards and to combine these with socioeconomic data facilitates analysis. It improves 
communications among participants in the hazard management process and between planners and 
decision-makers. Two important techniques in use are  
 Multiple hazard mapping and  
 Critical facilities mapping  
     
        
Multiple Hazard Mapping (MHM) 
 
This is usually carried out with new development in mind. Valuable information on individual natural 
hazards in a study area may appear on maps with varying scales, coverage, and detail, but these maps 
are difficult to use in risk analyses due to the inability to conveniently overlay them on each other for 
study. Information from several of them can be combined in a single map to give a composite picture 
of the magnitude, frequency, and area of effect of all the natural hazards.  
 Regional scale hazard mapping uses 1:100,000 to 1:250,000. These are useful during planning 
stages of regional development. 
 Urban land use planners may need medium scale hazard maps of 1: 10,000 to 1:25,000. 
 Site investigation for infrastructure projects may require large-scale hazard maps of 1:1,000 to 
1:5,000. 
 The multiple hazard map (MHM; also called a composite, synthesis, or overlay map) is an 
excellent tool for fomenting an awareness of natural hazards and for analyzing vulnerability and 
risk, especially when combined with the mapping of critical facilities. Its benefits include the 
following:  
 Characteristics of the natural phenomena and their possible impacts can be synthesized from 
different sources and placed on a single map.  
 It can call attention to hazards that may trigger others (as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions trigger 
landslides) or exacerbate their effects.  
 A more precise view of the effects of natural phenomena on a particular area can be obtained. 
Common mitigation techniques can be recommended for the same portion of the study area.  
 Sub-areas requiring more information, additional assessments, or specific hazard-reduction 
techniques can be identified. 
 Land-use decisions can be based on all hazard considerations simultaneously. 
 
The use of a multiple hazard map also has several implications in emergency preparedness planning:  
 It provides a more equitable basis for allocating disaster-planning funds.  
 It stimulates the use of more efficient, integrated emergency preparedness response and recovery 
procedures.  
 It promotes the creation of cooperative agreements to involve all relevant agencies and interested 
groups. 
 
The base map upon which to place all the information is the first consideration. It is usually selected 
during the preliminary mission. If at all possible, it is best to use an existing map or controlled 
photograph rather than go through the difficult and time-consuming process of creating a base map 
from scratch.  




The scale used for an MHM depends on the hazard information to be shown, availability of funds and 
the scale of the base map. If a choice of scales is available, then the following factors should be 
considered:  
 Number of hazards to be shown. 
 Hazard elements to be shown 
 Range of relative severity of hazards to be shown. 
 Area to be covered. 
 Proposed uses of the map. 
 
Much hazard information will be in forms other than maps, and not readily understandable by laymen. 
It must be "translated" for planners and decision-makers and placed on maps. The information should 
explain how a hazard may adversely affect life, property, or socioeconomic activities, and must 
therefore include location, likelihood of occurrence (return period), and severity. If some of this 
information is missing, the planning team must decide whether it is feasible to fill the gaps.  
 
Development and investment decisions made in the absence of these data should be noted. Despite the 
importance of multiple hazard maps in the integrated development planning process, planners and 
decision-makers must remember that the credibility, accuracy, and content of an MHM are no better 
than the individual hazard information from which it was compiled. Furthermore, since it contains no 
new information - it is merely a clearer presentation of information previously compiled - the clarity 
and simplicity of the map is the key to its utility. 
 
        
Critical Facilities Mapping (CFM) 
 
This is carried out for development within existing infrastructure in mind. The term "critical facilities" 
means all man-made structures or other improvements whose function, size, service area, or 
uniqueness gives them the potential to cause serious bodily harm, extensive property damage, or 
disruption of vital socioeconomic activities if they are destroyed or damaged or if their services are 
repeatedly interrupted.  
 
The primary purpose of a critical facilities map (CFM) is to convey clearly and accurately to planners 
and decision-makers the location, capacity, and service area of critical facilities. An extensive number 
of such facilities can be presented at the same time. Also, when combined with a multiple hazard map, 
a CFM can show which areas require more information, which ones require different hazard reduction 
techniques, and which need immediate attention when a hazardous event occurs. Some of the benefits 
of a CFM are:  
 The uniqueness of service of facilities in the area (or lack of it) is made clear.  
 Facilities that may require upgrading and expansion are identified.  
 The impact of potential development on existing infrastructure can be assessed before a project is 
implemented.  
 Any need for more (or better) hazard assessment becomes apparent 
 
     
        
 




Combining critical facilities maps and multiple hazard maps  
 
There are many advantages in combining a CFM, with a MHM, and integrating both into the 
development planning process. For example, if a critical facility is found to be in a hazardous area, 
planners and decision-makers are alerted to the fact that in the future it may confront serious problems. 
Its equipment, use and condition can then be analyzed to evaluate its vulnerability.  
If appropriate techniques to reduce any vulnerability are incorporated into each stage of the planning 
process, social and economic disasters can be avoided or substantially lessened. Avoiding hazardous 
areas, designing for resistance, or operating with minimal exposure, can make new critical facilities 
less vulnerable.  
 
Mitigation strategies for existing critical facilities include relocation, strengthening, retrofitting, adding 
redundancy, revising operations, and adopting emergency preparedness, response, and recovery 
programs.  
 
The benefits obtained by combining a CFM and an MHM include:  
 Project planners and decision-makers are made aware of hazards to existing and proposed critical 
facilities prior to project implementation.  
 The extent to which new development can be affected by the failure or disruption of existing 
critical facilities as a consequence of a natural event can be determined.  
 More realistic benefit-cost ratios for new development are possible.  
 Sub-areas requiring different assessments, emergency preparedness, immediate recovery, or 
specific vulnerability reduction techniques can be identified. 
     
       
Mapping techniques and tools 
        
Community knowledge: - A simple mapping of local experience can be achieved using local 
knowledge. Tools used in rural development activities such as 
 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): can be very useful in this work. The method is cost effective and 
the outcome reflects the local perception of hazard. The information can overlay local contour maps.
     
        
Surveys on historic events: There may be reports compiled on historic events, which may focus on 
varying issues depending on its original purpose. However they may contain useful information.   
   
        
Scientific investigation and research: Usually carried out through teamwork with experts from an array 
of different disciplines. For example, landslide hazard mapping would require skills of geologists, geo-
technical engineers, geomorphologists, topography and so on. 
 
Data over large areas for extensive time periods are collected. These are multidisciplinary studies and 
each discipline would provide tools and techniques, which become more sophisticated and more 
accurate over time. 




Computer modeling using such data has opened up new vistas for hazard prediction. Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) modeling is one outstanding example. Remote sensing by satellite (RS) 
refers to the viewing of the earth’s surface using sensing devices fixed onto satellites in orbit. Such 
data have already proved useful in flood prediction in Bangladesh for example. The future holds 
promising prospects for this area of study.     
 
 
28. TECHNICAL ANNEX 17: TRAINING – VULNERABILITY AND RISK 
 
Goal (Session 2) 
 









 The participant will learn to      
 Distinguish between the concepts of vulnerability and risk      
 List and describe criteria that add to the vulnerability of a community      
 List and describe criteria that reduce the vulnerability      
 Name and explain the components in quantification of risk      





Vulnerability definition  
  
A set of prevailing and consequential conditions – physical, social, and attitudinal – which adversely 
affect the community’s ability to prevent, mitigate, prepare and respond to the impact of a hazard 
event. The predisposition to suffer damage due to external events. 
 
This definition is more focused on communities - Vulnerability is a condition or a predisposition. It 
applies to individuals, groups of individuals or communities, but it can be also used when referring to 
physical structures or the environment in general. Vulnerability is about Susceptibility and Resilience 
under threat of a hazard event. 
 
Susceptibility: Proximity and exposure to an event. It is the potential to incur harm or avoid loss. It is 
the fact of being exposed. You can be susceptible but not vulnerable. E.g. a landslide is threatening a 




house but the owners have built a wall to protect it and to divert the landslide. Susceptibility is easy to 
assess.  
 
Resilience: Access to resources and capacities which determine the ability to recover from the impacts 
of to a hazard event It is the ability to adjust and recover. E.g. the owners of the house threatened by a 
landslide have a second house in town. They reside there during the rainy season. One can be 
susceptible, but if he/she is resilient, one is not vulnerable. Resilience has many components: It implies 
access to resources, individual skills, beliefs, etc. Compared to susceptibility, it is more difficult to 
assess. E.g. Most Middle Eastern countries are in deserts. But their water supply system helps them not 
to be exposed to drought conditions in normal life. 
 
If susceptibility is very low and resilience very high, then one has minimum vulnerability. E.g. take a 
displaced population in an emergency settlement. Susceptibility to measles is very high. If all children 
are immunized however, resilience is high, and the vulnerability would be low. When Susceptibility is 
high and resilience very low, one has maximum vulnerability. If the children are not immunized, 






It is the state of being physically affected from a hazard. Researchers differentiate between voluntary 
and involuntary exposure to hazards. Examples of involuntary exposure include air pollution (as we 
must breathe ambient air), toxic contamination of food (as we must eat), and water pollution (as we 
have to drink). We do, on the other hand, have a greater choice over where we live and what activities 
we engage in (living in coastal or seismically active zones is to some extent voluntary; smoking and 





Those positive conditions or recourses which increase the ability of a community to deal with hazards. 
Capacity may be  
 Physical  
 Social/Organizational 
 Attitudinal/Motivational. 





Measures taken in anticipation of a disaster to ensure that appropriate and effective actions are taken in 
the aftermath of a hazard event. To enhance preparedness, people plan how to respond in case a hazard 
event occurs and work to increase the resources available to respond effectively. Preparedness 
activities are designed to help save lives and minimize damage by preparing people to respond 







Refer to actions taken immediately following the impact of a hazard event when exceptional measures 
are required to meet the basic needs of the survivors. –ADPC. It refers to the sum of all actions taken 
to adjust to hazards; more narrowly defined to mean the appropriate actions taken during an emergency 






Socio-economic indicators provide another dimension to view Vulnerability. The Indicator of Human 
Development (IDH) is synthesized by combining other indicators and gathers together 
 The adjusted GDP per capita 
 Life expectancy 
 Adult literacy. 
The assumption is that the lower the IDH, the lower will be the mean wealth, the literacy and the 
average health state of the population. This will increase the vulnerability to physical hazards. Poverty 
is one of the major vulnerability criteria. Poverty also has an effect on housing which constitute a 






When high to very high population densities (>200 hab/km2) are combined with unfavorable socio-








Risk is the likelihood or probability of a hazard event of a certain magnitude occurring. Risks are 
measures of the threat of hazards. Risk is the actual exposure of something of human value to a hazard. 
Often regarded as the product of probability and loss. Risk is the exposure or the chance of loss due to 
a particular hazard for a given area and reference period. It may be expressed mathematically as the 
probability that a hazard impact will occur multiplied by the consequences of that impact.  
 
(Note: Definitions of risk in the hazards literature vary from those that equate risk with probability to 
those that see risk as the product of a probability and a particular kind of impact occurring.)  
 




Risk and Hazard are two concepts that are different from each other. The ocean is a hazard (deep water 
and large waves). If one attempts to cross the ocean in a small rowboat, a great risk (probability of 
capsizing and drowning) is incurred. If the crossing is made aboard the Queen Elizabeth, (a large 
passenger ship) the risk is reduced – all else being equal. The ocean going vessel is a device used as a 
safeguard against the hazard. In general, risk may be diminished by increasing safeguards but never 
eliminated unless the hazard itself is removed. 
 
Consequence: The monetary and non-monetary "costs" or “losses” of a hazard event. This includes 
financial, economic, life safety, environmental, social, legal and other costs or losses. Its assessment 
may be made easier if the elements at risk are enumerated first.  
 
Elements at risk: Persons, buildings, property, crops, utilities, critical facilities, infrastructure, 
environment or societal components with a potential of being exposed to a hazard event and likely to 
be adversely affected by the hazard event.  
  
Elements at risk may be listed as follows: 
Table 32 Elements at risk 
Physical Infrastructure, Roads, Railway, Bridges, Harbor, Airport,   
Critical facilities Emergency shelters, Schools, Hospitals and Nursing Homes, Fire Brigades, 
Police,  
Utilities Power supply, Water supply, Transport, Communication, Government services 
Economic Business and trade activities, Access to work, Impact on work force, Opportunity 
cost 
Societal Vulnerable age categories, Low income group people, Gender 





Quantification of risk: There are three essential components to the quantification of risk after 
identification of local hazards. 
 
Table 33 Parameters for quantifying risk 
Hazard occurrence probability (p) the probability of occurrence of a specified natural hazard at a 
specified severity level in a specified future time period.  
Elements at risk an inventory of those people or things, which are exposed to the 
hazard. 
Expected loss (L)  the degree of loss to each element, should a hazard of a given 
severity occur. Its accuracy and acceptability will depend on the 
methodology used to derive it. 
 
Disaster losses include the direct impacts like the loss of life, housing and infrastructure as well as 
indirect impacts on production in utility services, transport, labor supplies, suppliers and markets. 
Secondary losses include impacts on macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, balance of 
payments, public spending and inflation. The impacts are felt more by developing countries. 





In 1977, a cyclone struck the Andrah Pradesh. The following loss figures were estimated for the East 
Godavari District – Houses destroyed 2,89,906, Houses damaged 89,677, TOTAL 3,79,583, Persons 
rendered homeless 1.442 million. 
 
If measures were taken to strengthen houses by retrofitting, the loss would have been reduced as 
follows –Houses destroyed Nil, Houses damaged 1,36,489, Persons rendered homeless 0.519 million. 
The economic benefit is estimated to be Rs. 91 crores.  
 
It is advisable that, if a hazard event does occur, that a post-audit be carried out so that one may match 
the ‘actual’ Vs the ‘expected’. This would give more understanding on deficiencies of the Risk 
Assessment carried out and help to improve the process next time around. 
  
Note: The probability of occurrence of natural hazards events may be estimated by statistical 
extrapolation from historical data. The accuracy of such estimates depends on the completeness of data 
and the period of time over which it has been collected.  
Losses are measured differently for different hazards, by different agencies, and by different users. 
Most loss data are dollar estimates, but some dollar estimates are for specific agencies or only one 
level of government. The estimates could show variability as well as considerable uncertainties and is 





It is the overall process of identifying and analyzing risks. The process of characterizing hazards 
within risk areas, analyzing them for their potential mishap consequences and probabilities of 
occurrence, and combining the two estimates to reach a risk rating. 
 
Experts on behalf of others carry out assessment of the risk parameters. 
Risk Assessment provides a sound basis for mitigation planning and for allocation of funds and other 
resources.  
  
Some use the term Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) to express Risk. 
  
It is the process of evaluating risk associated with a specific hazard and defined in terms of probability 
and frequency of occurrence, magnitude and severity, exposure and consequences. 
 
Frequency vs. Severity: Where flooding occurs every year or every few years, the hazard becomes part 
of the landscape, and projects are sited and designed with this constraint in mind. Conversely, in an 
area where a tsunami may strike any time in the next 50 or 100 years, it is difficult to stimulate interest 
in vulnerability reduction measures even though the damage may be catastrophic. With so long a time 
horizon, investment in capital-intensive measures may not be economically viable. Rare or low-
probability events of great severity are the most difficult to mitigate, and vulnerability reduction may 
demand risk-aversion measures beyond those justified by economic analysis.  
Here, severity means the event’s duration and impact area. 
 




There are many methodologies for Risk Assessment from High Tech computer-based methods to 
pencil pushing and head scratching. Computer-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS) modeling 
use many different kinds of information to assess risk. However it needs sophisticated hardware, 
software and expertise of handling them. 
  
Risk matrix: A simpler method is the Risk Matrix Analysis. The method gives a qualitative measure 
that permits the prioritization of risk among multiple hazards. It enables hazard mitigation planners to 
classify various types of hazards into different categories of priority by locating them on a two-
dimensional grid based on their probability and loss. The ranking of ‘high’, ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ is 
subjective and would vary from one group to another. The ranking depends on Probability of a hazard 
event and Potential loss. 
  
 










Table 34 Guidelines to do a matrix analysis 
Probability High Events that occur more 
frequently than once in 10 years 
Moderate 
 
Events that occur from once in 
10 years to once in 100 years 
Low 
 
Events that occur from once in 
100 years to once in 1000 years 
Very Low Events that occur less frequently 
than once in 1000 years 
Loss 
 
Based on the potential by taking 
into account elements at risk 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Impact on facilities, critical 






The criteria used for class categorization is also subjective. What has been given below merely 
illustrates the type of criteria that countries may adopt to facilitate the process. 
  
Table 35 Risk categorization by class 







may be over 
100,000 Complete 
shut down of 
facilities and 
critical services 
for more than 14 
days. Over 50% of 
property located in 
the area may be 
damaged 
Class B Moderate to high-
risk condition 









less than 1000 
People affected 
may be between 
50,000 to 100,000 
Complete shut 
down of facilities 
and critical 
services for 7 
days25% of the 
property located in 
the area may be 
damaged 
Class C Low risk  Possibility of People affected 








and planning may 
be necessary after 
cost-benefit 
analysis 
death low between 10,000 
and 
50,000Complete 
shut down of 
facilities not more 
than 1 day. About 
10% of the 
property located in 
the area may be 
damaged. 




 No possibility of 
death 
People affected 
less than 10,000 
Facilities and 
critical services 
may not be 
affected. About 
1% of the property 
located in the area 
may be damaged 
 
Risk as a function of hazard, loss and preparedness. According to Fournier d’Albe (1979), risk may be 
conceptualized as follows: 
    








 Attitudinal/motivational aspects. 
 
Thus their quantification cannot be discrete. It is advisable therefore, not to treat this conceptualization 
as a mathematical entity because of the emotive aspects that are inclusive in “preparedness”. It is wiser 
to consider that disaster risk is a function of preparedness/capacity/manageability. 
 
Greater the hazard probability, greater the risk. 
Greater the loss, greater the risk. 
Greater the preparedness or capacity of a community, lesser the risk. 
(Capacity and Risk show an inversely proportional relationship) 
 
Risk = function (hazard, loss, preparedness)  
 
Preparedness has an inverse relationship to risk. 
 





29. TECHNICAL ANNEX 18: TRAINING – DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
 
Goal (Session 3) 
To instill an understanding of the disaster management process      
 
Learning outcomes 
After completing this session, the participant  will be able to -- 
 Affirm the usefulness of integrating management principles in disaster mitigation work      
 Distinguish between the different approaches needed to manage pre- during and post- disaster 
periods  
 Explain the process of risk management      
      
Learning objectives 
Participant will learn to -- 
 Distinguish between disaster management and risk management     
 Explain the disaster management  Cycle    
 Describe the strategies for risk mitigation      
 List activities needed for post-disaster management 
 
 
 What is Management? 
 
Management consists of decision-making activities undertaken by one or more individuals to direct 
and coordinate the activities of other people in order to achieve results, which could not be 
accomplished by any one person acting alone. 
Management is required when two or more persons combine their efforts and resources to accomplish 
a goal, which neither can accomplish alone.   
  
 
29.1.  Disaster Management 
 
What is disaster management? 
 
Disaster management can be defined as the effective organization, direction and utilization of 
available counter-disaster resources. 
 
Disaster management includes administrative decisions and operational activities that involve – 
Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery and Rehabilitation. 
   
Disaster management involves all levels of government. Non-governmental and community-based 
organizations play a vital role in the process.  
Modern disaster management goes beyond post-disaster assistance. It now includes pre-disaster 
planning and preparedness activities, organizational planning, training, information management, 
public relations and many other fields. Crisis management is important but is only a part of the 




responsibility of a disaster manager. The newer paradigm is the Total Risk Management (TRM) which 
takes a holistic approach to risk reduction.  
    
The traditional approach was to provide immediate humanitarian aid (usually rescue teams, materials 
and medical services) as quickly as possible after the onset of a disaster. There has been a paradigm 
shift over the last decade.  
The modern view is that there must be pre-disaster mitigation measures to avoid or reduce impact of 
disasters. Pre-disaster measures to prevent or mitigate disasters are called Risk Management.   
  
 
Disaster management cycle 
  
The traditional approach to disaster management has been to regard it as a number of phased sequences 
of action or a continuum. These can be represented as a cycle.  
  
  
Figure 44 Diagram of the Disaster Management Cycle 
   
  
In this model, disaster management occurs in stages, in sequence. The focus is more on activities 
immediately before and after the onset of the disaster event.  
Mitigation and preparedness precede a disaster. Pre-disaster management is called Risk Management.
  
  
29.2.  Risk Management 
    
The process, by which assessed risks are mitigated, minimized or controlled through engineering, 
management or operational means. This involves the optimal allocation of available resources in 
support of group goals. 




    
Risk identification has already been discussed. It is usual to allocate risk management to a special body 
at national level. Usually it is a National Disaster Management Organization (NDMO). At local level it 
may be the responsibility of a Disaster Mitigation Committee, which administers risk management. 
This varies in different countries depending on administrative patterns and needs.   
  
 
Risk reduction  
 
Effective risk reduction involves mitigation measures in hazard prone areas. It may also involve 
overcoming the socioeconomic, institutional and political barriers to the adoption of effective risk 




Measures taken prior to the impact of a hazard event to minimize its effects (which may be structural 
and non-structural). The following non-structural and structural means may be listed (Carter, 1991) 
   
Non-structural mitigation 
 
Legal framework - Examples are building codes for built structures to withstand impact such as 
cyclones or earthquakes etc. 
   
Land-use planning - Controlling human activities in hazard prone areas (zoning) to avoid fatalities and 
loss. This may involve re-location of communities to safer locations. It may be achieved by passing 
legal statues, E.g. Ordinances. 
   
Incentives - Often provide better inducements for mitigation than legal impositions. Government grants 
or subsidies may help to persuade commercial and other institutions to include mitigation measures in 
their building and reconstruction. Insurance companies may be persuaded to offer reduced premiums 
for buildings that incorporate hazard resistant measures. 
   
Training and Education - Provide awareness and know-how to those government officials involved in 
disaster management, construction experts, craftsmen, land use planners and the general public. 
  
Public Awareness - This is necessary to ensure: a good public knowledge and understanding of natural 
hazards and vulnerabilities, awareness of effective mitigation measures, public participation in 
community preparedness programs. 
 
Institution building - This is the strengthening of national or community social structure. This can work 
through; Identifying and strengthening organizations that serve as coping mechanisms: by increasing 
capacity and skills to face a crisis. Increasing the number of coping mechanisms within a country or 
community and by linking them to outside resources and Encouraging actions that promote 
cooperation among different groups within society.  




 Structural mitigation 
 
Engineered structures - These involve architects and engineers during the planning, designing and 
construction phases. The application of sound technical principles is achieved through  
 Site planning 
 Assessment of forces created by natural hazards 
 Planning and analysis of structural measures to resist such forces 
 Design and proper detailing of structural components 
 Construction with suitable material 
 Good workmanship under adequate supervision 
   
Most countries have building codes for engineered construction.   
 
Non engineered structures - These are constructions by owners using local masons and carpenters who 
lack formal training. The design may be improved according to traditional ways. Their location on 
hazard prone areas may be controlled. 
   
The mitigation plan 
   
The disaster mitigation committee should ‘brainstorm’ on all possible measures that might help to 
reduce risk. The alternatives should be weighed and the more acceptable ones selected which are 
appropriate to satisfy community needs. Then a plan must be formulated to facilitate the 
implementation of the selected risk reduction measures.   
 
 
29.3.  Prevention 
  
Prevention is more applicable to man-made and technological disasters. Stringent safety precautions 
through technological innovation can bring these about. Natural hazard events cannot be prevented. 
But if the vulnerability of the community is reduced, one can prevent the hazard event becoming a 
disaster. The government departments or municipalities can prevent disaster impact by conducting 
selected mitigation activities before a disaster strikes. 
 
A dam could control floodwater. Controlled burning of fire belts could prevent the spread of a wild 
fire. Stringent building code imposition can reduce collapse of buildings during an earthquake. Proper 
socio-economic development and active ownership and participation of communities in the disaster 
management continuum and the development of adequate warning systems where applicable, can also 
bring positive results. 
 
 
29.4. Crisis Management 
   
Crisis management applies to emergency operations and covers Preparedness and Immediate post-
disaster period. To avoid confusion during the emergency period immediately after the disaster strikes, 
disaster management places heavy emphasis on advance planning. This is called disaster preparedness.





A variety of different management systems have evolved to respond to different types of disasters. 
Most agencies borrowed military and or business organizational models to mange disasters. These used 
a pyramidal hierarchy of upper-level managers, middle managers and field managers. The upper-level 
and middle managers dealt with managing the organization and facilitating field operations. The field 
manager was responsible for development of programs that directly assisted people of the disaster 
impact area. 
 
Recently, new management models have appeared which emphasize community participation in 
decision-making and response. 
 
 
29.5. Response and Relief 
   
If a disaster occurs, response and relief have to take place immediately. Rescue of affected people, 
distribution of basic supplies such as food water, clothing, shelter and medical care become urgent 
need of the hour. Delays will occur if government departments and municipalities have no clear plans 
to manage such events. It is therefore important to have plans in place.  
 
Take a simple example. A flood has occurred in a mountainous area and there is very strong wind and 
continuous heavy rain. The possibility of landslides is real. Members of the public are panicking and 
the mayor is under pressure to take emergency action  
 
A well-managed team of government and local players should be prepared and know where to go, 
what to do. If the situation is managed in an ad-hoc way, the affected people will rush off in all 
directions, waste valuable time, and even make serious mistakes with fatal consequences. 
 
Search and rescue plans need to be clear and all role players need to know their role and functions in 
such activities. Basic needs such as emergency shelter, water, food, and medical care have to be 
provided. A plan must be in place. 
 
 
29.6. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
   
The rehabilitation period involves the weeks and months after the disaster. The focus is to enable the 
area to start functioning again. This involves debris removal, restoration of public services and 
provision of temporary housing. Reconstruction is a much longer-term activity. This phase involves 
permanent rebuilding, improved infrastructure and better disaster planning. Both rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phases demand good management. Diversion of national and international aid 
prudently, prioritization of activities, proper coordination and monitoring as well as prevention of 
corruption and abuse of scarce funds become priorities.  




30. TECHNICAL ANNEX 19: TRAINING – PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL TOOLS 
 
Goal (Session 4) 
 
To impart knowledge and skill to use tools for participatory appraisal of hazards, vulnerabilities and 




 After completing this session, the participant will be able to perform a participatory appraisal of 




 Participant will learn to     
 Describe the different tools used in participatory appraisal 
 Conduct participatory assessment of hazards, vulnerabilities and risks 
 
Content of this session is based on a Hand Book produced by the National Institute of Rural 
Development (NIRD), Hyderabad, India. 
 
This session will outline tools that have been recommended for working with rural communities. 
However, PRA tools can be used in almost any situation and need not be confined to appraisal 
interviews in rural situations. 
 
The major challenges in vulnerability reduction in communities are: sensitization to bring about 
attitudinal and behavioral change; using participatory techniques to build rapport, elicit support, 
information and participation of the people in their own development. 
 
 
30.1. Importance of Participatory Techniques 
 
Participatory techniques aim to ‘break the silence’ of the poor and disadvantaged sections, recognize 
the value of popular collective knowledge and wisdom and legitimize the production of knowledge by 
the people themselves.  Participatory approaches seek to be catalysts enabling and empowering the 
people. These have internalized some key techniques in adult training for learning such as 
 linking learning to problems, 
 linking learning to people’s goals and visions, 
 giving trainees control over decisions on training. 
The participatory approach emphasizes flexible learning, is adaptable to the pace set by the 








30.2. Participatory Rural Appraisal 
 
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) is a methodology to enhance the development agent’s 
understanding of the rural reality for the planning and development of projects; and the feeling of a 
greater degree of ownership and responsibility in the rural poor for better results and social acceptance 
of the program. The effectiveness of participatory approaches has led donors, government 
organizations and NGOs to use PRA in their programs. Participatory training is based on the belief that 
learners with their life experiences are themselves a rich source of learning; learning cannot be 
imposed; the learner can only be encouraged to learn; learners learn best by doing or practicing an 
activity; and learning is facilitated by a positive/successful activity/experience resulting in further 
achievement, thereby building up a ‘virtuous circle’. 
 
 
30.3. Aims of participatory methods 
 
Different participatory methods are used for different ends. Sometimes participatory approaches are 
the means and ends as well. In the case of decentralized development, the ends are: 
 peoples’ active participation in prioritizing needs/micro-planning; 
 activating the key local institutions attitudinal and  
 behavioral change in the bureaucracy. 
 
Since village organizations have to play an active role in initiating the micro-planning exercise, they 
need a locally relevant database that is validated by the local people. This will form the basis for 




30.4. Scope of PRA 
 
PRA is used 
 To ascertain needs 
 To establish priorities for development activities 
 Within the scope of feasibility studies 
 During the implementation phase of projects 
 Within the scope of monitoring and evaluation of projects 
 For studies of specific topics 
 For focusing formal surveys on essential aspects, and identifying conflicting group interests. 
 
Areas of application 
 Natural resource management 
 Agriculture 
 Poverty alleviation/women in development programs 
 Health and nutrition 
 Preliminary and primary education 
 Village and district-level planning 
 Institutional and policy analysis. 





Table 36 Participatory rural appraisal 
Principles and methods Benefits 
From ‘they learn from us’ 
to ‘we learn from them’. 
. From ‘we let them participate’ to 
‘they take command of their own 
process’. 
Empowering the poor and 
weak to assert their priorities, 
make demands and act. 
From ‘we’ve done a PRA’ 
to ‘we admit being 
corrected by people’. 
From ‘we use instruments from our 
toolbox’ to ‘they can map, model, 
estimate, score, analyze, plan 
themselves’. 
Expression and harnessing of 
local diversity. 
From ‘we share our 
knowledge analysis with 
them’ to ‘we enable them 
to learn from each other 
and conduct their own 
analysis’. 
Offsetting biases: spatial, project, 






learning, which is flexible, 
exploratory, interactive and 
inventive. 
Triangulation: using different 
methods, sources and disciplines, and 
a range of informants in a range of 
places and cross checking to get closer 
to the truth through successive 
approximations. 
Identification of research 
priorities; experts more 
receptive to the ability of 
rural poor to design, 
implement and evaluate. 
Facilitation: to enable 
people to do more or all of 
the investigation 
themselves and own the 
outcome. 
 Insights gained from PRA 
leading to policy change. 
Sharing: a culture of 
sharing information, 
methods, field experiences 
among NGOs, government 
and villagers. 
Behavior and attitudes: critical self-
awareness in external facilitators, 
learning from errors. 
A culture of open learning 
































perspective on time 



























30.5. Participatory community monitoring and evaluation 
 
Why participatory community monitoring and evaluation? 
 
Participatory community monitoring and evaluation are extremely important for learning about the 
achievement/deviation from original concerns and problems faced by local development 
projects/programs being implemented, so that corrective measures can be taken in time. 
 
Evaluation is often carried out by donor agencies or policy makers and helps in assessing whether the 
project has brought benefits to those for whom it was intended. An evaluator is expected to examine: 
whether it was right to have invested resources in the project in the context of competing needs; 
whether the underlying assumptions and design were right; whether progress was made towards 
planning changes, and if not, why; and unplanned changes that may have occurred. 
 
Monitoring ensures that i) inputs are ready in time; ii) works plans are followed closely; iii) 
adjustments can be made and corrective action taken as and when necessary; iv) people who need to 
know are kept informed; v) constraints and bottlenecks are found; and vi) resources are used 
efficiently. 
 
Aim of participatory monitoring and evaluation (pme) 
 
To assess information or generate data on development activities being carried out at the local 
community level –  
 To facilitate monitoring and evaluation by beneficiaries of different development activities.  
 To increase beneficiaries’ commitment and understanding in designing, planning and 
implementing community-based development projects or programs. 
 
Participatory monitoring involves local beneficiaries in measuring, recording, collecting, processing 
and communicating information to assist local development project extension workers and local group 
members in decision-making. 
 
Participatory evaluation assists in adjusting and redefining objectives, reorganizing institutional 
arrangements or re-allocating resources as necessary. Monitoring and evaluation system (MES) allows 
continuous surveillance in order to assess the local development project’s impact on intended 
beneficiaries. 
 




Involving local people in project evaluation is one of the learning objectives of participatory 
management. Apart from project’s impact on the life of the people, it is also worthwhile to evaluate: i) 
attitudinal changes in the local community about their role and sense of responsibility; ii) if people 
have gained confidence in their ability to undertake new activities; and iii) lessons about people’s 
capacity, extent of participation and community responsibilities. 
 
It provides an opportunity to the project implementation committee to assess deficiencies in the project 
design - if objectives and work plan were realistic, if local funding was adequate and whether project 
actually owned by the people. Answers to these questions indicate future precautions and 
modifications in the method and approach. This in itself is an achievement in capacity building at the 
local level. 
 
Role of community extension workers 
 
It is the responsibility of extension workers/community development motivators to make beneficiaries 
aware about the project/programs and their objectives. Extension workers should develop and help 
beneficiaries identify indicators and measurements for each project activity. Based on these, extension 
workers should collect data on inputs and outputs by using simple formats and tables. Extension 
workers should process, organize and analyze the data for evaluation. For participatory evaluation, 
they should assist beneficiaries to understand the process, using simple procedures. After processing, 
organizing and analyzing the data, extension workers must assess the impact of local development 
project activities. 
 
 PME should be: 
 Demonstrative, not instructive in writing 
 Collaborative, not individualist or directive 
 Explorative, not repetitive 
 Listening to, not lecturing 
 Interactive, not dominating 
 Qualitative, not quantitative 
 For community/people, not project-oriented.  
 
Table 38 Steps in participatory monitoring and evaluation (PME) 
Step I Understanding goal/objectives of local development project/program. 
Step II Identifying activities to achieve objectives. 
Step III Identifying measurements to assess results or show extent of progress achieved. 
Step IV Developing measurement indicators. 
Step V Identifying methods and techniques of collecting information. 
Step VI Selecting formats/visual tools for presenting information 




31. TECHNICAL ANNEX 20: TRAINING – COMMUNITY PUBLIC AWARENESS 
  
Goal (Session 5) 
To impart an understanding of public awareness creation 
 
Learning Outcome 
 The participant will be able to explain the process of public awareness creation 
 
Learning Objectives 
 Participant will learn to     
 Explain situation analysis 
 Describe audience analysis and audience segmentation 
 Achieve SMART objective setting      
 Understand the process of message creation 
 Discriminate between available channels for message dissemination 
 Evaluate effectiveness of public awareness activities 
 
 
31.1. Definition of Social Change Communication Campaign 
 
Some generic definitions for social change communication campaigns: 
  
Programs designed to influence the voluntary behavior of target audiences where the primary objective 
is to improve the welfare of the target audiences and/or the society of which they are part (Andreasen, 
1995)  
 
A target audience-based approach to promote socially beneficial behavior change in specific 
populations 
 
It is much more than education; it includes analysis, planning, execution, and evaluation of integrated 
programs to influence people to trade their old ideas, beliefs, and behaviors for new ones. 
 
You want to change people’s behaviors, but that’s not your only outcome. You’ve got to change the 
environment. 
 
As figuratively defined by someone, “An idea attached to leadership”. Very often, the “change” social 
change communication campaigns seek is in knowledge, attitudes, skills and practice. A larger 
definition is that community norms need to change so that the targeted knowledge, attitude and 
practice changes become acceptable. Further, social change campaigns may also seek societal level 








31.2. Definition of Disaster Risk Communication 
 
Disaster Risk Communication is a specific application of social change communication campaigns to 
bring about change in knowledge, attitude, skills and practice at the individual and possibly societal 
level with regard to disasters.  
 
Specifically, DRC is: “The systematic planning of information transfer, based on scientific research, to 
prevent, solve or mitigate the risk problem with adjusted and customized information (risk messages) 
for specific target groups” (Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996). The authors of this definition also point out 
that the communication can be multi-way suggesting that it is not just a transfer of information. Let us 
try to understand each part of this definition. 
    
Systematic Planning 
 
The term currently in use for communication campaigns is “public awareness.”  Public awareness 
draws on the mass media to create awareness in society about the development intervention, while 
social marketing uses marketing ideas, i.e., the integrated use of channels, cost, intervention, 
promotional ideas, etc., to promote and deliver social change interventions. What is relevant is that any 
serious communication campaign, in this case for disaster risk communication, must be based on 
systematic planning. 
      
 The generic communication model (Lasswell, 1948) is: Who? Says what? To whom? With what 
effect? 
 
It is critical that the “What” itself be determined based on feedback, so that both the content of the 
message itself and the language/design, etc., used to convey the content is relevant and representative 
of the target group, and clarity is assured (or in communication jargon noise is reduced). That is, rather 
than “transfer” alone, the approach should be a mutual determination of the message and then its 
communication to the larger target group. 
     
The definition leaves out the “Who” or the source of the message. Sources of messages must be: 
 Knowledgeable: Content experts must be used for technical message content in mediated 
messages. While this might be routinely done for mass mediated messages, the need to impart 
content knowledge to interpersonal communication sources, particularly local level implementing 
officials, community opinion leaders, and volunteers is critical. 
 Credible/Trustworthy: Whether it is a medium (radio, newspaper, television) or an interpersonal 
source (government official), the source must be credible to the target and one that the target 
group trusts.  
 
The two characteristics are intertwined so that credibility may lead to trust and vice versa, but 
depending on the campaign sometimes it is credibility and at other times it is trustworthiness that is 
more important. 
 
Also, while knowledge lends credibility, it is not the only determinant of credibility. Sometimes 
likeability may also determine credibility. 




 Likeable: Likeability may be related to all the above concepts but is also related to attractiveness 
of the source and to the next characteristic of a source, representative ness. 
 Representative: A representative source is one who looks like, speaks like, and dresses like the 
target audience. People are more able to relate to and understand sources that are similar to them.  
   
   
Scientific Research 
 
The importance of research, systematic, planned, scientific, is often overlooked. Research informs 
each stage of the communication campaign and helps to ensure that decisions are made on the basis of 
fact rather than whim or opinion alone. Often when campaigns may fail, the temptation is to blame the 
ignorant public without looking at whether risk perception was accurate, whether the message was the 
right one, presented in the right manner, for the right public, etc. Research assists with these decisions. 
 
Problem definition: At this stage, there may be a disjoint in what the agency that is creating the 
campaign perceives as the problem and what the target group sees as a problem. While we are 
specifically interested in problems that can be solved by communication, we must be alert to the fact 
that some non-communication problem may be the larger problem. It is of course assumed that before 
we get to the stage of a communication campaign, it has been determined based on research that a 
communication problem is present. Still taking the target audience’s views even in defining the 
communication problem is important.  
Research at this stage may be largely qualitative and secondary (i.e., collected from existing materials 
rather than gathered from scratch) supplemented by quantitative and primary (i.e., gathered 
specifically for the purpose). 
Target audience definition: At this stage, research must be undertaken to provide a complete profile of 
the target audience starting with demographics. Such a profile is critical for the selection of messages, 
tactics, channels, sources, and such.  
Research at this stage is largely quantitative and primary but also qualitative and secondary. 
Delineation of strategy: The main message strategy (i.e., the big message idea) must be based on 
research into the problem and the target, but must be finalized based on testing with the target 
audience. This may require both secondary and primary research, and both qualitative and quantitative 
research. 
 
Message creation: Three broad stages of message creation are concept, rough (sketch of the idea), and 
comprehensive (close to final). At each of these stages, feedback from the target group is essential. 
Essentially, this is pre-testing the message. Research at this stage is largely quantitative and primary 
but also qualitative sometimes. 
 
Channel determination: This is largely based on research into the target audience’s channel profile 
(and knowledge of the strengths of each medium).  
 




Evaluation: Evaluation is conducted before, during and after the campaign respectively to establish a 
baseline, to see if the campaign is working and make adjustments if necessary, and to measure the 
success of the campaign.  
Largely, primary quantitative evaluation is done but qualitative evaluation is also used. 
Prevent, Solve, Mitigate Risk Problem This is the main goal of the disaster risk communication 
campaign.  
Specific objectives will also need to be articulated as building blocks through the use of 
communication to achieve this larger goal. 
    
Adjusted and Customized Risk Messages 
 
The messages themselves are composed of the content as well as the language, design, etc., used in 
constructing them. Messages need to be adjusted as noted above based on pre-campaign feedback and 
concurrent campaign evaluation. They must also be customized to different target audiences or sub 
groups within audiences, to different channels, and for different times of the year or day, etc. 




As mentioned above, the target audience must be profiled in depth. Any campaign may be targeted at 
more than one target audience (this does not imply that the same message, media, etc., be used for each 
group). 
These groups may be -- 
 Policy makers who, for example, may need to be convinced to make disaster preparedness a 
priority or to reform building codes. This includes local, regional and central bodies that 
determine and implement policies and practices. 
 Community members (and social networks) who may need to change formal and informal social 
norms or standards, for example, in terms of acceptance of education for females.  
 Institutions and organizations that may assist in the campaign by becoming venues. These include 
businesses, schools, religious institutions, public agencies, service organizations, trade or 
professional associations. 
 Interpersonal groups includes primary groups such as peers, family and friends that provide social 
identity, support and role delineation for an individual and may be able to influence change in 
individuals. 
 Individuals who may change their cognitive, psychological, and behavioral makeup, i.e., their 
knowledge, beliefs and attitudes, personality and action. Often in DRC campaigns, change at the 
individual level is the major component. 
  




31.3. Steps in DRC 
 
The broad basic steps in DRC (all of which are informed by research) are (see more details in 
appendix): 
 Situation Analysis: Study the situation with regard to the problem, its history, past attempts to 
resolve the problem, etc. 
 Target Audience Definition: Determine your specific target audience(s) and profile it. 
 Formulating Communication and Action Objectives: Outline objectives of the DRC in terms of 
communication and action outcomes at several levels as appropriate from the individual to 
societal. 
 Formulating Message Strategy and Tactics: Determine the main message(s) and the different ways 
of presenting the message. 
 Formulating Channel Objectives, Strategy and Tactics: Determine the channel including 
interpersonal sources through which the message(s) will be communicated. 
 Producing Materials and Implementing Campaign 
 Monitoring and Evaluation: Determine how to monitor the progress of the project and to evaluate 
its success. 
 
DRC is important because: 
 
 It empowers people. Most DRC campaigns have the public as their target audience. By providing 
the public with information, DRC campaigns empower them to control their lives and give them 
strategies on how to cope when disasters strike. This empowerment can help reduce the fatalistic 
attitude that one finds in many regions and ultimately save lives and livelihood, the most critical 
resources of any country. 
 DRC campaigns also enable policy change. This end result comes not only from the fact that 
policy makers may be the target group for the campaign, but also from the fact that the 
empowered public can create public opinion pressure to bring about change at the policy level. 
 DRC campaigns also make the work of disaster relief a lot easier. If people have an accurate 
perception of the risk to them, and know what to do and how to respond when the risk is present, 
relief agencies will have less work because fewer lives will be at stake and more people will have 




31.4. Barriers to Making Change 
 
While the need for DRC is urgent, there are barriers to making change that DRC campaigns must keep 
in mind: 
 Negative demand: Target audiences who are being reached by such campaigns may not want it 
(Andreason, 2000). 
 High involvement issues: Many of the behaviors these campaigns try to influence are much more 
involving, serious. 
 Invisible benefits: Often times, the benefits of these campaigns are not immediate and obvious.  
 Benefits to others: Often times, the benefits of these campaigns accrue to others.  
 




Thus making social change is difficult, but the tools presented in this workshop will assist in the 
endeavor. Apart from barriers to change, there are also factors that could become points of resistance. 





 products of ignorance 
 
 
31.5. Some Distinctions 
 
“Communication for development” is a researched and planned process which is crucial for social 
transformation, operating through three main strategies:      
 Advocacy to raise resources and political and social leadership commitment for development 
goals; Advocacy is a continuous and adaptive process of gathering, organizing and formulating 
information into argument, to be communicated through various interpersonal and media 
channels, with a view to raising resources or gaining political and social leadership and 
commitment for a development program, thereby preparing a society for its acceptance.’ 
 Social mobilization for wider participation and ownership; and Social Mobilization is the process 
of bringing together all feasible and practical inter-sectoral social partners and allies to determine 
felt-need and raise awareness of, and demand for, a particular development objective. It involves 
enlisting the participation of such actors, including institutions, groups, networks and 
communities, in identifying, raising, and managing human and material resources, thereby 
increasing and strengthening self-reliance and sustainability of achievements.’ 
 Program communication for changes in knowledge, attitudes and practices of specific participants 
in programs; Program communication is a research-based, consultative process of addressing 
knowledge, attitudes and practices through identifying, analyzing and segmenting audiences and 
participants in programs and by providing them with relevant information and motivation through 
well-defined strategies, using an appropriate mix of interpersonal, group and mass-media 
channels, including participatory methods.’ 
 
When combined with strategies for the development of appropriate skills and capacities, and the 
provision of an enabling environment, communication plays a central role in positive behavior 





You do not have to go it alone in a DRC campaign. Often, partnerships are developed which are very 
fruitful because they -- 
 Reduce the cost of the project to you 
 Develop long-term and more sustainable solutions if several partners are involved 
 Local partners particularly assist with local contacts, culture, etc. 
 They may take you out of the rut and routine that you are used to in doing your campaigns 




Partnerships are not however without problems. They could not carry their load, their ideas and yours 
might be so divergent that consensus becomes difficult, they may go off strategy and do their own 
think, you may feel loss of ownership, etc. Ultimately you may feel you are spending more time on 
managing partnership dynamics than if you had done it yourself. Hence great care needs to be 
exercised in selecting partners. Research the partnership choices you have: 
 Look for what mutual benefits can accrue from each 
 Look at financial stability  
 Look for compatibility of personalities 
 Look for compatibility of ideas and approaches 
 Look for complementary skills 
 
Once you have selected a partner(s), very clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each in terms 
of work, finances, etc. This is critical to forestalling problems. 
 
 
31.7. DRC Budget 
 
The budget for your DRC campaign is an important consideration. Sometimes you may have a defined 
budget within which you have to develop your DRC campaign. Thinking through your campaign in a 
systematic fashion through objectives may in fact assist you to exploit your predetermined budget to its 
fullest. You may need to make some hard choices, but if they are based on good strategy they may be 
easier to make.  
 
On the other hand, you may be able to develop a DRC campaign and develop a budget for it. In this 
case, the systematic planning of your DRC campaign will provide a strong rationale for each of your 
decisions and therefore for your budget making it easier for you to convince potential donors or 
government agencies to support your project. 
 
At the same time recognize that budgets are always limited. Responsible budgeting and ultimately 
responsible spending of budgets will increase your credibility. 
 
Also recognize, that the process of budgeting is not necessarily linear. That is, you may not be able to 
plan a full campaign and then begin the budgeting. Often as you are considering options, you will have 
to get rough quotes to compare and make decisions. Sometimes this assists in developing solutions you 
may not have thought of earlier. Local input is of very great importance at this stage in finding 
alternatives, in exploring options, and in getting good deals because of local relationships.  
 
As you budget, make sure you consider every expense. A DRC campaign plan is therefore very useful 
in ensuring that you do not overlook any expenses. Remember the tangible items, such as X number of 
booklets, may be easy to price. It is the intangibles such as time spent on preparing for an event that 
may tend to be poorly budgeted. Take a step-by-step approach, creating a line item for each step. Later 
after each step has been listed and costed chronologically, you may regroup into major categories that 
belong together. The chronological method keeps you from leaving anything out. A media budget 
recap sheet might also be very helpful for your media buys. This sheet should show spending for each 
medium and total media spending. 




As you budget, do not forget that you may find local donors who may be willing to provide some items 
free either because it is a good cause or for the publicity that your campaign might be able to generate 
for them. The media might be willing to provide free space and time for a good cause. Remember that 
developing a relationship with a vendor might also assist in reducing costs. Further, bulk business with 
a vendor is another possibility to explore. The advantage of this is that it gets the local community 
involved in the effort. 
 
The basic idea in budgeting is to achieve maximum benefit from the least amount of money. This is a 
good principle to keep in mind but a difficult one to measure and operationalize. Another similar 
principle is that there is a level beyond which spending more money will not help. There are some 
people you are never going to reach with your message, there are others you are going to reach but 
with no effect on them. In both of these matters, past experience can play a critical role. 
 
Some of the major expenses in a campaign are:     
 Materials - design and production (includes writing, photographing, illustrations, layout, video, 
audio, web sites, talent, etc.) 
 Media Buys - The time and space you will buy on various channels 
 Personnel - Project implementation once the campaign is planned; research implementation at 
various stages starting with the situation analysis to post-campaign evaluation; training for 
research, project implementation, etc.; travel expenses 
 Contingency - Generally set aside a percent (usually 10%) for contingencies. 
     
 
 
32. TECHNICAL ANNEX 21: TRAINING – EARLY WARNING 
  
Goal (Session 6) 
 











 Participant will learn to     
 Discriminate between hazard specific warnings  








32.1. Classification of disasters for early warning activities 
 
Disasters can be classified by nature, timing, predictability, response time and type of impact. 
 




















Table 41 Disasters according to response time 
Long response time 2-3 days response time 
or less 
1-2 hours Response 
time or less 













• Early warning 
• Preparedness 




32.2. Warning Systems 
 
Forecasting helps to issue early warnings of disasters; the warning should be communicated to the 
community through a warning system. This may be 
 Alarms – like a fire alarm 
 Sirens 
 Public Announcements through Radio, TV (Cyclones, Floods, Landslides) 
 Traditional communication systems in villages (temple bell, drums, hoisting of flags etc.) 





32.3. Important Issues 
 
 It must be noted that opportunity for warning does not exist in all cases.  
 Indiscriminate warnings may result in non-responsiveness of people. 
 A designated responsible person must always issue warnings 
 All warning systems and technologies must be maintained in working condition and checked 
regularly 
 Communities in disaster prone areas must be made aware of the warning systems. 
 Alternative warning systems must be kept in readiness in case of technological failure or power 
failure. 
 Only the delegated person will issue warning. 
 All available warning systems should be used. Each warning system has limited reach and 
multiple warning systems will help reinforcement. 
 The warning should be very clear about the severity, the time frame and the area that may be 
affected to the extent possible. 
 Community should be made aware of the DO’s and DON’T’s after the warning as a 
preparedness activity well ahead. 
 Warnings should not evoke panic. It must be devoid of emotions. 
 Rumor control action should be taken. 
 Wherever possible get the assistance of community leaders and organized groups within the 
community. 
 Latest situation reports must follow the warning. 
 If the disaster threat fades away an all-clear signal must be given. 
 Evacuation 
 It is important to understand the nature of the threat and the procedures to be adopted.  
 All agencies involved in evacuation must have a common understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities in order to avoid confusion and panic.  
 Different situations demand different priorities and hence the responsibility of ordering an 
evacuation is assigned to different agencies. The EOC, the Divisional Secretariat, Police and Fire 
Brigade will only order evacuation.  
 Evacuation should involve community leaders.  
 All evacuations must be reported to the Divisional Secretariat. 
 
 





32.4. Evacuation Preparedness Responsibility 
 
 
Table 42 Evacuation preparedness responsibility 
Preparedness/ Function Responsibility 
 To warn people about the 
impending danger & to leave for 
safer places 
 DS, GN. Police, Fire Brigade 
 Irrigation (flood)  
 Met Dept. (flood, cyclone)  
 NBRO (landslides)  
 Health (epidemics)  
 Police (Road Accidents, Industrial 
and Chemical Accidents)  
 Geological Survey & Mines 
Bureau, GSMB  (E’quakes, 
Tsunami)  
 Leading NGOs 
 To co-ordinate with State-Civil 
Defense/Police/NGOs/CBOs 
 District/Divisional Secretaries 
 Police  
 Leading NGOs/CBOs 
 Arrangement of Boats/ vehicles etc 
for speedy evacuation 
 District/Divisional Secretaries 
 Police/Army/Navy/Air Force  
 Leading NGOs/CBOs  Evacuate people of stranded areas 
 Organize trained task force 
members 
 Maintaining Law and Order  District/Divisional Secretaries 
 Police/ Army/Navy/Air Force 
 
 Mobilize people to go to safe places 
 Divisional Sec., GN,  
 Village Disaster Management 
Committee 
 Village Volunteers 
 Police/Army/Navy/Air Force 
 Deployment of Boats for 
evacuation 
 




33. TECHNICAL ANNEX 22: TRAINING – RESPONSE PLANNING 
  
Goal (Session 7) 
 









 Participant will learn to     
 Discriminate between House Hold Response Plan, Institutional (e.g. School) Response Plan and 
Community Response Plan 
 Understand the elements of an Evacuation Plan  
 Formulate an Evacuation Plan 
 Conduct an Evacuation Drill  





Response planning helps to prepare people to face a disaster situation. Each District with the leadership 
of the District Secretary will form a District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC). This will act 
as the Emergency Management and Response committee in the aftermath of a disaster. Activities 
identified for emergency response are 
 Early Warning 
 Evacuation 
 Identification of camps for displaced persons 
 Search and rescue 
 Post disaster assessment 
 Emergency relief 
 Logistics and supply 
 Communication and information management 
 Survivor response and coping 
 Safety 
 Security 
 Emergency operations management 
 
The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) will be the focal point of operations control with the District 
Secretary, Divisional Secretaries, District/Provincial Heads of Departments and Government Agencies 
and other major stakeholders.  
 
 




Response planning can be done at several levels. 
 Family 
 Institutional e.g. School, Office, Factory etc. 





It is important that plans must conform to each other. Therefore it is advisable that all response plans 
are vetted by the DDMC. 
 
This session concentrates on the community level response. People can – and do – cope with disaster 
by preparing in advance and working as a team. Helping people know what to do is the best protection.  
 
 
33.2. What to Know? What to Plan 
 
 Conduct a hazard assessment of the community to identify any hazards that may exist and 
could cause an emergency. This is best done through a participatory approach. Involve 
community leaders and the Grama Niladhari.  
 Discuss the types of disasters that are most likely to happen. Understand what to do in each 
case. Grama Niladhari can get help from the DDMC in the event you need outside help to do 
this. 
 Make a list of key personnel with contact information as well as contact information for local 
NGO emergency responders, agencies and police. 
 Identify vulnerable areas and mark households that should evacuate for safety 
 Find out who needs help such as elderly, disabled persons, pregnant women, young children 
and where they reside. 
 Identify safe shelters for evacuation and best routes to take in the event of a disaster. 
 Identify relief goods and services as well as logistics needed at evacuation shelters. Who would 
be able to undertake them (resource mapping)? 
 Identify persons who would manage evacuation shelters. What should they know and be able to 
do? 
 Learn about your community’s warning signals: what they sound like, how best to disseminate 
them, and what people should do when they hear them. 
 Ask about animal care after disaster. Animals may not be allowed inside 
emergency shelters due to health regulations. 
 Find out about the disaster plans at workplaces, children’s school or daycare centers. 
 
 
33.3. Evacuation Policy and Procedure 
 
All people involved in evacuation must have a common understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities in order to avoid confusion and panicky behavior. The community plan must identify a 
clear chain of command and designate a person authorized to order an evacuation. The EOC, District 




Secretary or the Divisional Secretary, Police and Fire Brigade are the only authorized entities to order 
an evacuation. Therefore the evacuation must be done in concurrence with any of them. The Police 
must be notified immediately after the evacuation.  
 
It is common practice to select a responsible individual to lead and coordinate your emergency plan 
and evacuation. It is critical that community know who the coordinator is and understand that this 
person has the authority to make decisions during emergencies. The coordinator should be responsible 
for assessing the situation to oversee emergency procedures, notifying and coordinating with outside 
emergency services.  
 The community plan must address procedures for assisting people during evacuations, particularly 
the sick, the elderly, the young and those with disabilities. Designate individuals as evacuation 
wardens to help move people from danger to safe areas during an emergency. Generally, one 
warden for every 20 people should be adequate, and the appropriate number of wardens should be 
available at all times. 
 Encourage an entire family to evacuate together as a unit. 
 Identify one or more assembly areas (as necessary for different types of emergencies and available 
time) where people will gather first before proceeding to shelters and a method for accounting for 
all persons worked out. 
Accounting for all persons following an evacuation is critical. Confusion in the assembly areas 
can lead to delays in helping disabled, or unnecessary and dangerous search-and-rescue 
operations. To ensure the fastest, most accurate accounting of your community members, consider 
taking a head count after the evacuation. The names and last known locations of anyone not 
accounted for should be passed on to the official in charge. 
 Amount of time needed for evacuation will depend on the disaster. 
 As much as possible, the shelter sites should be within walking distance. 
 Show evacuation routes with proper sign boards for different types of disasters. The extent of 
evacuation may be different for different types of hazards. 
 Evacuation routes should be well lit at night, wide enough to accommodate the number of 
evacuating personnel, unobstructed and clear of debris at all times, and unlikely to expose 
evacuating personnel to additional hazards. 
 
 
33.4. House Hold Level Preparation 
 
 Wear long-sleeved shirts, long pants and sturdy shoes so you can be protected as much as 
possible. Avoid dresses that impede speedy walking where necessary. 
 Turn off electricity and water. Turn off electricity at the main fuse or breaker, and turn off water 
at the main valve. Turn off gas cylinder. 
 Take your disaster supplies kit. 
 
If you have only moments before leaving, grab these things and go! Have them packaged in 
anticipation of evacuation! 
 Flashlight with plenty of extra batteries 
 Battery-powered radio with extra batteries 
 First aid kit 




 Prescription medications in their original bottle, plus copies of the prescriptions 
 Eyeglasses (with a copy of the prescription) 
 Water (at least one gallon per person is recommended; more is better) 
 Foods that do not require refrigeration or cooking 
 Items that infants and elderly household members may require 
 Medical equipment and devices, such as dentures, crutches, prostheses, etc. 
 Change of clothes for each household member 
 Sleeping bag or bedroll and pillow for each household member 
 Checkbook, cash, and credit cards 
 Lock your home. 
 Set pets and livestock free. They will not be allowed inside shelter. 
 Use identified evacuation routes  — don't use shortcuts because certain areas may be impassable 
or dangerous. Stay away from downed power lines. 
If warning time is adequate 
 Make arrangements for pets and livestock accommodation 
 If high winds are expected, cover the outside of all windows of your home. Use shutters that are 
rated to provide significant protection from windblown debris, or fit plywood coverings over all 
windows. 
 Protect your valuables 
o Move objects that may get damaged by wind or water to safer areas of your home. Move 
television sets, computers, stereo and electronic equipment, and easily moveable 
appliances like a microwave oven to higher levels of your home and away from windows. 
Wrap them in sheets, blankets, or polythene. 
o Make a visual or written record of all of your household possessions. Record model and 
serial numbers. This list could help you prove the value of what you owned if those 
possessions are damaged or destroyed, and can assist you to claim deductions on taxes. 
o Do this for all items in your home, including expensive items such as sofas, chairs, tables, 
beds, chests, wall units, and any other furniture too heavy to move. 
o Store a copy of the record somewhere away from home, such as in a safe deposit box. 
 
 
33.5. Training and Drills 
 
 Does the community plan identify how and when community members will be trained so that 
they understand the types of emergencies that may occur, their responsibilities and actions as 
outlined in the plan? 
 
 Does the plan address if and how often drills will be conducted? Once you have reviewed your 
emergency action plan and everyone has had the proper training, it is a good idea to hold practice 
drills as often as necessary to keep people prepared. Include outside resources such as 
- fire and police departments when possible. After each drill, evaluate the 
- effectiveness of the drill. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of your plan and work to 
improve it. 




34. TECHNICAL ANNEX 23: TRAINING –MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
Goal (Session 8) 
 




 The participant will be able to understand the importance of monitoring and evaluation and of 




 The participant will learn to      
 Explain the difference between monitoring and evaluation     
 Understand the importance of these two aspects to measure success of a project     
 Apply monitoring techniques  (How? Who? What?)  
 Apply evaluation techniques (How? Who? Scope? When?)       
 Explain monitoring and evaluation terminology, techniques, and designs 
 Understand the need for and techniques for documentation.  
 
 
34.1. Definition of Monitoring and Evaluation 
        
Monitoring 
 
Monitoring refers to tracking the progress of your campaign as it is being implemented. It is concerned 
more with implementation details, problems and adjustments in them, and not essentially with whether 
the campaign’s communication and action objectives are being met.    
 
        
Evaluation 
 
Whether program objectives are being met or not falls under the purview of evaluation. Evaluation is 
assessing gains in the effects desired. Evaluation is therefore conducted against the communication and 
action objectives.    
 
        
Difference between Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
While some people do not make this distinction between monitoring and evaluation and often include 
evaluation in monitoring, it is a useful difference to keep in mind. Monitoring is essentially done to 
make sure everything (activities, visits, distribution, media placement, etc.) is taking placed as it was 
planned. Evaluation, on the other hand, is to assess whether these things (activities, visits, distribution, 
media placement, etc.) resulted in the effects desired, i.e., whether knowledge increased, for example.
     








Monitoring will enable you to keep ahead of the campaign, ensure quality control, keep your 
staff/volunteers/implementers alert and on the go, and such. When a campaign is very tightly planned 
so that certain activities logically follow others, then failure in implementing one aspect of the 





While monitoring is met with less apprehension and is generally included in DRC campaigns, 
evaluation is often not conducted at all or at least not conducted as systematically as necessary. This 
may be due to the fear that results may not be as positive as expected or due to the lack of realization 
of the importance of evaluation or simply due to lack of budget or even skills. None of these are really 
good reasons for not conducting an evaluation. Further, in this day and time, funding agencies are 
more and more focused on accountability, and evaluation ensures accountability.  
There are several good reasons to do an evaluation:  
 Primarily, results are useful in your own campaign. Respond to them in real time. If you find that 
KASP levels are not rising at the rate expected, find out the source of the problem (lack of 
distribution of message, garbled message, inaccessibility to message, etc.) and fix it. The problem 
may lie in the message, in the people or media delivering the message, in the timing, and in a host 
of other places. Identify these causes and move fast to eliminate them so that the campaign is back 
on track as soon as possible and problems do not snowball and have a chain reaction. In essence, 
making these adjustments as problems are identified is iterative.  
 Results will be useful to others working in the same field. Particularly in the field of disasters, 
literature on DRC campaigns is scarce.  
 Unexpected things can happen and derail even the best planned campaigns, but if your campaign 
was informed by research at each stage, then the results of the evaluation should most likely 
indicate strides in achieving objectives. This will boost your confidence and convince others of the 
merits of your work. 
  
A certain amount of planning and foresight will keep evaluation from becoming an object of fear or a 
burden. 
 Set realistic communication and action objectives at the start of the campaign. Changes in most 
variables do not occur easily and overnight and are only incremental in nature not drastic. Most 
people make the mistake of setting unreal goals or confusing expected results from 
communication and action objectives. Remember communication objectives can make people 
aware or create knowledge, recall, etc., but may not result in action unless other elements are in 
place in the campaign. 
 Budget for evaluation from the very start. Evaluation is important enough that you must plan for it 
in terms of budget. Remember this involves not just money but also staff time and expertise.  
 Make the budget large enough to do a systematic evaluation. Do not conduct a half-baked 
evaluation. You will then end up making unfounded conclusions about the success or failure of 
the campaign. 




 Develop skills in evaluation or engage an expert to conduct it. Evaluation is serious business. It 
requires skill if it is to be done right. Either develop your own skills or engage an expert to 
conduct it. 
 
If your campaign is not having an effect, an evaluation will indicate that and you may be able to make 




34.3. Monitoring Plan and Mechanism 
 
While it may not be possible to anticipate everything, it is a good idea to put a monitoring plan in place 
before campaign start, and to begin monitoring activity from the beginning of the campaign. This plan 
should detail who will check on what activity (all major activities must be tracked), when (at very 
regular intervals such as daily/weekly if the activity is ongoing or at time of activity if activity is a one-
timer), where (actual site visits, from office, etc.), and how (see below). A chart that outlines this will 
be very useful in keeping staff and monitoring on track. 
 
The monitoring mechanisms (the “how” of the monitoring plan) might be simply counting brochures, 
or making sure the posters were distributed on a certain date, or ensuring that the media ran the 
campaign notice of a contest in time. Here are some mechanisms that may be used:     
 Materials inventory 
 Materials placement audit 
 Materials distribution audit 
 Media logs, tear sheets 
 Budget assessment 
 Timeline assessment 
 Staff meetings and reports 
  
A very useful tool is a calendar with considerable detail entered (when, where, how many, etc.) on 
every activity that needs to take place. Such a calendar will be useful to implementers as well as to the 
monitoring staff. A master calendar in the head office with copies for implementers (volunteers, 
officials, etc.) would ensure shared knowledge of the timing, type and scope of each activity. Each one 
of your partners, implementers, volunteers, etc., would know how crucial they are to the complete plan 
and how the success of other activities is dependent on their success in delivering on their 
responsibilities. The calendar also makes very clear the consequences of failing to get any one activity 
done in time or in the scope planned. Similarly, monitoring staff can identify the activities to be 
monitored on this calendar and use it as a scheduling guide for their monitoring activities. Calendar 
apart, staff will have to be trained to conduct the monitoring and to file monitoring reports.   
   
 
34.4. Evaluation Terminology 
        
There is considerable difference in the use of terminology for evaluation. Simply, however, evaluation 
may take place:      
 During the campaign (concurrent evaluation) and at its finish (post-campaign evaluation). 




 Concurrent evaluation may be one time (mid-campaign, for example) or at multiple points in time 
(critical moments).  
 Post-campaign evaluation may be done one time (immediately on close of campaign) or at 
repeated intervals after post-campaign evaluation. The latter is done to see if campaign effects are 
long-term but it is also rather expensive to continue evaluation. 
 Terminology you may be familiar with is: 
 Process evaluation (concurrent evaluation) and summative evaluation (post-campaign evaluation). 
The term process evaluation is sometimes also used to refer to monitoring activities. 
 Summative evaluation is of two types: outcome and impact. 
 Outcome evaluation is the linking of program objectives and gains made in desired effects. It 
assesses individual level changes. Conducting individual level data as part of outcome evaluation 
has many advantages other than providing a direct measure of campaign success against 
objectives. Such data can be analyzed in many creative ways to see which groups had more or less 
gains. The groups may be defined by gender, education, psychographic and many other 
characteristics. This will provide invaluable data for other phases of the campaign, for writing 
proposals to funding agencies, and for others in the field. 
 Impact evaluation focuses on long-term impact. It asks questions such as: Was there a reduction in 
number of people killed?  
 
 
34.5. Evaluation Plan 
 
Strategic Planning of Outcome Evaluation - Much evaluation that is done may be anecdotal in nature. 
This is not evaluation in the real sense of the term. Bias may enter in the selection of people who tell 
anecdotes or in the reporting of anecdotes. Similarly, post-hoc counting of brochures distributed or 
noting the enthusiasm of people at an activity is not evaluation. Rather rigorous, multi-method (called 
triangulation) evaluation must be conducted against the communication and action objectives defined 
earlier in the campaign. This is strategic research as opposed to ad hoc, haphazard evaluation research.  
Formulate your evaluation plan before the start of the campaign. The plan for your evaluation will 
depend on the length of your campaign and the resources you have. 
The plan should detail when (how often, exact time period), where (which sample), and how (which 
methods) you will conduct the evaluation(s). 
 
For example, if your campaign is one year long and you have necessary resources, you may plan to 
conduct two concurrent evaluations, one every four months and a post-campaign evaluation. You may 
randomly pick one or more of several target communities or you may select randomly respondents 
from each target community as sample. You may decide to conduct a survey and focus groups at each 
time. You may decide on a panel survey (same sample of people over the three evaluations) or a trend 
(different sample each time) and on conducting at least four focus groups in each sample community. 
Critical are the communication and action objectives set earlier. These define what you set out to 
achieve and therefore measurement of the success of your DRC campaign should be made to 
demonstrate if these objectives were in fact achieved.      
 
To be able to measure results against the objectives set early in the campaign, before any outcome 
evaluation is done, baseline data must be collected. To do this, develop a questionnaire based largely 
on the communication and action objectives of the campaign. That is, the questionnaire must capture 




the current (pre-campaign) levels of the effects desired (e.g., knowledge, attitude, Skills and practice 
levels if these were the targeted effects). Considerable care must be used in developing this 
questionnaire because it will be used for the concurrent and post-campaign evaluations; questions may 
be added but the ones already in the questionnaire should not be changed.     
 
        
34.6. Outcome Evaluation Designs 
 
Generally survey and other qualitative methods such as focus groups, in-depth interviews, target 
audience diaries, and observation are used in outcome evaluation. Experiments, particularly laboratory 
experiments, are hard to conduct because of the field nature of DRC campaigns which makes control 
of rival explanations difficult.  
     
While experiments may be difficult in DRC, field experiments are possible if you can identify a 
control community that is very similar to your intervention community and has not had any spillover 
effects from the campaign. That is, the control community must have the same characteristics that your 
target group has in terms of demographics, psychographics, geographies, KASP levels, etc. (in essence 
any variable critical to the campaign) and also not have been indirectly exposed to any campaign 
messages. Here is one possible design:     
        
Intervention Community  Pre-campaign measure CM 1 CM 2 PCM 1 
     PCM2    
 Control Community      PCM 
     
Note that if resources require that you make changes in the design of your survey or field experiment, 
as far as possible do not remove the pre-campaign measure.     
 
 
34.7. Community Indicators 
 
Such outcome evaluation though can be expensive. Sometimes when resources are very limited, 
community level indicators may be used (this is not a recommended measure however other than as 
supplemental to the individual level data). Community level indicators are generally garnered through 
observation. You may observe if people are learning how to swim or are strengthening homes, how 
many people are contacting offices for information, whether the media are covering the campaign and 
the topic of disaster in particular, whether legislative or policy changes are in the making, etc. Even 
with this kind of data, it is important not to bring in researcher bias in interpretation.     
 
 
34.8. Steps in Evaluation Research 
 
 Specifically, the steps in your evaluation plan will be: 
 Determining the data to be collected based on your communication and action objectives 
 Selecting a method(s) to use for the evaluation.  
 Designing your data collection instrument 




 Collecting and analyzing your data 
 Writing a final report 
 
Follow this outline in writing your research report but remember to keep the report user friendly (see 
attached): 
 Introduction: provide the general context within which the DRC campaign has been initiated, 
elements of the DRC campaign, and its specific communication and action objectives. 
 Method: provide details on the method(s) picked (e.g., survey), why; the design picked (e.g., 
longitudinal), why; the data collection instrument picked (e.g., questionnaire), why; a description 
of the variables and how they are measured, why; and population and sample, why. Note that 
these details should be provided both for the outcome and impact evaluations as well as for 
concurrent and post-campaign evaluations. 
 Findings: provide a description of the sample particularly in demographic terms; provide results in 
terms of KASP and other targeted effects (including attitude to messages, channels used for 
delivery, etc.). Here you may outline both outcome and impact evaluation results. 
 Conclusions: provide a summary of what worked and what did not based on the findings. 
 Recommendations: provide recommendations based on these results for others and your own 





Monitoring and evaluation are both related to documentation. Documentation is the recording of the 
experience of project implementation as well as of results of the evaluation. Reasons to document are:  
 Provide secondary information to others in the field saving them time and effort 
 Provide a proof of performance of your efforts 
 Provide materials for display, presentation, academic papers, etc. 
 Provide funding agencies with an overview of your capabilities 
 Use as a tool to draw in partners, volunteers, etc. 
 Use as a too to boost pride among your staff and others involved in the project 
 Use as a tool to send to the media 
     
 Staff needs to be socialized in the importance of documentation and trained to contribute to this 
documentation effort. Together, make a documentation plan so that the effort is not haphazard. Decide 
what will be recorded in text, pictures, audio and video, at what times within the progress of the 
campaign and its completion, and who will be responsible for this. This responsibility includes writing 
reports, clipping newspaper stories and getting taped copies of other press coverage, storing a few 











35. APPENDIX A: MAP OF SRI LANKA WITH 32 COASTAL COMMUNITIES 
 
The Sarvodaya villages marked on the map were selected such that 16 are Sarvodaya 1, 2, & 3 stage 
communities and the remaining 16 are stage 4 & 5. Table 5 in Technical Annex 4 complies with the set 
of villages identified on this map. 
Figure 45 Locations of 32 HazInfo project participating communities. 
 





36. APPENDIX B: DATA OF RESEARCH MATRIX ALLOCATION 
 
Table 43 Allocation of ICTs to Communities with training and organizational capacity 
NO 
District 













Abeysainghepura Trained 2 None None 
2 Panama North Trained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society AREA 
3 
Colombo 
Modara Untrained 2 None  None 
4 Moratuwella Trained 2 "SAMUDURA" Sarvodaya S.S AREA 
5 
Galle 
Brahammanawatta Untrained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society AREA 
6 Urawatta Trained 2 Sarvodaya Center VSAT 
7 Velhengoda Trained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society 
AREA 
MOP 





Indivinna Untrained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society FXP 
10 Modarapelessa Trained 2 Sarvodaya shramadana society 
AREA 
RAD 
11 Modaragama Trained 4 Sarvodaya D/C VSAT 
12 Samodhagama Untrained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society MOP 
13 
Jaffna 
Munai Untrained 2 - AREA MOP 





Kalmunai II Trained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society 
AREA 
RAD 
16 Ninthavur Trained 2 Sarvodaya shramadana society MOP 
17 Oluvilu Untrained 2 Sarvodaya shramadana society FXP 
18 Karathivu Untrained 2 Sarvodaya shramadana society 
AREA 
FXP 
19 Thambiluvil Untrained 2 Sarvodaya Thambiluvil MOP 
20 
Kalutara 
Diyalagoda Trained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society MOP 
21 Maggona Untrained 2 Sarvodaya shramadana society AREA 
22 Talpitya Untrained 4 None  NONE 









24 Madiya Untrained 2 Sarvodaya D/C MOP 
25 Mirissa South Trained 4 None  NONE 
26 Talalla South Untrained 4 Sarvodaya shramadana society 
AREA 
MOP 





Samudragama Trained 4 Sarvodaya Shanthi Sena AREA FXP 
29 Thirukkadalar Trained 2 Sarvodaya Trincomalee FXP 
30 
Batticaloa 
Maangadu Untrained 4 Sarvodaya Shanthi Sena MOP 
31 Periyakallar Trained 4 Sarvodaya Shanthi Sena FXP 
32 Palamunai Trained 2 Sarvodaya Shanthi Sena AREA MOP 
 
 
37. APPENDIX C: DATA OF HIH OPERTIONAL 
 







Download Acknowledge EOI 
Start End Eff Start End Eff Start End Eff 
1 11-Dec-06    0.00%   0.00% 10:10 10:14 0.95 
2 11-Dec-06 ANNY   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
3 4-Mar-07 ANNY 10:30 10:31 0.98 10:34 10:34 
1.0 10:34 10:36 0.97 
4 4-Mar-07 ANNY 10:30 10:31 0.98 10:34 10:34 
1.0 10:34 10:36 0.97 
5 26-Nov-06 ANNY   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
6 26-Nov-06 IPAS   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
7 26-Nov-06 ANNY   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
0 26-Nov-06 DEWN   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
8 26-Nov-06 
ANNY 
DEWN   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
9 0-Jan-00 CALL   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
10 9-May-07 ANNY 10:16 10:17 0.98 10:17  0.00% 10:17 10:20 0.96 
11 9-May-07 DEWN 10:16 10:17 0.98 10:17  0.00% 10:17 10:20 0.96 
12 9-May- DEWN 10:16 10:17 0.98 10:17  0.00% 10:17 10:20 0.96 





13  ANNY DEWN   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
14 0-Jan-00 ANNY DEWN   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
15 17-Mar-07 
ANNY 
DEWN 9:06 9:06 1.0 9:06 9:06 
1.0 9:06 9:08 0.97 
16 17-Mar-07 DEWN 9:06 9:06 
1.0 9:06 9:06 1.0 9:06 9:08 0.97 
17 17-Mar-07 CALL 9:06 9:06 
1.0 9:06 9:06 1.0 9:06 9:08 0.97 
18 17-Mar-07 
ANNY 
CALL 9:06 9:06 
1.0 9:06 9:06 1.0 9:06 9:08 0.97 
19 17-Mar-07 DEWN 9:06 9:06 
1.0 9:06 9:06 1.0 9:06 9:08 0.97 
20 11-Mar-07 DEWN 10:22 10:22 
1.0   0.00% 10:23  0.00% 
21 11-Mar-07 ANNY 10:22 10:22 
1.0   0.00% 10:23  0.00% 
22 9-Apr-06  10:22 10:22 1.0   0.00% 10:23  0.00% 
23 11-Dec-06 
ANNY 
CALL   0.00%   0.00% 10:10 10:14 0.95 
24 25-Feb-07 DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 10:10 10:14 0.95 
25 11-Dec-06    0.00%   0.00% 10:10 10:14 0.95 
26 11-Dec-06 
ANNY 
DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 10:10 10:14 0.95 
27 11-Dec-06 
ANNY 
CALL   0.00%   0.00% 10:10 10:14 0.95 
28 10-Mar-07 
ANNY 
CALL 10:08 10:08 
1.0   0.00% 10:10 10:11 0.98 
29 10-Mar-07 CALL 10:08 10:08 
1.0   0.00% 10:10 10:11 0.98 
30 25-Feb-07 DEWN   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
31 25-Feb-07 CALL   0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 















Approval Issue Exercise 
Duration 
Overall 
Eff Start End Eff Start End Eff 
1 11-Dec-06    0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
2 11-Dec-06 ANNY   0.00% 10:36 10:42 93.33% 1:30 93.33% 
3 4-Mar-07  10:36 10:39 96.67%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
4 4-Mar-07 ANNY 10:36 10:39 96.67% 10:39 10:45 93.33% 1:30 93.33% 
5 26-Nov-06 ANNY   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 





ANNY   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 




DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
CALL   0.00%   0.00% 1:15 0.00% 
10 9-May-07 
ANNY 10:20 10:21 98.67% 10:28 10:50 70.67% 1:15 70.67% 
   0.00%   0.00% 1:15 0.00% 
11 9-May-07 DEWN 10:20 10:21 98.67% 10:23 10:25 97.33% 1:15 97.33% 
12 9-May-07 DEWN 10:20 10:21 98.67% 10:25 10:28 96.00% 1:15 96.00% 
13 00 
ANNY   0.00%   0.00% 0:00 0.00% 
DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 0:00 0.00% 
140 000 
ANNY   0.00%   0.00% 0:00 0.00% 
DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 0:00 0.00% 
15 17-Mar-07 
ANNY 9:08 9:10 97.78% 9:10 9:18 91.11% 1:30 91.11% 
DEWN   0.00% 9:56 9:58 97.78% 1:30 97.78% 
16 17-Mar-07 DEWN 9:08 9:10 97.78%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
17 17-Mar-07 CALL 9:08 9:10 97.78%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
18 17-Mar-07 
ANNY 9:08 9:10 97.78% 9:10 9:18 91.11% 1:30 91.11% 
CALL   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
19 17-Mar-07 DEWN 9:08 9:10 97.78%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
20 11-Mar-07 DEWN 10:24 10:25 98.89% 10:28 10:32 95.56% 1:30 95.56% 
21 11-Mar-07 ANNY 10:24 10:25 98.89% 10:25 10:28 96.67% 1:30 96.67% 
22 9-Apr-06  10:24 10:25 98.89%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
23 11-Dec-06 
ANNY   0.00% 10:36 10:42 93.33% 1:30 93.33% 
CALL   0.00% 10:55 11:02 92.22% 1:30 92.22% 
24 25-Feb-07 DEWN   0.00% 10:51 10:53 97.78% 1:30 97.78% 
25 11-Dec-06    0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
26 11-Dec-06 
ANNY   0.00% 10:36 10:42 93.33% 1:30 93.33% 
DEWN   0.00% 10:51 10:53 97.78% 1:30 97.78% 
27 11-Dec-06 
ANNY   0.00% 10:36 10:42 93.33% 1:30 93.33% 
CALL   0.00% 10:55 11:02 92.22% 1:30 92.22% 





ANNY 10:11 10:15 95.56% 10:15 10:19 95.56% 1:30 95.56% 
CALL 10:11 10:15 95.56% 10:20 10:22 97.78% 1:30 97.78% 
29 10-Mar-07 CALL 10:11 10:15 95.56% 10:33 10:34 98.89% 1:30 98.89% 
30 25-Feb-07 DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
31 25-Feb-07 CALL   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
32 25-Feb-07 
ANNY   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
DEWN   0.00%   0.00% 1:30 0.00% 
     Approval   Issue   
     99.1   69.91   
 
 
38. APPENDIX D: DATA OF EFFICIENCY MEASURE FROM LIVE-EXERCISES 
 






HIH Monitor ICT Terminal Device 
Sent Received Ack Eff Sent Received Ack Eff 
1 None 12/11/2006 10:19 10:21  0.00%    0.00% 
2 AREA 12/11/2006 10:19 10:21  96.67% 10:24 10:24  98.89% 
3 None 3/4/2007 10:10 10:35  0.00%    0.00% 
4 AREA 3/4/2007 10:10 10:35  83.33% 10:49 10:50  87.78% 
5 AREA 11/26/2006 10:25 10:35  87.78% 10:46 10:46  82.22% 




10:25 10:35  61.11% 11:10 11:10  100.00% 




10:25 10:35  87.78% 10:46 10:46  97.78% 
RAD 10:25 10:35  92.22% 10:42 10:42  100.00% 




10:15 10:20  54.67% 10:54 10:54  85.33% 
RAD 10:15 10:20  0.00%    0.00% 
11 VSAT 5/9/2007 10:15 10:20  0.00%    0.00% 




   0.00%    0.00% 





   0.00%    0.00% 




9:15 9:16  97.78% 9:18 9:18  97.78% 
RAD 9:15 9:16  92.22% 9:20 9:23  96.67% 
16 MOP 3/17/2007 9:15 9:16  88.89% 9:24 9:26  97.78% 




9:15 9:16  97.78% 9:18 9:18  23.33% 
FXP 9:15 9:16  0.00%    0.00% 
19 MOP 3/17/2007 9:15 9:16  0.00%    0.00% 




20 MOP 3/11/2007 10:15 10:30  77.78% 10:50 10:50  97.78% 
21 AREA 3/11/2007 10:15 10:30  97.78% 10:32 10:32  85.56% 




10:19 10:21  96.67% 10:24 10:24  98.89% 
FXP 10:19 10:21  84.44% 10:35 10:35  98.89% 
24 MOP 2/25/2007 10:19 10:21  87.78% 10:32 10:32  94.44% 




10:19 10:21  96.67% 10:24 10:24  98.89% 




10:19 10:21  96.67% 10:24 10:24  98.89% 




10:20 10:23  98.89% 10:24 10:24  91.11% 
FXP 10:20 10:23  90.00% 10:32 10:32  100.00% 
29 FXP 3/10/2007 10:20 10:23  90.00% 10:32 10:32  98.89% 
30 MOP 2/25/2007 10:15 10:18  0.00%    0.00% 




10:15 10:18  97.78% 10:20 10:20  100.00% 
MOP 10:15 10:18  0.00%    0.00% 
 






ICT Guardian ERP Coordinator 
Sent Eff Ack Eff Sent Eff Ack Eff 
1 None 12/11/2006    0.00% 10:36 10:43  47.78% 
2 AREA 12/11/2006 10:24 10:25  86.67% 10:36 10:43  47.78% 
3 None 3/4/2007    0.00% 10:47 10:51  63.33% 
4 AREA 3/4/2007 10:50 11:00  94.44% 10:55 10:55  44.44% 
5 AREA 11/26/2006 10:46 11:02  82.22% 11:02 11:02  100.00% 




11:10 11:10  97.78% 11:12 11:13  74.44% 




10:46 10:48  95.56% 10:50 10:55  83.33% 
RAD 10:42 10:42  91.11% 10:50 10:55  83.33% 




10:55 11:05  80.00% 11:10 11:15  66.67% 
RAD    0.00% 11:10 11:15  66.67% 
11 VSAT 5/9/2007    0.00% 10:40 10:41  66.67% 




   0.00%    0.00% 




   0.00%    0.00% 
RAD    0.00%    0.00% 
15 
AREA 3/17/2007 9:19 9:20  91.11% 9:27 9:30  68.89% 
RAD 3/17/2007    0.00% 9:27 9:30  68.89% 




16 MOP 3/17/2007    0.00% 10:26 10:29  67.78% 




10:26 10:27  96.67% 10:29 10:30  71.11% 
FXP 10:26 10:27  96.67% 10:29 10:30  71.11% 
19 MOP 3/17/2007 10:27 10:29  95.56% 10:31 10:32  51.11% 
20 MOP 3/11/2007 10:50 10:52  93.33% 10:56 10:58  73.33% 
21 AREA 3/11/2007 10:32 10:45  83.33% 10:47 10:55  63.33% 




10:24 10:25  86.67% 10:36 10:40  62.22% 
FXP 10:35 10:36  98.89% 10:36 10:40  62.22% 
24 MOP 2/25/2007 10:32 10:37  93.33% 10:38 10:47  58.89% 




10:24 10:25  84.44% 10:38 10:45  53.33% 




10:24 10:25  96.67% 10:27 10:30  44.44% 




10:27 10:32  88.89% 10:37 10:39  88.89% 
FXP 10:32 10:32  94.44% 10:37 10:39  88.89% 
29 FXP 3/10/2007 10:32 10:33  94.44% 10:37 10:39  88.89% 
30 MOP 2/25/2007    0.00%    0.00% 




10:20   0.00%    0.00% 
MOP    0.00%    0.00% 
 
 
Table 48 - Efficiency data summary for all functions in Tables 20 & 21 
 ICT Exercise Exercise Hazard Exercise  
NO Name Date End Time Duration Detect Impact MTTF Comments 
1 None 12/11/2006 11:23 1:23 10:00 11:30 92% 
ICTG Incompetent 
in documenting 
mag, Delay in 
ICTG contacting 
ERPC 
2 AREA 12/11/2006 11:23 1:23 10:00 11:30 92% 
ICTG incompetent 
in documenting 
msg, Delay in 
ICTG contacting 
ERPC 
3 None 3/4/2007 11:20 1:20 10:00 11:30 89% 
Delay in HIH 
Monitor retrieving 
email for details 
4 AREA 3/4/2007 11:45 1:45 10:00 11:30 100% Delay in community 






5 AREA 11/26/2006 11:02 0:47 10:15 11:45 52% 
AREA had 2 bars 
and didn't receive 
alert because no 
FEC, signal 
strength must be > 
4 




11:35 1:20 10:15 11:45 89% Did not receive 1st alert, received 2nd, 
MOP 11:35 1:20 10:15 11:45 89% 
MOP Received 
alert but siren not 




11:05 0:50 10:15 11:45 56% 2nd received AREA alert 
RAD 11:05 0:50 10:15 11:45 56% 1st received RAD alert 




11:35 1:20 10:15 11:30 100%  
RAD 11:35 1:20 10:15 11:30 100% 
RAD was sent for 
repairs and had not 
received before 
simulations 
11 VSAT 5/9/2007 11:05 0:50 10:15 11:30 67%  
12 MOP 5/9/2007 11:05 0:50 10:15 11:30 67% 
RAD was used 
instead of MOP, 
could not get 




 0:00   0%  




 0:00   0%  
RAD  0:00   0%  
15 
AREA 3/17/2007 9:55 0:55 9:00 10:30 61% Delay in ICT-G receiving message 
RAD 3/17/2007 9:55 0:55 9:00 10:30 61% 
Did not receive 
RAD & No GSM 




with land line 
16 MOP 3/17/2007 10:55 1:55 9:00 10:30 100% 
No GSM Coverage 
bc of North East 
Conflict, District 






17 FXP 3/17/2007 10:55 1:55 9:00 10:30 100% 
No GSM Coverage 











AREA, No GSM 





FXP 10:55 1:55 9:00 10:30 100% 
No GSM Coverage 




19 MOP 3/17/2007 11:15 2:15 9:00 10:30 100% 
No GSM Coverage 




20 MOP 3/11/2007 11:20 1:20 10:00 11:30 89% 
Church bell and 
Mosque speakers 
announcement not 
heard by all in 
community 
21 AREA 3/11/2007 11:20 1:20 10:00 11:30 89%  
22 None 4/9/2006 11:30 1:30 10:00 11:30 100% 
Thalpitiya was 
excluded bc live-
exercises were run 
during ToT 
program as well as 
by Gov DMC and 





11:10 1:10 10:00 11:30 78%  
FXP 11:10 1:10 10:00 11:30 78%  
24 MOP 2/25/2007 11:15 1:15 10:00 11:30 83%  
25 None 12/11/2006 11:18 1:18 10:00 11:30 87%  
26 AREA 12/11/2006 11:20 1:20 10:00 11:30 89%  








11:17 1:17 10:00 11:30 86%  




10:47 0:32 10:15 11:45 36%  
FXP 10:47 0:32 10:15 11:45 36%  
29 FXP 3/10/2007 10:47 0:32 10:15 11:45 36%  





East conflict was a 
higher priority 
















East conflict was a 
higher priority 
MOP 11:30 1:30 10:00 11:30 100%  
 
 
39. APPENDIX E: DATA FOR CERTAINTY MEAURE OF ICT 
 




Deployment Min Max Mean Score 
1 None - - - - 
2 AREA 2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
3 None  - - - -0 
4 AREA 2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
5 AREA 2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
6 VSAT 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
7 AREA+MOP 2.00 7.00 3.50 0.82 1.00 5.00 3.00 0.88 
8 AREA+RAD 2.00 7.00 3.00 0.73 1.00 5.00 2.00 0.73 
9 FXP 2.00 5.00 2.50 0.62 




10 AREA+RAD 2.00 7.00 3.50 0.82 11 1.00 5.00 2.00 0.73 
12 VSAT 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.73 
13 MOP 1.00 5.00 3.00 0.88 
14 AREA+MOP 
- - - - 
- - - - 
15 AREA+RAD 
- - - - 
- - - - 
16 AREA+RAD 
2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
1.00 5.00 2.00 0.73 
17 MOP 1.00 5.00 2.00 0.73 
18 FXP 2.00 5.00 2.00 0.50 
19 AREA+FXP 
2.00 7.00 3.00 0.73 
2.00 5.00 2.50 0.62 
20 MOP 1.00 5.00 2.50 0.82 
21 MOP 1.00 5.00 4.00 0.95 
22 AREA 2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
23 None - - - 0.00 
24 AREA+FXP 
2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
1.00 5.00 3.00 0.88 
25 MOP 1.00 5.00 4.00 0.95 
26 None - - - 0.00 
27 AREA+MOP 
2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
1.00 5.00 3.00 0.88 
28 AREA+FXP 
2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
2.00 5.00 3.00 0.73 
29 AREA+FXP 
2.00 7.00 4.00 0.88 
2.00 5.00 3.00 0.73 
30 MOP 1.00 5.00 3.00 0.88 
31 FXP 2.00 5.00 3.00 0.73 
32 AREA+MOP 
2.00 7.00 3.50 0.82 




Table 50 Mean certainty for each of the ICT deployments 
ICT 
























































40. APPENDIX F: EFFECTIVENESS DATA FOR ALL THE CLIQUES 
 
40.1. Full CAP Completeness 
 
Table 51 Description of the ICT capabilities for the Full CAP Completeness set of parameters 
Parameter AREA MOP RAD FXP VSAT 
Ethnicity Text is only in 
English; audio 
channel can 
carry a voice 
message in any 
languages. 




display a SMS 
text message 




















































Multimedia Text and 
Audio 
Text only Text only Audio only Text only 
 
Table 52 Rating for the ICTs for effectiveness of relaying a Complete Full CAP message 





Ethnicity 1.00 0.15 1.00 1.00 0.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 
All-media All-
hazards 0.95 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Multimedia 0.90 0.50 0.50 0.80 0.50 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Rating of Full CAP 
Completeness 0.86 0.05 0.35 0.64 0.05 0.86 0.86 0.86 




40.2. Active Alert Function 
 
Table 53 Description of the ICT capabilities for the Active Alerting set of parameters 
Parameter AREA MOP RAD FXP VSAT 






return SMS is 
sent to SMSC 
when message 





return SMS is 
sent to SMSC 
when message 





call is real time 




























Table 54 Rating of ICTs for effectiveness of Alerting the Last-Mile Communities 





Accountability 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Wakeup 0.87 0.95 0.87 0.85 0.70 0.87 0.87 0.95 
Rating of Alerting 





The WorldSpace AREA and Speedcast VSAT systems required that the project invest in some of the 
infrastructure such as purchasing a dedicated audio channel and installing satellite ground station for 
the AREA and VSAT respectively. Although Table 14 shows the infrastructure cost these values are 
not taken in to the calculation of the TCO.  
 
Table 55 Costs associated with each of the ICTs 










1422000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90000.00 
Terminal Device Fixed  8000.00 25000.00 15000.00 18000.00 100000.00 









0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Service Fixed Cost  0.00 1000.00 1000.00 0.00 50000.00 




1000.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 0.00 
Number of Active Units Units 56 12 6 9 2 




44000.00 44000.00 34000.00 36000.00 150000.00 
 
 
Table 56 Total Cost of Ownership per house hold over three years 







TCO of deployed 
ICTs for 3 year 44000 44000 34000 36000 150000 88000 78000 
80000.0
0 
TCO Per Family 
for 3 years 440 440 340 360 1500 880 780 800.00 
Effectiveness 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.79 0.58 0.62 
 
 
Although the ICT Guardians were expected to document the daily journal it was not carried out. 
Therefore, data on Integration of ICT in to daily life of the community is based on perception and a 
few random interviews with the ICT owners. Researchers acknowledge that this data is not substantial 
evidence.  
 
Table 57 Description of the ICT integration in to daily life of community’s perceptions 
AREA MOP RAD FXP VSAT 
Enjoyed listening 
to foreign NEWS 
channels such as 
BBC or NDTV as 




show usage high 
during calamities 
such as when the 
Northeast conflict 
broke out in 
January 2007. 
Not used at all 
negligible use of 
FM radio. 
Monthly bills 
show usage high 
during calamities 
such as when the 
Northeast conflict 
broke out in 
January 2007. 
Highly used by 











Table 58 Rating of ICTs for effectiveness of Adoptability 





Affordability 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.78 0.62 0.58 
Utilization 0.70 0.10 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.70 
Rating of 





Table 59 Weight of the ICTs in Kg 
AREA MOP RAD FXP VSAT 
DAMB-R2, 
Linear antenna 




2.4m dish antenna, 
iDirect modem, and 
Power unit 
0.1680 0.1250 3.6000 0.7500 44.6000 
Note – The weight of the AREA+MOP, AREA+RAD, and AREA+FXP is the aggregate of the two 
units 
 
Table 60 Volume of the ICTs in cubic meters 




0.1086 0.275 0.0168 Modem + Power 0.0508 
Width DAMB-R2: 
0.0900 0.0582 0.175 0.0189 
Modem + Power 
0.2889 
Height DAMB-R2: 
0.0250 0.0237 0.0035 0.0077 





0.0003 0.0001 0.0017 0.0024 0.0035 




- - - - 1.2724 
Aggregated 
Volume 0.0003 0.0001 0.0017 0.0024 1.2759 
Note – The volume of the AREA+MOP, AREA+RAD, and AREA+FXP is the aggregate of the two 
units 
 




Table 61 Lifetime of Power of ICTs in hours 















8.00 36.00 4.00 8.00 0.5 
Note – The lifetime of the AREA+MOP, AREA+RAD, and AREA+FXP is the aggregate of the two 
units because one unit can be powered down when the other is operational. 
 
 
Table 62 Rating of ICTs for effectiveness of Miniaturization 





Weight 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Volume 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 
longevity 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.03 1.00 0.75 1.00 
Rating of 





Table 63 Bi-directionality of ICTs in terms of upstream and downstream 









only after alert 
has been sent 








Table 64 Rating of ICTs for effectiveness of Two-way communication 













41. APPENDIX G: OUTCOME OF THE ICT IN THE FIELD 
 
41.1. WorldSpace Addressable Satellite Radio System 
 
Reliability of transmitting CAP Messages 
 
Initial test results show all devices to take less than 7.2 seconds to push the alert messages to the end 
user AREA devices. The signal path for the alert message is from the Toulouse server to the Singapore 
BOC, interfacing with the BC-LAN and inserting the binary coded CAP message into the OAAC 
channel (BCID 2000) for decoding by the DAMB-R2. As DAMB-R2 was able to receive and interpret 
the alert message, it appears that the CAP coding, binary conversion, routing to the correct port in 
Singapore are happening correctly.  
 
In terms of certainty there was no issue in receiving the minimum signal strength 4 of 7 bars to receive 
text and audio alerts. The WS worked without fail in all of the coastal community live-exercises, 
accept for one case when the antenna was not properly aligned for minimum required signal strength. 
There was a situation where the CDMA and GSM terrestrial public networks work instructed to be 
turned off by the Government of Sri Lanka in the North-East conflict areas during militaryy operations. 
However, the satellite based one-way system was operational and was able to transmit alerts during the 
field trials in these conflict areas. The average certainty of the WS AREA devices ranked to be 0.88 
based on the average signal strength at each of the measuring points in the communities. 
 
Efficiency as a function of time was measured from the instant the HIH staff created and issued the 
CAP message through the ANNY Networks to the moment the message was received, decoded, and 
recorded by the ICT-G in the community. In order to receive the text of all the elements, due to the 
limited 80 character display, the user has to press one of the control buttons of the terminal device to 
jump to the next text element. This step-by-step operation of scrolling and recording the text message 
took 2 - 3 minutes.  The HIH staff would spend 7 – 12 minutes, depending on the length of the 
message to record the audio and upload to the server. Thereafter, the message would be queued 
broadcasted within a few seconds. The WS system for the first set of live-exercises, with respect to a 
tsunami alert anticipating a 90 minute period, ranked to have an efficiency of 0.87. 
 
 
Effectiveness of the ‘Terminal Device 
 
CAP Complete -- The WS additional ‘External Box’  could display the entire CAP message. The 
‘External Box’ was not tested in the field (i.e. in the communities). The DAMB-R2 tested in the field 
could display the CAP elements: <msgType>, <scope>, <sender>, , <status>, <category>, <urgency>, 
<severity>, <certainty>, and <event>. These elements were adequate to provide the ICT-G with the 
type of hazard and the priority level but inadequate to carry a complete alert bulletin with full 
instructions. However, the audio message is capable of carrying the <description> element of the CAP 
message. Both the text and audio components together form the mandatory elements of the CAP 
Profile for Sri Lanka; as a result score a 0.95 on the ability to carry the necessary and sufficient 
elements of a CAP message. The English text messages received in the rural English illiterate 
communities were ineffective. Hence, an alternative was when issuing an alert using the ANNY 




Network the HIH staff would instruct the interface to auto switch the audio channel of the DAMB-R2 
to the SarvoTalk (BCID 950) channel. Thereafter, the HIH staff would record and upload an audio 
(voiced) version of the <description> element of the CAP message, which would carry the complete 
bulletin in the three national languages: Sinhala, Tamil, and English. The scoring method also 
emphaisesd that the ICT be capable of transmit both audio and text, which gave the AREA a 0.95 score 
for CAP Compliant (i.e. being CAP Complete). 
 
Two-way – The WS systems being a one-to-multi-point system would score an absolute zero in terms 
of effectiveness because the research emphasised the importance of tow-way communication in 
warning systems. Therefore, the research had coupled the AREA units with an alternate two-way 
device such as a GSM mobile phone or CDMA normadic phone. The ICT-G would use the mobile 
phone or the normadic phone to communicate with the HIH to notify them of any local hazards 
(upstream communication), which was not possible using the AREA units. This marriage would 
increase the effectiveness score in terms of two-way of the AREA with mobile phone or AREA with 
normadic phone to 0.85. 
 
Adoptability – Total cost of ownership and integration of the system into the community daily life 
measures the adoptability of the system. The cost of an AREA terminal device is well under USD 80. 
However, the audio channel is what costs the most. Currently the HazInfo project is paying for the 
audio channel. Sarvodaya being present in 15,000 villages in Sri Lanka can make it affordable to the 
communities once the system is implemented in all those villages at which point the per user cost for 
the Channel subscription fee will be affordable. One belief in the world of ‘public alerting’ is that the 
best alerting device is the one that is ‘on’ and is ‘used’ all the time. The content for SarvoTalk (BCID 
950) is developed by Sarvodaya. The channel is operational around-the-clock where Sarvodaya 
broadcasts community-development based content to its member communities. There are a dozen 
trained youth scattered in the coastal districts. They record content on to simple MP3 player/recorders 
and email the files or deliver the files burned on CDs to the HIH. The HIH has employed a Media 
Assistant who edits the content received from the communities and uploads on to the WS SarvoTalk 
channel. Besides normal weekly programs the HIH also captures special events conducted by 
Sarvodaya such as workshops and community events that are later broadcast to the communities, 
which keeps the channel alive. 
 
Miniaturization – The idea of the LM-HWS was to use the system during pre and post disasters; where 
one aspect of the system is to provide alerts with adequate time for the communities to execute their 
ERPs to protect themselves from the hazards and the second aspect is after the disaster when the 
community livelihoods are destroyed the system must would communicate with the community during 
response and recovery stages. Therefore, the terminal devices must be portable. The research assessed 
Miniaturization in terms of the longevity of DC power consumption, volume of the complete terminal 
device, and weight of the terminal device (including antenna and battery). The WS AREA-B system 
can run on a 12v battery that weighs less than 3kg for 8 hours comfortably. The battery can be 
recharged using a solar panel. The rating for the AREA unit (excluding the solar panel) based on the 
fact that the unit must function consecutively for at least 30 hours, must weigh less than 30kg (for a 
single person to carry comfortably), and has a volume that fits in a small suitcase or backpack, scored 
0.68. The score improves to 0.95 when the portable solar panel is included in to the rating, which 
assumes DC power is available for 18 hours (assuming 10 hours powered by solar panel during day 
time and 8 hours of battery power during night time). 





Alerting – This is an effectiveness feature equally important as CAP Completeness. The parameters: 
Active Alert Function and Message Receipt Acknowledgement are what determine the Alerting 
effectiveness. The message receipt acknowledgement is different from Two-way or upstream 
communication. This function is important for the message ‘recipients’ to notify the message ‘sender’ 
the receipt of message [8]. Since WS uses forward-error-correction encryption and decryption for 
audio and text packets it is almost impossible for the ICT-G to receive a mutated or truncated message, 
provided the uplink and satellite doesn’t fail during transmission. The ICT-G would use the spouse 
terminal device married to the AREA such as the GSM mobile phone or CDMA nomadic phone to 
acknowledge message receipt. During a crisis situation both the GSM and CDMA networks get 
congested and the acknowledgement would be delayed. Unlike an SMS controller that would receive a 
return message upon the user accepting the SMS the WS system does not have a message returned to 
the server, which the HIH staff could query to check if the messages have been delivered to the end 
user. Active Alert Function describes the basis of being able to get the attention of the ICT-G. The 
AREA units have an audible alarm. The research ranks an audible siren higher over a flashing light or 
a vibration which must me in visible range or attached the ICT-G respectively [8]. Although the AREA 
has the ability to ‘wakeup’ (or get the attention) of the ICT-G, it is weak in the message receipt 
acknowledgement as it must rely on an alternate system. Therefore, the overall effectiveness for 
Alerting scores a 0.22. 
 
 
41.2. Dialog Disaster and Emergency Warning System 
 
Uncertainty and Inefficiencies in Messaging 
 
The terminal device reliability measures: certainty and efficiency were recorded on the day of the live-
exercises. The results in Fig. 5 are a summary (average) of the measures obtained during each of the 
exercises conducted in the individual communities.  
 
Certainty in the RAD devices dropped below a benchmark of 0.85 because the signal strength in 
location of the devices measured between 2 – 3 bars. However, this did not effect the SMS alert 
coming through because 1 bar was sufficient to receive the alerts and activate the alerting operational 
states of the device. The research experienced cases of 0 (zero) certainty due to unquantifiable reasons 
where the community ICT-G had accidentally deleted the J2ME applet, had forgotten to charge the 
battery of the MOP, had not paid the phone bill, communities in the North and East conflict areas of 
Sri Lanka being denied GSM access because the Government of Sri Lanka was conducting military 
operations and had instructed the mobile operators turn of the cells in those conflict areas.  
 
In some communities the alert message was not received during the first attempt of pushing the 
messages to the MOPs using the DEWN Internet application. Therefore, the efficiency dropped as a 
result of excess time taken to repeat the process in order for the MOPs to receive the alerts.  
 
Normally both GSM devices take less than 30 seconds to push the alert messages to the end user 
devices. No more that 1 – 3 units were used during any given trial. Therefore the trials were not 
effected by congestion even thought both solutions use a store-and-forward method to push the SMS 




alerts to each device. Ten MOPs were tested in the different communities. Hence, the additional 
samples used in the trials compared to the 2 RAD units used the research had the opportunity to learn 
lessons of unsuccessful behaviors. The MOPs tested in the rural environments, where the ICT 
incompetence of the ICT-G in the communities using non traditional feature introduced by inserting a 
J2ME applet, for example, further effected to the efficiencies because the menu and instructions were 
in English, incomprehensible by folks in the rural areas. The RAD score a high rating in terms 
efficiency because only 2 units were used in the field trials and they both happened to performed quite 
well in the urban environment. The distinctly marked 4 buttons in he RAD opposed to the menu driven 
MOP simplified the transition between operating states to increase efficiencies. 
 
 
Effectiveness of Alerting the ICT-G 
 
Both units, the RAD and MOP, have good active alerting capabilities because they both have audible 
sirens and a flashing light. The MOP can be weak at times when the device is conceiled in a trouser 
pocket or is ditached from the ICT-G at a distance; where both the audible siren and light may not be 
strong enough to get immediate attention of the ICT-G. However, the RAD is the most effective unit of 
all the ICTs tested. The RAD would gain the immediate attention of the ICT-G as a result of the loud 
siren and externaly mounted large orange light even from a distance of 50 meters.  
 
Of the two units the MOP has the best Miniaturization features; where the ICT-G can carry the MOP, 
weighing less than 200 grams (Nokia 6600 weighs 130 grams), in an external belt-case or the pocket, 
whcich also frees their hands. Comparitively, the weight and size of the RAD requires a single person 
to carry the unit by its fixed handle or, as an alternative, carry the RAD in a backpack. The RAD works 
both on AC and DC power. However, the 12v battery that provides the power to the unit had 
approximately 4 hours or less of a life time, when the unit went through all the operational sates in 
receiving multiplicity of repeated alerts . Unlike the MOP, which is quite versatile, the RAD does not 
provide utilities other than the FM radio and for alerting for the average citizen to use in their daily 
lives. The initial design of the units were for Government First-Responders; where the sets telephony 
feature of the unit was denied. Therefore, the community users were not able to use the unit to make 
voice calls or send SMS as an when they wanted, restricting upstream comunication. The voice call 
was active as a ‘call-back” feature only following the receipt of and alert; where the user would press a 
button to call back a central information source at a pre programmed phone number. The restriction in 
two-way comunication in the RAD ranked very low compared to the MOP, which was unrestricted. In 
regards to CAP Completeness, ony the MOP was capable of receiving messages in the three languages: 
Sinahala, Tamil, and English. The RAD was capable of receiving Englishe text messages. 
 
 
Shortcomings of the ICTs with the use of CAP 
 
The 2 GSM ICTs used in the project make use of the CAP message format. As illustrated in Table 3, 
each is only capable of displaying a limited number of the CAP elements, limiting the amount of alert 
message content that can be transmitted to the ICT-G. Consequently, during simulations, ICT-G 
recorded only the <msgType> and a truncated portion of the <description> elements because that’s all 
they received. Although, the RAD and MOP devices use the <description> element that could have 
carried a complete set of information, they were restricted to an overall message content limit of 270 




characters, which is insufficient to carry a meaningful unambiguous alert message. Message did not 
include <urgency>, <severity>, and <certainty> to enable ICT-Guardians to judge the Priority of the 
incident, which is mandatory for the CAP Profile for Sri Lanka. Therefore, both devices were only 
good for getting the attention of the ICT-G that there was an eminant threat but were forced to seek 
complete information from an alternate source. 
 
EXAMPLE 1: The simulations began at the HIH with the receipt of an email containing the critical 
information pertaining to a Cyclone hazard. The following abstract of the entire message contains the 
critical information of the message. 
 
“A SEVERE CATEGORY 4 CYCLONE is now current for HAMBANTOTA District coastal areas. 
At 10:00 am local time SEVERE TROPICAL CYCLONE MONTY was estimated to be 80 kilometers 
west of Hambantota and moving southeast at 10 kilometers per hour.”  
 
The HIH then transformed message to a CAP Message and entered the relevant information in to the 
DEWN HTTP application.  The <msgType> was set to “Warning” and the Cyclone message was 
inserted in to the <description> field. The Cyclone message was translated to Sinhala and Tamil 
languages to be used; especially with the MOP. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the elements of the CAP message received and parts of the message received by 
each of the devices. The RAD provided more information than the MOP but no a full message where it 
was truncated after 160 characters. The MOP displayed that there was a Cyclone warning in effect but 
had no additional information as to where and when the hazard is effective. 
 
Table 65 Messages received by the RAD and MOP 
RAD MOP 
“Warning A SEVERE CATEGORY 4 CYCLONE 
is now current for HAMBANTOTA District coastal 
areas. At 10:00 am local time SEVERE 
TROPICAL CYCLONE MONTY was estimated to 
be 80 kilometers west of Hamban” 
“Warning”  
 
“A SEVERE CATEGORY 4 CYCLONE” 
 
“ {same in Sinhala}” 
 
“ {same in Tamil” 
 
 
41.3. Solana Networks/Innovative Technologies VSAT/IPAS 
 
Reliability of the VSAT/IPAS 
 
In tests performed with IPAS, the message system appears to be very efficient and straightforward for 
composing and sending alerts. However, certain peculiarities were observed that will be important for 
both HIH Monitor message senders and ICT Guardian receivers to take note of. 
 
If the Internet connection is broken, the client may lose its subscription record and thus its 




configuration for receiving alerts. When this occurs, the client still appears to the user to be functioning 
correctly in its standby mode, but will not be triggered by an alert message until it is closed and 
restarted. At that point, its subscription record is reloaded and the client will function correctly again. 
 
However, even VSAT systems are not entirely risk free. Several factors can affect continuity of 
services. First, the earth stations must be perfectly aligned with the geostationary satellite and any 
small movement of the station can easily cause loss of signal. This can be problematic during severe 
weather events such as cyclones, requiring skilled technicians to realign dishes and restore services. 
Also, even when the satellite component of the network is functioning perfectly, loss of connectivity 
from the gateway to the Internet can also disrupt connectivity for accessing the IPAS server or clients. 
Such as the situation that occurred on 27 December 2006 when an earthquake in the Taiwan region 
severed the undersea fiber network connecting the Hong Kong Gateway to Europe and beyond. 
Further, any failure of equipment at the HIH or village nodes will cause message delivery failures.  
Two potential recurring issues are power loss and affects of heat on satellite modems. 
 
With the installation of the VSAT gateway at the HIH, two separate routes are now available to 
improve redundancy and diversity in routing to the IPAS server located in Canada. One route (Dialog) 
uses a domestic gateway to connect overseas with the return link for alerts traveling over the VSAT 
stations fed through a gateway in Hong Kong. The second route uses the Hong Kong gateway to 
connect the HIH to the Internet (in Hong Kong) and then is routed to the IPAS server whereupon the 
return path from the server is uplinked to HIH and the VSAT equipped villages via the Hong Kong 
gateway. In this latter case, the IPAS system can operate completely independently of the Sri Lankan 
domestic networks and adds another potential layer of disaster resiliency. 
 
 
Effectiveness of the System 
 
Because IPAS, in its current form, is not CAP-compliant, it has not been tested for CAP 
interoperability like the DEWN and ANNY applications, where a CAP message sent from the 
WorldSpace ANNY application is teleported to the Dialog-Microimage DEWN application and, 
thereafter, the DEWN application uploads the same message for dissemination. One advantage of 
IPAS is that unlike SMS and the basic AREA DAMB-R2 components, IPAS appears capable of 
carrying the equivalent of the entire CAP description field. IPAS alerts can also be received on any 
Internet enabled MS Windows computer and is not dependent on a dedicated network. However, IPAS 
currently only supports English language text messaging and cannot support Sinhala or Tami scripts in 
either the Server GUI for message creation or Client GUI for message display. 
 
The HIH depended exclusively upon a Dialog 128 kbps fixed terrestrial wireless link (bridge) for its 
Internet access.13
 
 This connection is terminated at the HIH through a modem which in turn is 
connected to a Local Area Network (LAN) through a data switch and a wireless 802.11g WiFi access 
point. Dialog provides 5 static IP addresses for use at the HIH. 
Before the VSAT facilities were operational, this fixed wireless link was used to test the IPAS server-
                                                 
13 The Dialog connection is now replaced  by the VSAT satellite connection and now serves as the backup connection. 




to-client connection and to enable the HIH staff to become familiar with IPAS message composition 
and dissemination. However, during this period, a series of problems concerning outbound Internet 
connectivity emerged and continued to plaque the tests, resulting in both the software timing out before 
messages could be fully entered into their templates and/or sent. These problems manifested 
themselves in the form of severe network congestion that caused lengthy delays in logging into the 
servers. After an extensive investigation, it was revealed that four separate issues were at the root of 
the problems. 
 
The first problem was caused by an incorrectly connected cable that was routing data packets from the 
WiFi access point router back into the main Dialog connection. This effectively caused the LAN to be 
flooded with excess packets, causing severe local congestion. Once correctly cabled, most of the 
congestion disappeared.  
 
The second problem was caused by the HIH workstations being connected to the WiFi access point, 
rather than through a cable connection to the Dialog router via the data switch. The WiFi access point 
appears to intermittently drop its signal, causing the link to time out and PCs to have to reinitialize 
their Internet connections through a DHCP setup. Each time this occurred, the connection to the IPAS 
servers broke and/or timed out. This problem was solved by connecting the PCs directly to the Dialog 
connection and assigning them a Dialog static IP address. 
 
The third problem was caused by congestion on the main Dialog backbone connection. This was 
discovered by conducting a trace route connection between the HIH and the final destination where the 
server resided; in the case of IPAS, the server resides Canada. A trace route test sends a series of data 
packets through the network and measures and analyzes the quality of the link according to how long it 
takes to get an acknowledgement back from all of the locations where the packets are routed on their 
way to the final destination (latency), along with how many of the sent packets were dropped in transit 
(packet loss).  The trace route tests revealed that, at times, there were significant latencies in packet 
delivery possibly due to congestion or a malfunctioning router at the Dialog gateway, which were 
resulting in timeouts and excessive packet losses en route to their final destination.  Results of the route 
traces were sent to Dialog who, in turn, made changes to the packet routing. The routing now appears 
to be stable. 
 
The fourth problem was caused by the Dialog radio antenna being mounted on a tall pipe that tends to 
sway in the wind, moving the antenna in and out of focus.   
 
Power outages and lightning storms -- VSATs and PCs require an alternative power source during 
power interruptions. Presently, neither the HIH nor the ICT Guardians possess alternative backup 
power to mitigate the impacts of frequent or prolonged power interruptions. Often, to prevent power 
surges, equipment is unplugged during lightning storms. 
 
Further in order to keep satellite modems functioning properly they must be protected from excess heat 
and require proper ventilation and some form of air conditioning. Even accidentally covering the 
ventilation holes on the modem’s cover can cause equipment malfunctions. 
 
  




42. APPENDIX H – DATA FROM SILENT TESTS 
 
Table 66 Silent test results 06 to 10 August 2007 
No Date  Time  Village  Device No. ICT  Status Remarks 
1   Moratuwa 602164957 FXP Working   
2 06.08.2007 12.03PM Thirukkadalar 602269982 FXP Working   Line is Not Clear 
3 06.08.2007 12.07PM Oluvil 602679957 FXP Working   
4 10.08.2007 9.23AM Samudragama 602269981 FXP Not working Phone is Currently Not Available 
5 10.08.2007 9.26AM Shithtandikudipuram 602659950 FXP Not working Phone is Currently Not Available 
6 06.08.2007 1.10PM Waththegama 602418972 FXP Working   
7 06.08.2007 12.50PM Kottegoda 602418973 FXP Not working Ringing NO Answer 
8 06.08.2007 12.54PM Idivinna  602489978 FXP working   
9   Periyakallar 602659955 FXP Not working   
10   Oluvil 602679957 FXP Working   Now the Line is Clear 
11 07.08.2007 10.08AM Palmunnai 773428477 MOP Working   
12 06.08.2007 4.28PM Welhengoda 773428478 MOP Working   
13 10.08.2007 3.42PM Thalalla South 773428479 MOP Working  DEWN software is not working  
14 10.08.2007 3.37PM Meddewatte 773428480 MOP Working   
15 06.08.2007 4.38PM Saturkondan 773428481 MOP Not working  Line is Disconnected  
16 06.08.2007 2.22PM Diyalagoda 773428482 MOP Working   
17 10.08.2007 3.22PM Thambiluvil 773428483 MOP Working   
18 10.08.2007 3.45Pm 
Niluka 
Wicramasinhge  773428484 MOP Working   
19 06.08.2007 4.25PM Nindaur 773428485 MOP Working   
20 07.08.2007 10.23AM HUB Disconnected 773428486 MOP Not working  Line is Temporally Disconnected  
21 07.08.2007 3.01PM Samodagama 773428487 MOP Working  DEWN Software is Uninstalled  
22   Rajiw   773428488 MOP Working   
23   Moratuwella  
10000000 
00068845 AREA   




24   Maggona 
10000000 
00068841 AREA   
25 07.08.2007 4.10PM Palamunai  
10000000 
00068842 AREA   
26 07.08.2007 4.22PM Warregama South  
10000000 
00068840 AREA   
27   Brahmanawatta  
10000000 
00068847 AREA   
28   Kalmunai II 
10000000 
00068849 AREA   
29 06.08.2007 4.28PM Wellhengoda 
10000000 
00068848 AREA   
30   Susiripala  
10000000 
00068843 AREA   
31   Talalla South  
10000000 
00068844 AREA   
32   Wennamulla  
10000000 
00068800 AREA   
33   Panama North  
10000000 
00068805 AREA   
34   Sithandikudipuram  
10000000 
00068801 AREA   
35   Modara Pelessa 
10000000 
00068806 AREA   
36   Munnai 
10000000 
00068802 AREA   
37   Tondamanaru  
10000000 
00068807 AREA   
 
 




Table 67 Silent test results 15 to 20 October 2007 
No Date Time Village Device No ICT Status Remarks 
1 16.10.2007 9.10AM  Moratuwa 602164957 FXP Working  Some times it is not clear 
2 16.10.2007 9.22AM Thirukkadalar 602269982 FXP Working   
3 16.10.2007 9.25AM Oluvil 602679957 FXP Working   
4 16.10.2007 9.26Am Samudragama 602269981 FXP Not working  
could not do the silent test because  
phone is not contactable 
5 16.10.2007 9.34AM Shithtandikudipuram 602659950 FXP Not working 
Could not  do the Silent test 
because the phone is Power off 
6 18.10.2007 9.46AM Waththegama 602418972 FXP Not working 
Could not do the silent test because  
phone is not reachable 
7 17.10.2007 9.51AM Kottegoda 602418973 FXP Not working 
Could not do the silent test because  
phone is not contactable 
8 18.10.2007 9.55AM Idivinna  602489978 FXP Working   
9 17.10.2007 10.04AM Periyakallar 602659955 FXP Ringing  Phone is Ringing but no answer  
10 17.10.2007 0 Palmunnai 773428477 MOP Working   
11 16.10.2007 10.04Am Welhengoda 773428478 MOP Working  
AREA is working but could not do 
the silent test because the person is 
on the way to Sarvodaya Head 
office  
12 20.10.2007 4.28Pm Thalalla South 773428479 MOP Working  DEWN software is not working  
13 20.10.2007 3.42PM Meddewatte 773428480 MOP Working   
14 16.10.2007 3.37PM Saturkondan 773428481 MOP Not working  Line is Disconnected  
15 16.10.2007 4.38PM Diyalagoda 773428482 MOP Working   
16 20.10.2007 2.22PM Thambiluvil 773428483 MOP Working   
17 20.10.2007 3.22PM 
Niluka 
Wicramasinhge  773428484 MOP Working   
18 16.10.2007 3.45PM Nindaur 773428485 MOP Working   
19 17.10.2007 4.26PM HUB 773428486 MOP Not working  Phone  is Temporally Disconnected  
20 17.10.2007 10.23AM Samodagama 773428487 MOP Working  DEWN Software is Uninstalled  
21 18.10.2017 10.30AM Rajiw   773428488 MOP Working   




22 15.10.2007 11.10Am Moratuwella  
10000000 
00068845 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
23 15.10.2007 11.35Am Maggona 
10000000 
00068841 AREA - 
Could not do the silent test because 
it is a Religion problem she is 
handed over the AREA Device to 
Temple through the Sarvodaya 
District Center. Have no any 
contact details of the temple 
persons.  
24 15.10.2007 11.42AM Palamunai  
10000000 
00068842 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
25 18.10.2007 9.46AM Warregama South  
10000000 
00068840 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact  
lines are not working .Could not do 
the silent test  
26 18.10.2007 10.01AM Brahmanawatta  
10000000 
00068847 AREA - 
The Power charger is not inside. 
After the rapier the power charger 
is misplaced  
27 18.10.2007 10.11AM Kalmunai II 
10000000 
00068849 AREA - could Not contact to person  
27 18.10.2007 10.15Am Wellhengoda 
10000000 
00068848 AREA Working   
29 18.10.2007 10.17AM Susiripala  
10000000 
00068843 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
30 18.10.2007 10.20Am Talalla South  
10000000 
00068844 AREA Working  Some times it is not working  
31 18.10.2007 10.49Am Wennamulla  
10000000 
00068800 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
32 18.10.2007 11.07AM Panama North  10000000 AREA - The ICT person's all of contact 




00068805 lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
33 18.102007 11.10Am Sithandikudipuram  
10000000 
00068801 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
34 18.102007 11.18Am Modara Pelessa 
10000000 
00068806 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
34 - - Munnai 
10000000 
00068802 AREA -  
36 - - Tondamanaru  
10000000 
00068807 AREA -  
 
 
Table 68 Silent test results 26 to 30 December 2007 
No Date Time Village Device No ICT Status Remarks 
1 26.12.2007 11.16AM Moratuwa 602164957 FXP Working   
2 26.12.2007 11.32AM Thirukkadalar 602269982 FXP Working   
3 26.12.2007 11.38AM Oluvil 602679957 FXP Working   
4 26.12.2007 11.38.AM Samudragama 602269981 FXP Not working 
Power OFF ; could not do the silent 
test because  phone is Power Off 
5 26.12.2007 11.40AM Shithtandikudipuram 602659950 FXP Not working 
Power OFF ; Could not  do the 
Silent test because the phone is 
Power off 
6 26.12.2007 12.00.PM Waththegama 602418972 FXP Not working 
Power OFF ; Could not do the 
silent test because  phone is not 
reachable 
7 26.12.2007 11.48AM Kottegoda 602418973 FXP Not working  
Could not do the silent test because  
phone is not contactable 
8 26.12.2007 11.45AM Idivinna  602489978 FXP Working   
9 26.12.2007 11.42AM Periyakallar 602659955 FXP Ringing  No answer  




10 26.12.2007 11.46AM Palmunnai 773428477 MOP Working   
11 26.12.2007 12.25PM Welhengoda 773428478 MOP Working   
12 26.12.2007 1.03PM Thalalla South 773428479 MOP Working   
13 26.12.2007 1.06PM Saturkondan 773428481 MOP Not working  Line is Disconnected  
14 26.12.2007 1.07PM Diyalagoda 773428482 MOP Ringing Not Responded 
15 26.12.2007 1.08PM Thambiluvil 773428483 MOP Not working Out of Service; disconnected 
16 26.12.2007 11.17AM 
Niluka 
Wicramasinhge  773428484 MOP Working   
17 26.12.2007 1.25PM Nindaur 773428485 MOP Working   
18 26.12.2007 11.18AM HUB Disconnected 773428486 MOP Not working Phone line  is Disconnected  
19 26.12.2007 11.18AM Rajiw   773428488 MOP Working   
20 30.12.2007 9.48Am Moratuwella  
10000000 
00068845 AREA Not working 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
21 30.12.2007 9.49AM Maggona 
10000000 
00068841 AREA Not working 
The ICT Person's Contact line is 
can not be reach  
22 30.12.2007 9.50Am Palamunai  
10000000 
00068842 AREA working  
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
23 30.12.2007 12.25PM Warregama South  
10000000 
00068840 AREA Ringing 
The ICT person's all of contact  
lines are not working .Could not do 
the silent test  





The Power charger is not available. 
After the repair MOP the power 
charger is misplaced  
25  12.25PM Kalmunai II 
10000000 
00068849 AREA - could Not contact to person  
26 30.12.2007 12.27PM Wellhengoda 
10000000 
00068848 AREA Working   
27 30.12.2007 1.03PM Susiripala  
10000000 
00068843 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  




28 26.12.2007 1.06PM Talalla South  
10000000 
00068844 AREA Working  Some times the signal is problem 
29 26.12.2007 9.51Pm Wennamulla  
10000000 
00068800 AREA - 
The ICT person's all of contact 
lines are not working. Could not do 
the silent test  
30 30.12.2007 9.53PM Panama North  
10000000 
00068805 AREA - 
Could Not contact the person; The 
ICT person's all of contact lines are 
not working. Could not do the 
silent test  
31 30.12.2007 9.54PM Sithandikudipuram  
10000000 
00068801 AREA - 
Can not contact the person; The 
ICT person's all of contact line are 
switch off 
32 30.12.2007 12.01PM Modara Pelessa 
10000000 
00068806 AREA - 
Power off; The ICT Guidant Is no 
at the home. Spoke with his wife 
she said that the Device is not 
connect t the Power. 
33 -  Munnai 
10000000 
00068802 AREA - - 
34 -  Tondamanaru  
10000000 









43. APPENDIX I – OUTCOME OF ICT ON 12-SEP-2007 TSUNAMI ADVISORY 
 
Table 69 Email from Executive Director of Sarvodaya on Tsunami Watch 12-Sep-2007 
Dear All, 
 
It was quite an interesting learning experience how the country (Sri Lanka) reacted to yesterday's 
Tsunami warning following the earthquake in Indonesia yesterday and also the present alert following 
another quake around 5.30 a.m. this morning. 
 
Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Centre (SCDMC) went into immediate action and we 
were able to test "live" all our systems including the landlines, mobile phones and especially the 
addressable satellite radio (ASR). After the official Tsunami warning was given we prepared and sent 
regular alerts and updates to the Last Mile Project (IDRC supported) villages as well as the Sarvodaya 
District Centers in the coastal belt. We are receiving now reports of how effectively the messages were 
received.  
 
We were also able to identify weaknesses in our own systems at the Emergency Operations Centre 
(EOC) of SCDMC and today as I write this another Tsunami warning has been given and we are 
working on these weaknesses.  
 
We have also witnessed how much the national disaster warning system has to improve in terms of 
standard protocols etc. There was wide spread panic and uncoordinated response. 
 








Table 70 Performs of Mobile Phones on the real event of a Tsunami watch on 12-Sep-2007 
0 ICT G Name Tel No Message Status Remarks 
1 Hewawitharana 773428480 Not Received  Software Problem  
2 Ranjith  773428481 Not Received Service Disconnected 
0 Salee 773428482 Not Received Problem with provider service 
3 P.Alahuthurai 773428483 Received  
4 HIH 773428484 Received  
0 Rafeek 773428485 Not Received  Problem with provider service 
5 HIH 773428486 Not Received  Line is Disconnected 




6 J.A.C.Priyadarshani 773428487 Received Message  received but she couldn't 
understand message because the 
mobile  software is removed 
0 Not Nominated 773428488 Received  
7 A.M.Yasar 773428477 Received  
8 K.Nishantha  773428478 Not received  Problem with provider service 
0 Ajith Soyza 773428479 Received Software Problem; Message  received  
but couldn’t understand  because  
displayed only  the DEWN software 
name   
9 HIH Back up 773428476 Received  
10 HIH Back Up 773428475 Received  
 
 




44. APPENDIX J – DATA COLLECTION SHEETS 
 
44.1. Datasheet 1 – ICT Guardian Alert Log 
 
 Last Mile Hazard Warning System  
 
Last mile - 
  
 





















 ksl=;a l< oskh iy fõ,dj 
ntspapl;l NeuKk; jpfjpAk; 
Disseminate Date Time 
 
 
lreKdlr my; i|yka WmlrK w;ßka i¾fjdaoh wdmod f;dr;=re uOHia:dkfhka Tng ,enqKq NdKavh jgd rjqula w¢kak – 
jaT nra;J fPo;f;Fwpg;gpl;Ls;s cgfuzq;fspy; ru;Nthja mdu;j;j jfty; epiyaj;jhy; toq;fg;gl;l fUtpia Rw;wp tl;lkpl;Lf; fhl;Lf. 





















Remote Alarm Device 





ix{d ^ mrSlaIK fyda WoajSmk & my; j.=fjs igyka l, hq;= w;r Tn .kq ,enQ l%shd udra.h o igyka lrkak 
fpuhkj;jpw;F fpilf;fg; ngWk; vitNaDk; guPl;rhj;jpa my;yJ cz;ikahd vr;rupf;iffs; njhlu;ghd tptuj;ij  kw;Wk; re;ju;g;gj;ij 
gad;gLj;jpa tpjk; njhlu;ghf fPo;fhZk; gl;baiy )u;j;jp nra;J mDg;gpitf;fTk; 




























































































































.kq ,enq l%shdu¾.h 
Nkw;nfhz;l nraw;ghL 















ix{d Ynsoh ,enqfkao ? 
/ 
 / 
Did you hear the alerting 












ix{dj f;areus .ekSug myiqo ? 
/ 
 / 
Was the alert message easy to 
















/ Was the ICT easy to use? 

























































44.2. Datasheet 3 – Community drills evaluation form 
 
Page 1 Last Mile Hazard Warning System 
.ïudk fmryqre jevigygyk-m%yYakdj,sh iy idrdxYh  / 
,Wjpf;fl;l mdu;j;j vr;rupf;if xOq;F Kiw /fpuhkpa xj;jpif 
kjpg;gPl;L-rhuhk;rKk; tpdhg;gj;jpuKk; 




 .u / fpuhkk; / Village 
 
 osia;%slalh / khtl;lk; / District  
 oskh /jpfjp / Date  fõ,dj / Neuk; / Time  
 
Please fill in the answers to the questions by asking the questions from the village simulation participants that are at the 
final assembly point. 
 
ldKavh/ tu;f;fk; / Category 
 
msßñ / Mz; / Male .eyeKq / ngz; / Female <uhs /rpWtu; / Children  
.ïjdiskaf.a iyNd.s;ajh/ vz;zpf;if / 
Number  of Community 
Participants 
 
   
 
 
.ïjdis mjq,a ixLHdj / FLk;g vz;zpf;if / Number of Families in Community  
 .fus uqM ck.ykh/fpuhkj;jpd; nkhj;j rdj;njhif  / Total Community Population  
 
 





(a) .ïjdiska fldmuK ixLHdjla bj;ajSfñ ie,iqu ms,snoj ±kqj;aj isáfhao? / mtrufhy ntspNaw;wy; 
jpl;lk; njhlu;ghf vj;jid Ngu;fs; mwpe;Js;sdu; ? / How many knew the emergency evacuation plan 
for the community? 
 
(b) .ïjdiska fldmuK ixLHdjla bj;aùfñ ud¾.h ms,snoj wlue;a; m,lf,ao?/ vj;jid Ngu; ntspNaw;wy; 
ghijfs; gw;wp Fyg;gkile;jtu;fshf ,Ue;jdu; ? / How many were confused over evacuation routes? 
 
(c)  iEu wdmodjla i|ydu bj;ajhdfñ ie,iqula Tfì .ïjdiska i;=j ;snqfkao? (Tú /ke; / midj;J 
 mdu;j;jq;fSf;Fk; Kfk; nfhLf;ff;$ba jpl;lk; xd;W ,Uf;fpd;wjh ? 
  / Does your community have a plan for all-hazards (yes/no and reasons)? 
 
        (d)   bj;a fkdjqkq .ïjdiska msßila isáfhao? / ntspNaw;wypd;NghJ fpuhkj;jpy; VjhtnjhU gpupT   
  tpLg;gl;ljh ? / Were any parts of the village not evacuated? 
 
 (e)   bj;aùfñ ud¾.h yryd ndOl lsisjla ;snqfkao? (Wod:- ÿñßh yria ud¾., md,ñ, lgq lñì jeg,      
bj;al, fkdyels WmlrK) / ntspNaw;wy; ghijapy; VjhtJ jilfs; ,Ue;jdth ?     
(ghyq;fs;>Gifapuj flitfs>fjTfs;> Kw;fk;gp Ntspfs; ) Nghd;w / Were there any      
obstructions, stored materials, equipment blocking the evacuation paths, bridges, railway-crossings, doors,     









Q3 (a)  .ïjdiska fldmuK ixLHdjla bj;aùfñ fmryqrejg iyNd.s ùug wlue;a; m,lf,ao ?/ jid Ngu;fSf;F  ,e;j 
xj;jpifapy; fye;Jnfhs;s tpUg;gk; ,y;iy ? / How many did not want to participate in  the Simulations?  
 
(b) ikaksfúok WmlrK fol ne.ska ,o .ïjdiska fldmuK ixLHdjla bj;aùfñ fmryqrejg iyNd.sùo?   /  vj;jid 
Ngu; vspjpy; efuf;$ba – gytPdg;gl;Nlhu;fs; tUifj; je;jpUe;jhu;fs; ? 
  / How many mobility-in paired people present?  
 
(c) bj;aùfñ fmryqrejg iyNd.s fkdjSug fya;=?/ ,e;j xj;jpifapy; fye;Jnfhs;shjikf;F  fhuzj;ij fhl;Lf.? / What 
Q2 
 
(a) .ïjdiska w;r mj;sk wk;=re we.ùfñ l%u fudkjdo?/ vit cs;@u; vr;rupg;Gfshf ,Ue;jd ? 
 / What were the local warning methods? 
 
(b) tu l%u ls%hd;aul lsÍug .;jk ld,h?/ cs;@u; vr;rupg;G fUtpfis ,af;Ftjw;F vt;tsT      Neuk; vLj;jJ ? / 
How long did it take to activate the local warning systems? 
 
(c) wk;=re we.úfñ ix{dj weiqkq .ïjdiska  ixLHdj ?/ vj;jid Ngu;fs; vr;rupg;G rkpf;iQia          
 mtjhdpj;jdu; ?/ How many heard the alarm?  
 
(d) ix{dj weiqkq .ïjdiska u.ska ±kqj;a jqkq .ïjdiska  ixLHdj ?  / vj;jidg; Ngu;fs; vr;rupg;G 
 rkpf;iQia Nfl;ltu;fshy; mwpTWj;jg; gl;ldu;? / How many were notified by the people who 
 heard the alarm? 
 
(e) wk;=re we.úfñ ix{dj u.ska wk;=r meyeÈ,sj yÿkd.; yels ùo? bkamiq ta ioyd ls%hd;aul jSug  fldmuK 
ld,hla ;snqfkao? / vr;rupf;if muptpg;G mghaj;ij NtWgLj;jp mwpe;J  r%fj;jpw;F cupa mwptpg;ig 
toq;f Kbe;jjh ? Mk; >,y;iy vdpd; fhuzk; 
  / Did the alarm distinctly identify the hazard? And the available time for the community to react (yes/no and 
 reasons)? 
 
(f) wk;=re we.úfñ ix{dj kdoùfuka wk;=rej wdrCIs; iaMdkh lrd hdug .;jk ld,h? /Kjy; 
 vr;rupf;ifapypUe;J ghJfhg;ghd ,lj;jpw;F ntspNaww;g; gLk; tiuf;Fk;  vt;tsT Neuk; 
vLj;jJ ?How long did it take from first alarm to evacuate or move to  shelter area?  
 




are the reasons for the people not to participating in the Simulation?  
 
 
(d) .ñudkfha iEu m%foaYhlgu wk;=re we.ùfñ mKsúvh m%pdrKh ùo?/ cs;@u; mghaj;ij 
 r%fj;jpdhy; vy;yh ,lj;jpYk; Nfl;f Kbe;jjh ? / Were local alarms for warning, heard from  all 
occupied areas of the community? 
 
(e) wdmod ioyd iqodkñ ùfñ lghq;= flfrys .ïjdiskaf.a iyNd.S;ajh jeä lr.ekSug HIH bÈß ie,iqñ flfia  úh 
hq;=o? / mdu;j;jj;ij vjpu;nfhs;tjw;fhd jahu;g;gLj;Jjy; r%f gq;fspg;ig  Kd;Ndw;w HIH jpl;lk; 





Q4 (a)  fuu jevigyk id¾:l f,i ms,s.;a ixnHdj? /vj;jid fw;gid rk;gtq;fs; ntw;wpf;nfhz;ld ? How many 
thought the event was a success? 
       
        (b)  fuu jevigyfkys ÿ¾j,;d rdYshla we;s nj;a ;j ÿrg;a fuu wdmod ikaksfúok ie,iqu ioyd iydh  wjYH f,I 
is;= ixnHdj? /mtrufhy epiyf;F Kfk; nfhLg;gjw;fhd jpl;lj;ij tpUj;jp  nra;a NkYk; cjtp Njit vd;Wk; 
mjpy; gy gpur;rpidfs; cs;sd vd;Wk;  vj;jid Ngu; epidj;jhu;fs; ?How many thought there were many 
problems and the village needed  further assistance in developing an emergency response plan? 
 
        (c)  .ïjdiska ioyd wdmod l,uKdlrkh iñnkaoj ixúOdk iydh, ;dCIKsl iydh  iy ICT Ndú;h  iñnkaoj iydh ;j 
ÿrg;a wjYHo? /ICT ia gad;gLj;JtjpYk; mtrufhy  jpl;lj;jpYk; xOq;FgLj;jy;> njhopy; El;gk; 
 vd;gtw;wpw;F Nkyjpf cjtp  Njitah ? Does the community need additional help in 




Q5  (d)  ICT WmlrK ksis wdldrfhka ls%hdlrkafkao? ls%hdfkdlrkafka kñ Bg fya;=? 
 Kd;ndr;rupg;G cgfuz ,af;Fjy; njhlu;ghd tpsf;fk; nfhz;Ls;sPuh ? ,y;iyNay;  mjw;fhd fhuzk; 
vd;d ? Did the community ICT for early warnings function properly? If no what  were the faults? 
 





        (e)jevigyfkys fjk;a fodaI?/NtW VjhtJ FiwghLfs; my;yJ gpiofis  mtjhdpf;fg;l;ldth ? ( Mk; 
 ,y;iy ) c+k; : nrad;Kiw Nghjhik> kWnkhop  toq;Fk; Neuk; mjpfk;> mwptpg;ig  Nfl;f 
KbahJs;sik )Were any other faults or  deficiencies noted Yes/No; (e.g. procedures  inadequate, response time 





fjk;a úfYaI lrekq we;akñ my; fldgqfjys ioyka lrkak:Use space below for additional remarks:  fPo; fz;l ,ilntspapy; 














m%dfoaYSh Èia;s%la kshuq fiajl/gpuNjr 
,izg;ghsu; / Divisional Coordinator 
 
 










44.3. Datasheet 4 – Counting people at strategic points 
 
Page 1 Last Mile Hazard Warning System  
reiapk ia:dkfha f;dr;=re / ,Wjp mdu;j;j vr;rupf;if 
xOq;F Kiw -xd;W$Lk; vz;zpf;if 








 reiapk ia:dkh 
xd;W$Lk; ,lk; 
Assemble Point 
 .eyeKq / msßñ / <uhs 
Mz;/ngz;/rpWtu; 













• iEu ñks;a;= 15lg jrla wod, fldgqfõ l;sr ,l=K oukak' / xt;nthU 15 tJ epkplj;jpYk; Fwpj;j rJuj;jpy; Fwpj;j Neuj;ij ,lTk; / 
Every 15 minutes record the time in the last box crossed 
 
• by, jñ fl,pf¾ fldgqfjka wdrñN lr, .Kkh lrk iaMdkh yer hk iEu wfhla fjkqfjkau l;sr i,l=Kq lrkak  
• cq;fs; kjpg;gPl;L ];jsj;jpypUe;J flf;Fk; xt;nthU egufspdJk; Fwpg;GfSf;fhf rJug;ngl;bfspy; Nky; ,lg;gf;fkpUe;J Gs;sb ,lTk;. 
• Cross out the boxes starting from upper left corner working each row for every person that passed your counting station 










         ……………………….. …………………      ……………………………….. 
n,Odßhd / cupikf;fhuu ;/ Authorized Person     w;aik / ifnahg;gk; / Signature 
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 
121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 
141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 
161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 
181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 





44.4. Datasheet 5 – ICT Guardian daily Test Log 
 
Last Mile Hazard Warning System 
Last mile -  
DAILY TEST LOG 









































 1     
 2     
 3     
 4     
 5     
 6     
 7     
 8     
 9     
 10     
 11     
 12     




 13     
 14     
 15     
 16     
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 18     
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 23     
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 25     
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 27     
 28     
 29     
 30     
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44.5. Datasheet 6 – ICT Guardian Breakdown Log 
 
Page 1 Last Mile Hazard Warning System  
ls%hdúrys; ùfñ f,d.h/ ,Wjpf;fl;l 
mdu;j;j vr;rupf;if xOq;F Kiw   


















lreKdlr my; i|yka WmlrK w;ßka i¾fjdaoh wdmod f;dr;=re uOHia:dkfhka Tng ,enqKq NdKavh jgd rjqula w¢kak – 
jaT nra;J fPo; Fwpg;gpl;Ls;s rhjdq;fspy; ru;Nthja mdu;j;j jfty; epiyaj;jhy; toq;fg;gl;l fUtpia tl;lkpl;Lf; fhl;Lf. 


























WmlrK Ndrlref.a ku 
cgfuz nghWg;ghsu; ngau; 
ICT Guardian’s Name 
 
 Èkh iy fõ,dj 
jpfjpAk; 

































 (fax, phone, email, sms, etc) 
jd¾:dj ,nd .;af;a   
mwpf;ifia ngw;Wf; 
nfhz;ltu; 





   
ngwg;gl;lj; jPu;Tfs; 
Solution Received 





If the solution was from a source other than the HIH, then specify source and comment on how you got the external help in 
the additional information section below; or you may use the area to provide any other relevant information. 
 





















Èia;%sla kshuq fiajlf.a ku 







                   District Coordinator                Signature                                           Date 
 




44.6. Datasheet 7– Event of Interest form 
 
 









































   
B  
 
   
C  
 
   
D  
 
   
E     





























Download alert into PC in HIH (i.e. hih email inbox) 
 
   
2 ix{dj ,enqKq njg ,ndoQka mqoa.,hdg oekajSu 
 
Send acknowledgement to Alert Sender at source 
 
   
3  
Create Event of Interest Document 
 
 
   
4  
Obtain approval from Sarvodaya Executive 
 
   
5 DEWNS RAD  
CAP   
Generate CAP text messages using DEWNS to send to 
RAD 
   







 CAP   
Generate CAP text message using DEWNS and 
submit to Mobile Phones 
 
   
8 DWRR (AREA) ANNY 
CAP   
Generate CAP text message using ANNY to submit 
DWRR (AREA) 
 
   
9 CAP MP3 file 
 950 pek,h fj; we;=,a lrkak  
 
Generate CAP audio message as MP3 file and upload 
on to channel 950 
 
   
10 CAP  CDMA 

. 
Call and read CAP text message to CDMA users 
 
   
11  
IPAS Ndú;d lrñka CAP 
VSAT fj; Ndr fokak  
Generate CAP text message using IPAS and submit to 
VSATs 
 
   
12 .ñ jdiSkaf.ka iy uOHiaMdk u.ska 
±kaùñ ,nd .kak 
Recieve acknowledgements for the messages from 
   





























CAP hardware and 
software  
? 
























Additional Remarks (please use additional paper if necessary) 
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LIRNEasia is a regional information and communication technology (ICT) policy and regulation 
capacity-building organization active across the Asia Pacific. LIRNEasia’s program of actionable 
research seeks to identify the institutional constraints to effective use of ICTs to improve the lives of 
the people of the Asia Pacific, not simply in abstract terms but in country context, and to work 
collaboratively with multiple stakeholders to catalyze the changes conducive to greater participation by 
users and suppliers. LIRNEasia’s overall mission of capacity building seeks to contribute to building 
capacity for evidence-based intervention in the public-policy process by persons attuned to the specific 
national contexts within which policies are made and implemented. Additional information is available 
at www.lirneasia.net.  
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1. Synthesis  
Following the successful implementation of the “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Information 
Dissemination” (HazInfo) pilot project, it was decided that regional dissemination of the pilot’s 
findings would enhance the project’s status as a path-breaker in last-mile risk communication 
for communities at-risk. 
 
The HazInfo supplemental project, as this dissemination portion of the original HazInfo 
project was called, encouraged the sharing of findings and lessons learned from the HazInfo 
project with similar last-mile initiatives in three select Bay of Bengal countries (Bangladesh, 
India and Indonesia). This was achieved by organizing a workshop in each of the three 
countries in partnership with a local disaster risk reduction/disaster preparedness 
organization.  
 
The workshops were structured into five sessions with a portion of an early warning system 
as the main topic (i.e. First Responder Action). Basically, each session featured one speaker 
from the HazInfo Sri Lanka project and one speaker from the host country. Several pointed 
questions were posed within the agenda for the ensuing discussions. The workshops 
unearthed much interest in the topic of last-mile hazard information dissemination for 
communities and shed light on a topic not otherwise discussed in typical workshop on early 
warning. Moreover, it produced interest in replicating the HazInfo project to suit the particular 
hazard makeup of the chosen country. 
2. Research problem  
The “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Information Dissemination” (HazInfo) pilot project could not 
achieve its proper status without appropriate dissemination of its findings within the region. 
Given that the pilot’s purpose was to test various technologies’ usefulness in the “last-mile” of 
a national early warning system, its implications for neighboring countries, particularly around 
the Bay of Bengal, are highly relevant. Thus, the need for a series of regional workshops 




arose with the central idea being that the HazInfo pilot would be the focus. Lessons would be 
drawn from each workshop for purposes of comparison and contrasting with similar host 
country initiatives.  
3. Research findings  
The workshops conducted between the inception of this supplemental (June 2007) until the 
present (February 2008), indicate a number of strong successes. It succeeded in its main 
goal of engaging practitioners and experts in discussing and speaking to the issue of 
community-based early warning systems and the potential of ICTs as a revolutionary means 
of disseminating warning to communities at-risk. 
 
The main research results should be described and interpreted by highlighting the 
contribution to knowledge that this project represents from a scientific and policy perspective.   
 
4. Fulfillment of objectives  
The primary objective of the HazInfo supplemental project was to organize and hold a series 
o of three regional workshops designed to discuss and compare similar community-based 
early warning systems. This objective was achieved with 75% completed. Meaning that 
workshops were conducted in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India, but not Indonesia. The 
Indonesia workshop could not be fulfilled due to logistical problems in obtaining visas for Sri 
Lankan speakers. The Sri Lanka workshop was an unexpected, unplanned (at the time of 
supplemental proposal submission) event, which not only featured the findings of the HazInfo 
project, but also brought together Sri Lankan telecom providers to initiate working committees 
(with the support of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights) to find effective 
an effective solution to issuing hazard alerts to the public. 
 
5. Project design and implementation  
The activities in this project were workshops. Each workshop was designed to discuss each 
part of an early warning system including a discussion period. This allowed for maximum 
speaker-audience interaction so as to derive as many lessons learned. In the final workshop 
in Indonesia, it was hoped that the session discussion would be revamped such that 
participants would break off into groups and have worksheets of questions that would 
encourage further discussion on the major topics.  





In terms of gender, speakers from both genders were invited for both the Bangladeshi and 
Indian workshops. Unfortunately, it was found that during both workshops there was only one 
female speaker, respectively. More often than not, invited female speakers would be unable 
to attend due to extenuating circumstances or would hand over the speaking part to their 
male colleagues.  
 
6. Project outputs and dissemination  
Conferences/Workshops: 
2nd International ISCRAM-CHINA Workshop: Harbin Engineering University, August 
26-27 2007 
Attendee: Nuwan Waidyanatha, Project Manager 
The 2nd International Workshop on Information Systems for Crisis Response and 
Management, in China (ISCRAM-CHINA-20071), is a post-conference meeting to the 
International Disaster Reduction Conference2 (IDRC). ISCRAM-CHINA took place in Harbin 
from August 26-27, 2007. The ISCRAM-Community3 and the School of Economics and 
Management - Harbin Engineering University4 (HARBEU), jointly organized the conference. 
The Workshop provided an outstanding opportunity for researchers, scholars, teachers, 
students, practitioners and policy makers in China as well as invited International delegates 
to address and discuss new trends and challenges in the area of Information Systems for 
Crisis Response and Management.  
 
The subject matter dealt with aspect of design, development, deployment, operation, and 
evaluation of information systems for crisis response and management.  Authors focused on 
tools, functionality, and/or interfaces that were being or should be provided for human users 
involved with crisis response and management. Contributions covered Crisis Response and 
Management in any phase, intersection of phases, and/or integration of phases of the 
Emergency Management and Preparedness lifecycle: Planning, Training, Mitigation, 
Detection, Alerting, Response, Recovery, and Assessment.  
 
Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Information Dissemination: A Research Project, or HazInfo 
Project, research findings were presented during Session 1: Information Systems along with 




20 other papers that were presented in the same session. The HazInfo paper titled “Common 
Alerting Protocol Message Broker for Last-Mile Hazard Warning System in Sri Lanka: An 
Essential Component”, edited by Bartel Van de Walle (bartel@uvt.nl), Xiaodi Li 
(lixiaodi2000@hotmail.com), and Shuyu Zhang, was 1 of 115 papers published in the 
workshop proceedings, pages 59-64, selected from over 200 submissions.  The residual 
session themes  were  –  Business/Organization,  Public Organizations/Government, and 
Mathematical Modeling.  
 
The HazInfo paper that discussed cutting edge research in the use of Common Alerting 
Protocol (CAP) was passionately received by the participants. Moreover, interested 
stakeholders expressed interest in collaborating in future research that is to be lead by 
LIRNEasia; especially in the development of the “P2P Multilanguage CAP Broker” for the 
region. 
 
“ The Role of Telecom Operators and Broadcasters in a National Public Warning 
System” , BMICH, Sri Lanka, September 7, 2007 
Attendees: Rohan Samarajiva, Natasha Udu-gama 
“The Role of Telecom Operators and Broadcasters in a National Public Warning System”. On 
Friday, September 7, 2007, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights 
(MDMHR), with the support of LIRNEasia, held a meeting on “The Role of Telecom 
Operators and Broadcasters in a National Public Warning System” with a six of the eight 
major telecom operators, as well as several disaster management-related government 
agencies (NBRO, Irrigation Dept., Meteorology Dept., CCP, etc.), UNDP, and a few technical 
institutes.  
 
Mr. P.D. Amarasinghe, Secretary of the MDMHR, opened the session by discussing the 
particular disaster role of each of the government agencies asked to attend. He 
acknowledged the government’s important role in disaster warning. The role of the Disaster 
Management Center (DMC) will be to disseminate warnings to first responders through 
various means – RANet, SMS, and fax. First responders will be media, police and armed 
forces, district coordinators of DMC, and other organizations (NGOs, community). Currently, 
the MDMHR is in the process of developing a proposal for a network of dissemination towers 
at Hikkaduwa, Kalmunai and Point Pedro. There will be a total of 50 by the end of this year 
(latest, Jan/Feb 2008). With further funding, the MDMHR will establish 10 EOCs, 4 EMC, in 




addition to four managed by police & armed forces. Thus, he declared that the basic warning 
system is in place and asked how might the telecom operators contribute to a public warning 
notification system.  
 
Major General Gamini Hettiarachchi, Director General of the DMC gave a presentation on the 
Disaster Early Warning and Dissemination Strategy of Sri Lanka. He reviewed the progress 
of disaster management since the tsunami, through the Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 
2005, and the establishment of the National Council on Disaster Management in the same 
year. He stated that there are currently 3 early warning towers, but by the end of next year 
there should be a total of 150. Emergency response committees have been formed including 
SLT, municipalities, 25 district secretaries and 9 province secretaries. 
 
Mr. Anjula Godakumbara from Dialog Telekom made a presentation on Dialog’s involvement 
in early warning dissemination. Dialog and the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human 
Rights have signed an MoU. Dialog along with MicroImage and the University of Moratuwa 
Research Lab looked into using GSM communication in disaster early warning dissemination 
by setting up the Disaster and Early Warning Network (DEWN). This has SMS and cell 
broadcast capabilities. The benefits of the DEWN system are that it is low-cost and uses 
existing communication infrastructure. Dialog reiterated the fact that only the DMC has the 
authority to send disaster warnings. For more information on this initiative see 
www.dialog.lk/dewn.  
 
Prof. Rohan Samarajiva, Executive Director – LIRNEasia, gave a presentation on “Effective 
use of telecom & electronic media in disaster risk reduction”. He asked how will the DMC 
communicate with the media and the phone companies. The government must have internal 
protocols, which must be double-checked with government officials. There must a technically 
sound system in place to get to all media and must be capable of showing if people got the 
message and in the right language. LIRNEasia recommends the Common Alerting Protocol 
(CAP) system with additional software, which is single input, multi-output, multi-language. 
LIRNEasia can develop this within a few months. Essentially this means that once a button is 
pressed, the software will translate the message accordingly and send the message by SMS, 
cell broadcast, fax, etc. The government is clearly interested in standard procedures and 
templates. Therefore, it would be in its best interest to approve a standard template in the 
language and simply insert the proper word as necessary. Prof. Samarajiva posed yet 




another question: How might the government ensure that the person issuing the warning is 
reliable and not someone who plans to sabotage the process? There must be some sort of 
encryption or verification method so that receivers know that the warning is official. 
 
In discussing the use of ICTs in public warning (an area not covered by the Last-Mile HazInfo 
Project), Samarajiva suggested that two of the most difficult cases be addressed: a 
passenger in a moving train and a tourist at the Yala National Park. If public warning can 
reach these two individuals, all the other less difficult problems can be solved. In both cases, 
he suggested that cell broadcasting would be the most important technology, though there 
may be areas within Yala that would be out of signal coverage, in which case no public 
warning was possible.  
 
The discussion that followed the presentations. Mr. Hettiarachchi called for a link with service 
providers to develop automated procedures. Secretary Amarasinghe suggested that there be 
a technical committee set up for hearing recommendations on early warning from telecom 
providers and broadcasters. It was decided that there would be two separate technical 
committees – one for telecom providers and the other for broadcasters. Dates and agendas 
for the first technical committee meetings of telecom providers and broadcasters were not 
discussed. 
 
Mr. U.W.L. Chandradasa, Director – DMC, wrapped up the session by reiterating that the 
DMC is responsible for disseminating warning messages. Regarding first responders, he 
agreed that other agencies could be involved. He acknowledged that government alone 
cannot take charge of “Last Mile” warning without the contributions of telecom providers, 
broadcasters and the private sector. 
 
1st Wireless Rural and Emergency Communications Conference: Rome, Italy. October 
1-2, 2007 
Attendee: Dr. Gordon Gow, University of Alberta, Canada 
The paper "Community-based Hazard Warnings in Rural Sri Lanka: Performance of Alerting 
and Notification in a Last-Mile Message Relay," written by Nuwan Waidyanatha (first author), 
Gordon Gow – University of Alberta, and Peter Anderson from Simon Fraser University.   
 
The paper presents research findings from HazInfo, where a subset of indicators is compared 




for evaluating system design and performance of the LM-HWS.  In particular, it introduces 
and defines measures for "reliability" and "effectiveness" for assessing the utility of 
technologies deployed in the last-mile of the HazInfo Project.  The measures were applied to 
data gathered from exercises conducted with the HazInfo System to determine how various 
combinations of ICTs perform in terms of alerting the ICT Guardians as well as conveying the 
contents of warning messages.  
 
An important contribution of the paper is the concept of "complementary redundancy."  Test 
results using the reliability and effectiveness measures in the study, showed that overall 
scores for end-user devices varied considerably and highlighted some important concerns for 
user training and unforeseen implementation issues.  For example, addressable satellite 
radios rated high in terms of reliability but relatively low in terms of effectiveness, as their 
messaging capability is limited (English only) and because they are nomadic but not mobile, 
meaning that the units cannot accompany the ICT-G from place to place (thereby reducing 
the score on the "Active Alerting" index).   On the other hand, mobile phones scored high on 
effectiveness, with capability to display warning messages in three languages and because 
they are a form of personal media that will usually accompany the ICT-G at all times.  
However, mobile phones scored less reliably because of signal coverage and battery 
maintenance issues.  
 
When combined, however, addressable satellite radio and mobile phone technology 
compensate for each other’s deficiencies and produce a synergy we refer to in the paper as 
"complementary redundancy."  As such, results from the initial field tests and technology 
assessment suggest that appropriate combinations of wireless technologies will provide the 
best performance if they exhibit complementary redundancy.  These results have a number 
of implications for emergency planners.   
 
First, planners should consider deployment of multiple devices with the aim of achieving 
complementary redundancy in reliability and effectiveness at the last-mile.  Second, planners 
should adopt the Common Alerting Protocol because of its ability to support the goal of 
complementary redundancy by providing consistent and complete messaging across multiple 
devices.  Third, that research is needed to further refine the reliability and effectiveness 
measures into a more robust index for assessing public warning technologies.  
 




The paper presentation was well received and questions arose about security provisions in 
the HazInfo system.  Security does remain a concern but that significant progress has 
already been made with provisions included in the HazInfo CAP profile as well as lower layer 




The IEEE Communications Society and Italian communications vendor and defense 
contractor Selex Communications sponsored WRECOM 2007.  The aim of the conference 
(Wireless and Rural Emergency Communications --WRECOM) was to bring together 
research on various facets of wireless broadband communications for emergencies and 
disasters, particularly in rural settings where infrastructure may be limited or non-existent.  To 
that end, various sessions covered wireless mesh networks, WIMAX and TETRA 
technologies, satellite services, as well as operational experiences with emergencies and 
public safety networks.  Being an IEEE conference, most sessions were technical at an 
engineering level and addressed specialized topics such as routing protocols, transmission 
control, and technical performance analysis.  Unfortunately, several important research 
papers (e.g., mesh networking in rural areas) presented findings with no mention of the 
potential application to emergency management!  Mesh networking is not as easy as one 
might be led to believe in the popular literature.   
 
A study led by Nicholas Race from Lancaster University, for instance, has followed the 
deployment of a mesh network in a small UK village for the past three years, with findings 
that suggest governance issues are significant.  However, the project also noted that user 
interest and participation in the upkeep and active development of the network was enhanced 
in a mesh architecture setting.  For the HazInfo project, these findings may shed some light 
on the challenge of long-term sustainability of the system and for building local technical 
know-how and local capabilities to further integrate the network into everyday activities 
beyond hazard warning.   
 
Roberto Saracco from Telecom Italia spoke about several paradigms that might be applied to 
emergency communications services, such as load sharing, broadcasting, peer to peer, and 
bit/video torrents.  He then went on to explain that the "layered" or "mashed" paradigm is 
growing in importance, with the likes of Google Maps and so forth.  Linking all these 




paradigms is a tension that emergency planners and policymakers must content with; 
namely, the choice between piggybacking on commercial networks and the deployment of 
dedicated infrastructure and services.  Of course, the problem with the former is concerns 
about guaranteed quality of service during critical situations.  The concern about the latter is 
cost and under-utilization.  Somewhere in between--and perhaps this is where 
layered/mashed systems come into play--is a balance between dedicated, specialized 
services and cost effectiveness.   
 
The US and other countries are now dealing with these economics of emergency 
communications in terms of the next generation of first responder radio systems.  In terms of 
public warning, HazInfo has been innovative in terms of rethinking the model.  By choosing to 
implement an open source like Common Alerting Protocol and by working closely with 
industry stakeholders to connect communities using everyday technologies, the project has in 
effect created a layered system that can in future expand in functionality and scope through 
mash-up applications with, for example, Google Earth for map sharing, as well as other 
applications as the need becomes evident.  The ongoing challenge is to take this to the next 
level through a sustained research project that builds on the current achievement. 
 
“ Sharing Knowledge on Last-Mile Warning: Community-based Last-Mile Warning 
Systems” : Dhaka, Bangladesh. October 25, 2007 
Attendees: Rohan Samarajiva, Natasha Udu-gama, Nuwan Waidyanatha 
“Sharing Knowledge on Last-Mile Warning: Community-based Last-Mile Warning Systems”: 
The workshop took place in Dhaka on October 25, 2007. LIRNEasia and Bangladesh 
Network Office for Urban Safety (BNUS) – Bangladesh University of Engineering and 
Technology jointly organized the Workshop. The Workshop provided an outstanding 
opportunity for researchers, students, practitioners, and policy makers in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh as well as invited international private sector participants to address and discuss 
early warning activities from the South Asia Region. 
 
5. The focus was on:  
• Obtaining feedback on the findings of “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Warning 
Dissemination: A Research Project”,  
• Exchanging lessons learned from end-to-end hazard detection and alerting systems that 
serve grassroots communities in Bangladesh,  
• Merging knowledge from Bangladesh to develop practical solutions for communicating 




risk information to rural communities 
• Analyze and determine methodologies for measuring the performance of Community-
based Early Warning Systems 
• Commencing dialogue on the development of a regional last mile warning system. 
6.  
The excitement started with heated debates between the academics and the bureaucrats. Dr. 
AMM Safiullah, Vice Chancellor of BUET acted as a moderator to point out the mistakes 
made during past events and the need to upgrade existing systems based on the lessons 
learned and not immerse in the glory of “half baked” systems. The Bangladeshi participants 
agreed on the proof that the existing systems for Cyclone preparedness do not apply to all-
hazards; especially tsunami and earthquake; modification is eminent. 
 
The audience had to be reminded constantly that the LIRNEasia tested Last-Mile Hazard 
Warning System was not a traditional warning system that is usually used by governments 
but it was a community-based model used for alert and notification. The HazInfo project and 
other similar community-based hazard information systems can only be responsible for 
providing clear and accurate hazard information alerts. Another issue that arose from 
discussions, was whether individual nations within the South Asian region should replicate 
hazard analysis, leave that responsibility to international hazard analysis organizations (such 
as the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center), or have a regional hazard analysis entity. Currently, 
Bangladesh is in the process of replicating similar tsunami models and earthquake risk maps 
already available at international hazard analysis organizations. The much-studied Common 
Alerting Protocol (CAP) used in the HazInfo project was new to the Bangladesh audience. 
They are yet to understand the value and strengths of using this content standard. 
 
Table 71 –Presentations and notes from each of the sessions 
















It is a tricky subject for government to make 
early warning 
Need to identify technical deficiencies 
Lessons are not only for government policy 
makers but also must activate CBO, NGO, 
Private Sector, Civil Society, Medics, etc 
DG invited LIRNEasia to contact his bureau 












ICTs play a key role in distancing the 
physical world where hazards occur from the 
symbolic world where media and first 
responders live giving time to alert the public 
Elements comprise national early warning 
center, government first-responders, media, 
community 
CAP Broker a 1-to-many software application 
is an essential non-existent component 
essential for last-mile warnings 
Planners must take in to consideration 
Complementary Redundancy when 












Cyclone warnings are initiated by the 
Meteorological department 
Tsunami warnings are initiated by the 
Geological department, which was practiced 
during Nias earthquake in March 2006 as 
well as Bengkulu earthquake in September 
2007 
Bulletin received from Japan had mentioned 
that it would take 9 hours before tsunami 
would hit Bangladesh coast but did not 
mention wave height; hence ran simulation 
model to estimate wave parameters 
Warning was issued and withdrawn at 0120 
September 12th Bangladesh Govt. instructed 
to “play fail safe” 
Heated debate 
between director and 
audience based on 
the fact that experts 
were not consulted 
prior to issuing 
warning 
General public was 
forced to understand 
expert knowledge in 
early warning 
Session I: Local 
Transmission of 
Warning 
An Overview of 
Overview of CPP 
CPP and ways in which local communities 
receive information about cyclones through 
BRCS’ extensive network of trained 
How are volunteers 
trained to receive 
and disseminate 
cyclone information? 





The workshop initiated much healthy debate and discussion on the issue of early warning, 
particularly on the government’s provision of early warning to Bangladeshi communities. 
Government officials in attendance were most vociferous in defending existing EW 
infrastructure – particularly its monitoring and detection equipment. What was lacking, 
however, was government acknowledgement and interest in equipping the “last mile” to 
respond effectively to warnings.  
 
Mr. Md. Nasir Ullah of the Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP) described an early warning 
system very much akin to the HazInfo system in that it utilized information technology (i.e. 
transistor radios) and trained locals (i.e. militia or Ansars). The most significant difference 
between the two systems is the use of transistor radios in CPP-Bangladesh, while the 




















Working with incomplete probabilistic 
information 
Cannot do disaster management work on 
usual turf based politics 
Early warning should give priority to “rapid 
onset’ hazards, which will be a catalyst to 
solving other hazard warning events 
Sri Lanka has 
recorded history of 8 
– 9 tsunamis in the 
past 
   





19th Meeting of the Wireless World Research Forum: Indian Institute of Technology, 
Madras, November 2007 
Attendees: Nuwan Waidyantha, HazInfo Project Manager 
 
The Forum took place in Le Meridien Hotel from November 5 - 7, 2007. The conference was 
jointly organized by the WWRF, Midas, and the Indian Institute of Technology - Madras. The 
forum provided an outstanding opportunity for researchers, scholars, operators, original-
equipment-manufacturers and policy makers working in the area of wireless communications 
to present and discuss the trends of the various technologies, latest research/developments, 
and services/applications in the field. The forum offered several Plenary Sessions, Working 
Groups (WG), and Special Interest Groups (SIG), which focused on disciplines within the 
global wireless communications community.  
 
In general the theme was to shape the global wireless future by develop a common vision for 
the year 2020. Moreover, the forum focused on influencing the decision makers’ views of the 
wireless world, enable powerful R&D collaborations, and advance wireless frontiers to serve 
the global customers. A main aspect of all the speakers was on the need to optimize the Kilo 
Bytes per second per Hertz per Cell (KB/Sec/Hz/Cell) in order to achieve very high spectrum 
efficiencies. The routes to the wireless future are WiMax (802.16) for the IT community and 
3GPP/LTE for the Telecommunication community. In terms of commercial roll out, 
technologies such as cognitive radio are beyond the 2020. The overall impression 
exemplified by the experts is that wireless broadband such as WiMax could not replace the 
kind of capacity and services that are offered by wired broadband such as DSL in the present 
day of the game. In all cases the backhaul problem cannot be neglected.  
 
Overall forum was quite intriguing especially to see the actual progress of cutting edge 
wireless technologies such as WiMax, LTE, etc that are paving the way for the 
communication industries to take them to the next level. Most importantly the researchers laid 
out the truth about the shortcomings and the realistic potential of the innovative technologies, 
which seem to defy theoretical frameworks. If not had been exposed to this forum the 
knowledge and awareness of the current state of affairs in the wireless world would have 
been oblivious and backwards.  
 




Two papers submitted by authors from LIRNEasia were accepted for presentation in 2 
different working groups and publication in forum proceedings. The first paper titled 
“Challenges of Optimizing Common Alerting Protocol for SMS based GSM Devices”4 was an 
output of the “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Information Dissemination Project” (or HazInfo 
Project) research findings, which were presented in the WG1: Human Perspectives and 
Service Concepts. The second paper titled “Wireless Mesh Networking – as a means of 
connecting rural communities was based on the design considerations of implementing the 
mesh network at Mahavilachchiya, Sri Lanka. Both papers were based on practical field level 
experiences. As a result they were well received by the audience and were inquisitive of the 
practical issues that sometimes defy the theoretical frameworks.  
 
“ Sharing Knowledge on Last-Mile Warning: Community-Based Last-Mile Warning 
Systems” : New Delhi, November 19, 2007 
Attendees: Rohan Samarajiva, Nuwan Waidyanatha, Natasha Udu-gama 
This report presents a summary of the “Sharing Knowledge on Last-Mile Warning: 
Community-Based Last-Mile Warning Systems” workshop which took place at the India 
Habitat Centre in New Delhi, India on 19 November 2007 from 9:30am - 4pm. The All India 
Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI) and LIRNEasia jointly organized the workshop. This 
workshop proved to be an ideal venue for the dissemination of findings from the “Evaluating 
Last-Mile Hazard Information Dissemination” pilot project in India through an intimate 
gathering of practitioners, private sector, international organizations, local NGOs, and 
government. 
 
7. The primary objectives were: 
• Obtaining feedback on the findings of “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Warning 
Dissemination: A Research Project”,  
• Exchanging lessons learned from end-to-end hazard detection and alerting systems that 
serve grassroots communities in India,  
• Merging knowledge from India to develop practical solutions for communicating risk 
information to rural communities 
• Analyze and determine methodologies for measuring the performance of Community-
based Early Warning Systems 
• Commencing dialogue on the development of a regional last mile warning system. 
 
This workshop proved to be one in which the participants engaged well throughout the 
duration of the day’s proceedings. Participants showed great enthusiasm for the subject of 




the workshop and the findings presented by LIRNEasia. The presentations and discussions 
were well on topic and discussions were fruitful and highly informative. As expected, 
discussion topics were not relegated to their individual sessions, rather, discussion on the 
overall topic of community-based early warning systems and the particular role of the HazInfo 
pilot project dominated all sessions.  
 
Media attention was much higher than in the previous workshop in Bangladesh, due to 
having a public relations manager for this event. Press kits were prepared and distributed to 
journalists who joined the workshop proceedings throughout the day. Media outlets such as 
MINT publications (Wall Street Journal) and Indian Express were just some of the up to 
seven outlets that interviewed LIRNEasia on the HazInfo pilot project.  
 
Session Title Presenter Title and Comments 
Inauguration 
Opening Remarks 
Mehul Pandya, Risk Reduction 
Transfer Initiative Coordinator, 




“ Long Last Mile”  
Video Screening 
 The video provided a sound 
basis for the audience’s 
understanding of the 
workshop’s main topic, 
“Evaluating Last-Mile 
Hazard Information 
Dissemination” pilot project.  
Opening Address: 
“ Elements of a 
community-based 
warning system”  




Reviewed the basic 
elements of a community-
based early warning system. 
The disaster cycle, early 
warning chains (standard vs. 
HazInfo), reasons for this 
type of system, overview of 
HazInfo results and 














Welfare Organization for Rural 
Lean Development (WORLD) 
 
“ICT Application in 
Community-Based Early 
Warning System”. Mr. 
Prasad gave an overview of 
natural hazards in Andhra 
Pradesh. His primary point 
was that WORLD has found 
a huge gap in the 
dissemination of hazard 
information from the mandal 
level to the villages despite 
wireless and other ICT 
communications systems 
available to the national and 
state level systems. 
 Mr. Menake Wijesinghe, Program 
Director, Sarvodaya Community 
Disaster Management Centre 
Menake_Wijesinghe@yahoo.com 
 
Discussion Sarvodaya’s role 
in the HazInfo project 
particularly in terms of 
formulation of methodology, 
participation in training, 
community organization and 
preparedness. 
Session II – 
Transmission of 
Warning to Local 
Levels 
Vijay Pratap Singh Aditya 
Ekgaon Technologies pvt. Ltd. 
vijay@ekgaon.com 
 
Mr. Aditya gave a thorough 
overview of the 
communications policies 
governing dissemination of 
hazard information. He 
explained the key acts and 
policies and how and why 
they sometimes enable and 
disable appropriate hazard 




information dissemination to 
those that require the 
information most – the last-
mile. He claimed that 
LIRNEasia and Sarvodaya 
would not be able to 
implement a pilot such as 
HazInfo in India because 
need for a strong interface 
with a local (governmental) 
institution. 
 Natasha Udu-gama, LIRNEasia “Transmission of Warnings 
to Local Levels: HazInfo 
Experience”. Outlined the 
differences between a 
traditional alerting system 
and HazInfo. Explained the 
HazInfo input applications 
and terminal devices, 
Common Alerting Protocol 
(CAP), Calculation of 
certainty and efficiency and 
results from HazInfo in 
determining the most 
effective methods for 
transmitting warnings to 
communities. 
Session III – First 
Responder Action 
Suresh Mariaselvam 
Coordination and Networking 
Associate 
Tamil Nadu Tsunami Resource 
Centre (TNTRC) 
suresh@tntrc.org 
Gave an overview of 
TNTRC’s aid coordination 
and community capacity 
development in disaster risk 
management in Tamil Nadu. 
Explained the role of village 





community radio and ICT 
initiatives by sector in 
obtaining most effective 
“last-mile” connectivity. 
 Natasha Udu-gama, LIRNEasia “First Responder Action in 
HazInfo”. Explained “first 
responders” in the context of 
HazInfo then gave 
descriptions of first 
responder roles and 
methods of dissemination. 
Session IV – 
Determination of 
Hazard from National 
Level 
Nuwan Waidyanatha, HazInfo 
Project Manager, LIRNEasia 
Waidyanatha@lirne.net 
 
“Determination of Hazard 
from the National Level: Sri 
Lanka Experience”. Drew 
comparisons on government 
action between Dec. 26, 
2004 and Sept. 12, 2007 
and described how the 
HazInfo pilot might help in 
structuring a national early 
warning system to be 
effective throughout the 
EWS chain. 
 Dr. K.J. Ramesh, Advisor, 
Ministry of Earth Sciences, 




Geneva Technologies works 
with WorldSpace Corp. to 
enable alerts to be sent in 
up to 24 languages. 
- 24 State government levels 
have a toll-free calling 
number 
Session V: Next Steps Dr. Rohan Samarajiva, “Roles of policymakers, 




LIRNEasia regulators, private sector 
and civil society”. 
Organizational problems 
must be solved for EW 
technologies to be fully 
realized. Early warning must 
be complemented by 
preparedness, evacuation 
plans, etc. Reiterated the 
need for the government to 
take the lead in providing 
early warning. Private sector 
and civil society can support 
and strengthen. 
 Mehul Pandya, AIDMI “Lessons for Early Warning 
from Tsunami Evaluation”. 
Discussed AIDMI’s role in 
the Tsunami Evaluation 
Coalition 
 Mihir R. Bhatt 
Honorary Director 
All India Disaster Mitigation 
Institute (AIDMI)  
dmi@icenet.co.in 
 
Discussed whether early 
warning is early enough or 
not. He then went on to talk 
on designing an early 
warning system and 
developing a strategy for an 
EW system saying that it 
must be an iterative process 
– an organization cannot 
have a prototype and just 
“do”, it must be 
simultaneous. Bhatt spoke 
of having a “pre-mortem” – 
declaring a failure prior to a 








• Press kits were prepared for up to 15 journalists that included copies of all the 
presentations and electronic copies of LIRNEasia’s presentations. 
• Several journalists joined the HazInfo workshop during its proceedings over the course 
of the day.  
• Between 6-7 media interviews followed the workshop proceedings, including one for 
NDTV and a Hindi channel. 
• Questions brought up by media: 
o Who is following through in India, where all the focus has been on hazard 
detection and monitoring?    
o Do you realize that getting such a system operational in India will be extremely 
complex because of center-state issues, etc.?    
o Are there plans to do a pilot in India?    




Like the HazInfo workshop in Dhaka, Bangladesh, the Indian workshop provoked much 
discussion on the use of technology in the “last mile” of an early warning system. Several 
small community-based organizations invited as speakers at the workshop, particularly 
TNTRC and WORLD, noted the use of village information centers and community radio in 
reaching the “last mile”. WORLD mentioned that the use of ICT has not breached the 
information gap between the mandal level and the village level. This signifies that thought 
there is an acknowledgement of the use of ICTs to leverage greater participation at the “last 
mile”, the importance of training and active community participation has not been stressed 
enough. In comparison, HazInfo has not only stressed the usage of dual, complementing 
technologies (i.e. mobile and satellite radio) – complementary redundancy – but it has also 
highlighted the utmost importance of a comprehensive training regime with adequate 
inclusion of ICTs. The Indians were most receptive to the concept of complementary 
redundancy introduced by HazInfo. The number of early warning initiatives in India struck 
HazInfo researchers, mainly by the fact that many of them were unaware or had few ties to 
initiatives in other parts of the country. For a community-based early warning system to be 
successful, it will be crucial that various initiatives start meeting and working together. The 
HazInfo workshop has provided that meeting ground for these national initiatives, while 




informing them of an international model (HazInfo) to optimize the use of technology and 
training within their systems.  
 
“ Sharing Knowledge on Last-Mile Warning: Community-Based Last-Mile Warning 
Systems” : Jakarta, Indonesia. March 5, 2008  
Attendees: Rohan Samarajiva, Natasha Udu-gama, Nuwan Waidyanatha 
A “Sharing Knowledge on Last-Mile Warning: Community-Based Last-Mile Warning Systems” 
workshop took place at the Hotel Borobudur in Jakarta, Indonesia in partnership with the 
Indonesian Institute for Disaster Preparedness (IIDP). The workshop provided an opportunity 
to discuss and share the findings of the “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Warning Dissemination: 
A Research Project” (HazInfo) with Indonesian counterparts while at the same time learning 
about similar initiatives and community-based hazard warning systems. 
 
The primary objectives were: 
• Obtaining feedback on the findings of “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Warning 
Dissemination: A Research Project”,  
• Exchanging lessons learned from end-to-end hazard detection and alerting systems 
that serve grassroots communities in Indonesia,  
• Merging knowledge from Indonesia to develop practical solutions for communicating 
risk information to rural communities 
• Analyze and determine methodologies for measuring the performance of Community-
based Early Warning Systems 
• Commencing dialogue on the development of a regional last mile warning system. 
 
OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS 
Overall, the workshop went well despite earlier setbacks (i.e. planning for the workshop to be 
on 30 January, speakers dropping out at the last minute, etc.). IIDP did an excellent job in 
organizing the event in Jakarta and finding a range of speakers from government to 
community-based organizations.  
 
The workshop began approximately 20 minutes late due to waiting for participants and some 
speakers. Workshop agendas were not printed and distributed prior to the event 
commencement, and when they were distributed the version was incorrect. Due to a late 
start, group discussion following each session had to be cut and put at the end of the 
workshop. This precluded asking questions on particular parts of the HazInfo research and 
their comparisons with the Indonesian experiences.  





Session Title Presenter Title and Comments 
Inauguration 
Opening Remarks 
Ms. Chandra Lukitasari, 
Executive Director, IIDP 
Chandra.lukitasari@yahoo.com 
 
Made some opening 
comments to participants 
and speakers including a 
brief introduction of 
LIRNEasia participants. 
 Dr. Ir. Tatag Wiranto, MURP, 
Deputy Minister for Economic 
and Private Business 
Development and Chairman, 
Board of Advisors, IIDP. 
tatagwiranto@gmail.com  
Gave opening remarks on 
the 4th anniversary of IIDP’s 
existence. 
“ Long Last Mile”  
Video Screening 
 The video provided a sound 
basis for the audience’s 
understanding of the 
workshop’s main topic, 
“Evaluating Last-Mile 
Hazard Information 
Dissemination” pilot project.  
Opening Address: 
“ Elements of a 
community-based 
warning system”  
Dr. Rohan Samarajiva, 
Executive Director, LIRNEasia 
Samarajiva@lirne.net 
 
Reviewed the basic 
elements of a community-
based early warning 
system. The disaster cycle, 
early warning chains 
(standard vs. HazInfo), 
reasons for this type of 
system, overview of 





Ms. Titi Moektajasih, UNOCHA Gave a brief overview of the 
impact of the 2004 tsunami 
in Aceh from a personal 











Jan Sopaheluwakan, Ph. D., 
Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences (LIPI) 
“From Emergency 
Response to Community 
Preparedness”. Prof. 
Sopaheluwakan discussed 
the involvement of LIPI in 
monitoring and detection, 
warning and community 
preparedness. He noted 
that Indonesia is taking the 
lead on driving the process 
of early warning. It has 
been most interested in 
pushing preparedness, 
mitigation and response 
within community 
preparedness. He 
discussed 4 main elements 
of community-based early 
warning systems: 
Risk knowledge 
Monitoring of EW 
Dissemination & 
Communication 
Response Capability (Can 
people evacuate?) 
There are 3 spheres: 
Environmental -> ocean 
monitoring 
Social -> early warning 
Economic -> tsunami 
preparedness 
LIPI does community 
preparedness and public 





Prof. Jan discussed the 
National Framework 
developed by LIPI in 
conjunction with UNESCO 
and ISDR. He went on to 
explain the IOC-UNESCO 
end-to-end system. He 
introduced the audience to 
the LIPI “hourglass” 
concept where warning and 
emergency response meet 
at a critical point but are not 
mutually inclusive. He 
showcased lessons learned 
from the 2007 intervention 
and community expectation 
on TWS. To sum, he 
discussed challenges and 
recommendations noting 
that no agreements have 
yet been made at the 
national level. 
 Natasha Udu-gama, 
Dissemination Manager – 
HazInfo, LIRNEasia udu-
gama@lirne.net  
Discussion of the HazInfo 
project from the perspective 
of methodology, 
participation in training, 
community organization 
and preparedness. 
Session II – First 
Responder Action 
Mrs. Patra Rina Dewi, M.Sc., 
Executive Director, KOGAMI 
Padang 
patrarinadewi@gmail.com  
“Tsunami Early Warning 
System: Lessons Learned 
from Padang City”. Mrs. 
Dewi gave a 
comprehensive overview of 




disaster preparedness in 
Padang, Sumatra. She 
mentioned that Padang was 
not affected by the 2004 
tsunami but that the risk to 
both tsunami and 
earthquake is the highest in 
the world. Evacuation time 
in Padang is only 30 
minutes. Early warning 
must be lightning fast to 
notify the densely populated 
city. She discussed an ideal 
Tsunami Early Warning 
System (TEWS) to meet the 
particular needs and 
concerns of Padang. Noted 
that electricity would be an 
issue for many technologies 
deployed for early warning 
(i.e. RA-Net). Current 
warnings and information 
from government is 
inconsistent and 
incomplete. She highlighted 
that education, particularly 
among children, is key to 
the success of early 
warning systems. 
 Nuwan Waidyanatha, Project 
Manager, HazInfo, LIRNEasia 
waidyanatha@lirne.net  
“Transmission of Warnings 
to Local Levels: HazInfo 
Experience”. Outlined the 
differences between a 
traditional alerting system 




and HazInfo. Explained the 
HazInfo input applications 
and terminal devices, 
Common Alerting Protocol 
(CAP), Calculation of 
certainty and efficiency and 
results from HazInfo in 
determining the most 
effective methods for 
transmitting warnings to 
communities. 
Session III – 
Transmission of 
Warning to Local 
Levels 
Mr. Aim Zein, Padang Advisor, 
GTZ - GITEWS 
 
“An Experience from 
Padang”. Mr. Zein noted 
that warning dissemination 
only allows for 10-20 
minutes reaction time. 
Discussed the RDS (Radio 
Data System) and said that 
radio is most effective to 
override other technological 
deficiencies, particularly in 
Padang where at least one 
radio can be found in every 
house. Discussed RABAB, 
a local radio innovation, 
based on the need for 
guidance and information 
following a warning. RABAB 
is based on walkie-talkie 
information being 
transmitted by repeater to 
radio; either live or pre-
recorded on FM 99.9. 
Current warning consists of 




SMS only. Future warning 
system should be RAP1 
(Citizen Band Radio 
Broadcast). Most in Padang 
are already aware of what 
to do in the event of an 
earthquake. 
 Drs. Sunarjo, MSc. 
Kepala Pusat Sistem Data dan 
Informasi Geofisika, Bureau of 
Meteorology and Geophysics 
(BMG) Sunaryo@bmg.go.id  
The BMG is responsible for 
the first 5 minutes of a 
disaster. Afterwards, other 
institutions are responsible. 
RA-Net has a 2-minute 
delay and is installed in 
more than 100 locations 
throughout Indonesia. They 
have SMS and radio 
dissemination systems – 
the technology used is 
more advanced than that of 
the GoSL. They say that the 
problem with SMS is the 
150-character limit (CAP 
could solve this). There is 
also a tsunami siren 
network consisting of both 
federal and TELKOMSEL 
(largest national telecom 
provider) sirens. The local 
government is the one that 
decides to push the “button” 
or not. Since both police 
and army are deployed 24/7 
the government works 
closely with them to be 




responsible for assisting at 
all levels. 
Session IV – 
Determination of 
Hazard from National 
Level 
Natasha Udu-gama, 




“Determination of Hazard 
from the National Level: Sri 
Lanka Experience”. Drew 
comparisons on 
government action between 
Dec. 26, 2004 and Sept. 12, 
2007 and described how 
the HazInfo pilot might help 
in structuring a national 
early warning system to be 
effective throughout the 
EWS chain. 
 Dr. Ir. M. Dirhamsyah, Director, 
Tsunami and Disaster 
Mitigation Research Center 
(TDMRC), Syiah Kuala 
University, 
mdirham@yahoo.com  
Dr. Dirhamsyah explained 
that an MoU has been 
signed with several other 
universities in February 
2005 on coordination for 
early warning systems. He 
explained the TEWS 
framework, DRR framework 
(policy, non-structural and 
structural elements), the 
work of Syiah Kuala 
University in tsunami and 
disaster mitigation, their 
annual regional meeting in 
December and the DRR-A 
(Disaster Risk Reduction for 
Aceh) project. 
Session V: Next 
Steps 
Dr. Rohan Samarajiva, 
Executive Director, LIRNEasia, 
samarajiva@lirne.net  
“Roles of policymakers, 
regulators, private sector 
and civil society”. 





must be solved for EW 
technologies to be fully 
realized. Early warning 
must be complemented by 
preparedness, evacuation 
plans, etc. Reiterated the 
need for the government to 
take the lead in providing 
early warning. Private 
sector and civil society can 
support and strengthen. 
 Kusuma Adinugroho, Senior 
Programme Officer, Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery Unit, 
kusuma.adinugroho@undp.org  
Mr. Adinugroho as 
moderator gave brief 
summaries following each 
session. Here he gave a 
summary of points 
discussed throughout the 
workshop and their 
implications for Indonesia.  
 
Discussion and Lessons Learned 
The group discussion at the end of the workshop served to sum up the main points of the 
workshop. Mr. Kusuma Adinugroho of UNDP led the discussion by asking participants to 
review the questions posed in the workshop agenda and flesh out issues that had arisen 
during the workshop. Mr. Adinugroho made copious notes during the workshop so that group 
discussion turned out to be both interesting and fruitful.  
 
What is the cost of the technologies used in the HazInfo pilot? [Nuwan Waidyanatha gave an 
approximate cost for each of the technologies] 
 
Are communities still panicking despite disaster preparedness? 
[Patra Rina Dewi, KOGAMI] Despite having many earthquakes in Padang, those that are 
uneducated and untrained still panic. However, children who have been trained and educated 




tend to educate others.  
[UNESCO] Since disasters can happen at any time there must be a disaster curriculum. The 
problem is the lack of education on disasters. There should be scheduled table-tops and/or 
drills, there should be good dissemination of technical knowledge and know-how. Despite 
having a national certification for training officials, trainers do not always have disaster 
management experience and expertise. This is essential. 
 
Training: 
[KOGAMI] Training must be culturally appropriate. The trainer must be able to adapt to the 
local culture. In some places KOGAMI can approach local government directly about these 
issues, but in other cases, it must first approach the religious/traditional leader of the 
community who would then approach the local government. Every school now has different 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); SOPs must be standard throughout and is key to 
disaster risk reduction in communities. 
[LIRNEasia] Since Sarvodaya trainers are young and oftentimes have difficulty getting 
through to village committees comprised mainly of elderly females, they train through asking 
pertinent questions. Other problems faced by trainers include caste differences. HazInfo is 
highly context specific; local knowledge in communities is of the utmost importance. 
However, in some cases, where communities requested certain items like loudspeakers, 
neither the item nor money was given. Communities had to figure out how to disseminate 
with the resources in existence. 
[IIDP] Does community-based training exist for communities in Padang? 
[KOGAMI] Still in process. Only 35% completed so far, but optimistically this will be 
completed in the long run. Religious leaders play a very important role in making decisions. 
 
How many people are ready to accept EW systems? 
[GTZ] BMG sends messages to first responders, etc. and others interested. 
[University of Surabaya] In East Java, mountains are erupting. The government gives 
warning but some people are refusing to evacuate. There is rampant distrust of government 
because of the number of false warnings. High tech. vs. local warning systems is also an 
issue.  
[UNESCO] Emphasize education. It is impossible to change the paradigm within local 
societies entirely. There are many false warnings in Indonesia because the GoI shares 
information, but warnings are not fully developed. 




[KOGAMI] Police and army should have similar approaches to DRR regarding specific 
scenarios. 
Currently, how long does warning reach communities? 
[KOGAMI] SMS = 5-7 minutes; when electricity goes out the TV is useless 
[Syiah Kuala] In Aceh, when warning was given there was no information at all.  
 
 
Recommendations to the Organizers 
• Presentations must be received prior to workshop commencement. This has been an 
ongoing problem; speakers must be forced to take the workshop seriously. 
• Workshop documentation, such as programs, must be printed and distributed prior to 
the onset of the workshop.  
• Coordination with partner organization needs to be improved. There must be a reliable 
contact who will keep documentation received updated and share necessary 
documents. 
• Ensure that the partner organization is equipped with necessary technical equipment 
(such as computer, recorder, etc.) for timely and accurate proceedings. 
• Start the workshop at a later time. Nine o’clock start times are difficult in several parts 
of Asia.  
• Having one moderator in this workshop turned out to be more efficient. It is best to 
have a moderator who is not a speaker but experienced in the subject matter. 
GK3 Session ET4: Emerging Technologies Session on “ Making Communities Disaster 
Resilient” : Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. December 11, 2007 
Attendees: Rohan Samarajiva, Nuwan Waidyanatha, Natasha Udu-gama, Vinya 
Ariyaratne (Sarvodaya), Michael De Soyza (Dialog Telekom), Mala Rao (WorldSpace) 
 
The ET4: Emerging Technologies Session on “Making Communities Disaster Resilient” took 
place on 11 December from 16:00 to 17:30 at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. The session addressed how an alliance of civil society and private sector 
organizations since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami have been striving to develop a robust 
solution for strengthening community resilience in the face of natural disasters. Efforts have 
ranged from technological innovation, such as remotely activated warning devices, to field 
simulations. Initiated pilot projects can now provide real data to support implementation. 
 
Panelists shared learning for regional scaling-up of these pilots through discussion, videos 
and actual equipment demonstrations. The pilots highlighted were the satellite radio from 




WorldSpace and the GSM-based warning device developed by Dialog Telekom, University of 
Moratuwa and MicroImage. 
 
This session addressed the following key questions: 
 
• What would be the new thinking on private supply of public goods, new technologies 
and novel forms of community involvement? 
• How can the essential public good of hazard warning be produced in adequate 
quantities and quality? 
• Why do governments appear to have other priorities? How can communities organize 
themselves to become disaster resilient? 
• How can the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) be successfully implemented in a multi-
technology, multi-language, multi-country environment like the Bay of Bengal region? 
 
Panelists included: 
• Vinya Ariyaratne, Executive Director, Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement of Sri Lanka 
• Natasha Udu-gama, Former Consultant, Sarvodaya Community-based Disaster 
Management Centre / HazInfo Project Dissemination Manager, LIRNEasia  
• Nuwan Waidyanatha, Project Manager, LIRNEasia 
• Mala Rao, Manager Closed User Group Solution, WorldSpace Corporation (India) 




• Rohan Samarajiva, Executive Director, LIRNEasia 
 
CPRsouth2 “ Empowering rural communities through ICT policy and research” : 
Chennai, India, December 15-18, 2007 
Attendees: Rohan Samarajiva, Nuwan Waidyanatha, Natasha Udu-gama 
 
The HazInfo project was presented during session 5 “National and Regional Innovation 
Systems” on December 15, 2007. Nuwan Waidyanatha presented his paper on “Last-Mile 
Hazard Warning System in Sri Lanka: Performance of the ICT First Responder Training 
Regime” and Natasha Udu-gama presented her paper on “A Last-Mile Hazard Warning 
System for disaster risk reduction in Sri Lankan villages: Community organization”.  
 
Nuwan Waidyanatha’s paper explained that the Sri Lankan experience shows that the LM-




HWS is neither efficient nor effective without competent human capacity at the message-
relays: Hazard-Information-Hub and Last-Mile Communities; a necessary condition to 
supplement the deficit of an end-to-end automated alerting system. Despite the training that 
was offered to the Hazard-Information-Hub Monitors and Community ICT Guardians; their 
performance was well bellow the 95% benchmark. The project identifies that the Common 
Alerting Protocol intensive ICT based last-Mile alerting and notification system requires 
periodically repeated training and certification to improve the reliability and effectiveness of 
the human resources who are entrusted with mission critical LM-HWS processes.  
 
Natasha Udu-gama’s paper discussed the hypothesis during the pilot phase that purported 
Sarvodaya level 4 villages would use and perform better with the ICTs than levels 1-3. 
Evidence found through the pilot demonstrates the congruity between highly organized 
communities and a better understanding and adoption of wireless technologies. It addressed 
why community organization is significant to Sarvodaya and the HazInfo project within the 
context of disaster risk reduction, preliminary findings from the pilot supporting this argument, 
and policy recommendations for stakeholders. 
 
GK3 Session Paper – “ Promoting Community Disaster Resilience through Technology, 
Training and Community Empowerment: The HazInfo Experience”  
GK3 organizers asked that a session paper be prepared for the “Making Communities 
Disaster Resilient”. The session paper entitled “Promoting Community Disaster Resilience 
through Technology, Training and Community Empowerment: The HazInfo Experience” 
discussed the main themes of community and technology defining HazInfo that have 
contributed to the success of the pilot and ways in which the expansion of the project may 
contribute to sustainability and disaster resiliency at the community level while utilizing 
appropriate information communication technologies (ICTs).  
 
CPRsouth2: Empowering rural communities through ICT policy and research IIT-
Madras, Chennai, India; December 14-18, 2007  
Session 5 – National and regional innovation systems 
Attendees: Natasha Udu-gama, Nuwan Waidyanatha 
This session was chaired by Prof. Myeong Cheol Park (South Korea) and the discussant was 
Prof. Harmeet Sawhney (USA). Three papers were presented by Nuwan Waidyanatha (Sri 
Lanka) on ‘Last-Mile Hazard Warning System in Sri Lanka: Performance of the ICT First 




Responder Training Regime’, Natasha Udu-gama (Sri Lanka/USA) on ‘A Last-Mile Hazard 
Warning System for disaster risk reduction in Sri Lankan villages: Community organization’, 
and Bernard Francis Chogi (Kenya) on ‘The impact of mobile phone technologies on Medium 
and Small Enterprises/Jua Kali (MSEs).’ 
  
Nuwan Waidyanatha’s presentation on the Last-Mile Hazard Warning System (LMHWS) in 
Sri Lanka focused on the lessons learned during the pilot phase of the project, which 
established the networking capability for 30 tsunami-affected communities with a 
heterogeneous deployment of five ICTs. One of the key lessons was the fact that the LM-
HWS was neither efficient nor effective without competent human capacity at the message-
relays, a necessary condition to supplement the deficit of an end-to-end automated alerting 
system. Nuwan’s presentation showed that despite their training, the ‘First Responders’ 
performance was well bellow the 95% benchmark. 
  
The presentation made by Natasha Udu-gama, on the same test case described above by 
Nuwan, provided insight into the organizational aspects of the pilot. Natasha’s study provided 
evidence that demonstrated the congruity between highly organized communities and a 
better understanding and adoption of wireless technologies deployed. The presentation also 
addressed why community organization was significant to Sarvodaya and the HazInfo project 
within the context of disaster risk reduction, the preliminary findings from the pilot supporting 
this argument, and policy recommendations for stakeholders. 
  
Francis presented the findings of a survey conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, which looked at the 
socio-technical dimension of using mobile phones in micro and small enterprises (commonly 
referred to as jua kali businesses), and the socio-economic impacts it had on the urban micro 
entrepreneurs in Kenya. The study also discussed the various ways in which mobile phones 
had transformed the micro enterprises in Nairobi. 
  
Discussant Prof. Sawhney believed that a more comprehensive literature review should have 
been carried out with regard to the two disaster management papers; he was also of the 
opinion that the papers presented in this session were not ready for journal publication yet. 
  
IDRC’s Regional Director for South Asia and China Stephen McGurk said that he was 
doubtful of Sarvodaya's role and contribution to the Last Mile project; he explained that more 




discussion needed to be made on their contributions to the project as well as how the pilot 
will continue. Another participant questioned how Last-Mile project contributed to 
sustainability. 
 
HazInfo Documentary: “ The Long Last Mile”  
“The Long Last Mile” video documentary, produced by TV-E Asia-Pacific, for LIRNEasia was 
completed in October 2007.  The video features Sarvodaya footage from the pilot project; 
excerpts of interviews with Dr. Rohan Samarajiva, Executive Director – LIRNEasia, and Dr. 
Vinya Ariyaratne, Executive Director – Sarvodaya; and, a thorough synopsis of the 
methodology and technologies tested and deployed during the pilot. 
 
HazInfo DVD Distribution 
“The Long Last Mile” DVD was distributed to fifty-three (53) partners and organizations in the 
early warning and disaster risk reduction fields all over the world. A list of these partners and 
organizations can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Conference Papers Accepted, Not Attended: 
4th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and 
Management (ISCRAM) – Delft, 13-16 May 2007 
The HazInfo paper on CAP titled “Hazard Warnings in Sri Lanka: Challenges of 
Internetworking with Common Alerting Protocol” has been published in the ISCRAM 
proceedings. The conference took place from 13-16 May 2007 in Delft, The Netherlands. The 
final program of the 4th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response 
and Management available on their website. It contains the complete program, including the 
abstracts of all papers and presentations. Conference was held at the Techniche Universiteit 
Delft. 
 
Wireless Personal Multimedia Communications (WPMC) Conference: Jaipur, India. 3-6 
December 2007 
The HazInfo paper titled “Last-Mile Hazard Warning in Sri Lanka: Performance of 
WorldSpace Satellite Radios for Emergency Alerts”, coauthored by Srinivasan Rangarajan, 
PhD (Senior Vice President Engineering, WorldSpace), Peter Anderson (Associate 




Professor, Simon Fraser University), Gordon Gow, PhD (Assistant Professor, University of 
Alberta), and Nuwan Waidyanatha (Project Manager, LIRNEasia) was accepted for 
oral/poster presentation at the Wireless Personal Multimedia Communications (WPMC) at 
The Birla Science and Technology Center in the heart of Jaipur, India, December 03 – 06, 
2007. 
 
WorldSpace, a lead technology partner in the HazInfo research project, field-tested 16 
Addressable Radios for Emergency Alerts (AREAs) in the Sarvodaya Communities and 34 
AREAs in the Sarvodaya District Centers. Although the AREA solutions lacked bi-directional 
communication and seemed the least effective, the AREA solution proved to be the most 
reliable that worked with utmost certainty and greatest efficiency even when GSM and CDMA 
cells were deactivated for over 2 months, at the beginning of this year, during military 
operations in the conflict prone North-East regions of Sri Lanka. The HazInfo research 
introduced a concept called “complementary redundancy”, where coupling the AREA 
addressable/broadcast technology with a GSM mobile phone or CDMA nomadic phone 
improves the overall performance (reliability and effectiveness) of the HazInfo system. The 
HazInfo system was used in a “live” scenario during the Bengkulu earthquake on September 
12th. 
Future Conferences/Workshops: 
International Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Disaster Mitigation 2008 
(ICEEDM): Jakarta, Indonesia, 14 April 2008 
Title: “Community-based Hazard Warning in Sri Lanka: Performance of the Last-Mile Link”. 
Author(s): Nuwan Waidyanatha, Peter Anderson, Gordon Gow 
 
Media Coverage: 
Print –  
“Disaster Alert”, DataQuest India. 31 December 2007 Online: 
http://www.lirneasia.net/2008/01/hazinfo-project-featured-in-dataquest-india/. 
 
Dole, Nilma. “Radio Messages to Warn of Natural Disasters”. Sunday Observer. 30 
December 2007. Online: http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2007/12/30/new17.asp.  





“Sri Lanka tested satellite disaster warning system to be used in India”. The Sinhalaya News 
Agency. 28 December 2007. Online: 
http://www.sinhalaya.com/news/english/wmview.php?ArtID=14500.  
 
“Sri Lanka tested satellite disaster warning system to be used in India”. Lanka Business 
Online (LBO). 27 December 2007. Online: 
http://www.lbo.lk/fullstory.php?newsID=2122122686&no_view=1&SEARCH_TERM=10.  
 






Wattegama, Chanuka. “A Tale of Two Tsunamis: What Went Wrong in Each Case”. Daily 
Mirror. 26 December 2007. Online: 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/DM_BLOG/Sections/frmNewsDetailView.aspx?ARTID=2220 
 




“Tsunami: Need for early warning systems underscored”. The Daily Star. 2 October 2007. 
Online: http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=6270.  
 
TV – 
Interview with Natasha Udu-gama. Astro Awari Cable Television (Malaysia). 11 December 
2007. Hosted by Kamurul Bahrin Haron.  
 
Interview with Rohan Samarajiva and Dr. A. T Ariyaratne. Channel One (MTV). Biz First. 
Hosted by Harsha De Silva. 26 December 2007 
 




7. Capacity-building  
The HazInfo supplemental workshops enabled LIRNEasia’s original HazInfo project to extend 
its reach beyond Sri Lanka, where it was originally piloted. It has helped the organization 
strengthen its ties with disaster risk reduction-related university departments, research and 
implementing organizations. In Sri Lanka it has sparked interest within the Ministry of 
Disaster Management and Human Rights (MDMHR) to gather a committee of telecom 
providers to design a mobile solution for an effective public warning system. The Bangladesh 
workshop at the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology encouraged sufficient 
interest for the civil engineering department to want to replicate the project given 
Bangladesh’s particular hazard vulnerabilities. Upon completion of the workshop in New 
Delhi, India, the host (All India Disaster Mitigation Institute) developed a proposal suggesting 
that HazInfo be disseminated as a “road tour” to four major Indian cities that are particularly 
vulnerable to a variety of hazards.  
 
The GK3 session on “Making Communities Disaster Resilient” was a panel discussion 
involving the various stakeholders involved in the HazInfo project. Each gave a short 
description of their organization’s role in the project and the lessons learned they gained from 
it. The session speakers were slightly more representative gender-wise given the venue and 
its particular attention to attracting minority representation. 
 
The HazInfo workshop in Indonesia was significant in that it was the only one that was 
organized by a predominantly female disaster risk reduction organization. Unlike earlier 
workshops, the participation of women was at its highest, including among speakers.  
8. Project management  
HazInfo supplemental project management during the six-month period was generally good. 
Administration was done mainly by the dissemination manager for HazInfo with financial 
support and expertise provided by LIRNEasia’s finance department. Technical oversight and 
scientific input for workshop organization and presentation design was done by both 
dissemination manager and HazInfo project manager. Most of this work was done virtually as 
the project manager is in a satellite location.  
 
IDRC support and administration was conducted directly from its main office in Ottawa. 
Throughout the duration of this supplemental, interaction with Ottawa was minimal. 




Administrative matters included the signing of an amendment to the original contract (for the 
supplemental) in August and last month, request for a no-cost extension to the HazInfo 
supplemental to take into account changes in the schedule for the Indonesia workshop. All 
interactions with IDRC regarding technical support and administration went smoothly.  
 
9. Impact  
The dissemination of the HazInfo pilot project throughout nations in the region will have a 
profound effect on the development of early warning systems. Until now, most of the thinking 
in developing sound early warning systems has focused primarily upon robust technology. 
Monitoring and detection technologies, especially, have garnered much of the attention. This 
dissemination sought to educate academia, government, NGO/INGO, research, private and 
civil society organizations working within the field about the necessity of a community-based 
last-mile early warning system and the availability of technologies that would be best-suited 
for relaying alerts/warnings to educated and aware community members within the HazInfo 
pilot. HazInfo supplemental dissemination reached a level of society already knowledgeable 
about the basics of early warning, but not necessarily those that had worked or researched 
the impact of specific technologies in relaying understandable alerts to trained members of a 
community at-risk.  
 
The series of workshops and additional events mainly influenced various stakeholders – from 
policymakers and NGOs to researchers and practitioners. The two dissemination workshops 
held in India and Bangladesh had more reach, rather than pure influence, than other events 
attended. Specifically, at the Bangladesh workshop, one of the speakers – a professor at 
BUET – had (at the time of the workshop) already expressed an interest in replicating the 
HazInfo project within the context of Bangladeshi disaster vulnerability. The Bangladeshi pilot 
is currently in the process of being developed with WorldSpace AREA receivers in process 
and pilot commencement scheduled for the end of February 2008. In regards to HazInfo’s 
reach in India, LIRNEasia’s partner organization, AIDMI, responded so favorably to the 
HazInfo presentations in Delhi that it suggested that dissemination of HazInfo findings should 
extend to other major India cities through a “road tour” workshop to 4 major vulnerable Indian 
cities. Since the Indonesia workshop has just completed 9at the time of this report], the reach 
has yet to be ascertained. The affiliated HazInfo supplemental events within the region (and 
in Rome) were highly influential in educating academics, researchers and practitioners on 




various aspects of the HazInfo project. It is expected that through contact with several 
community-based organizations through the HazInfo dissemination workshops in 
Bangladesh, India and Indonesia, marginalized social groups such as women, minorities, 
poor and disabled will derive optimum benefits since these organizations will comprehend 
and implement ideas garnered from lessons learned in the HazInfo pilot. 
 
10. Overall assessment  
The dissemination of the “Evaluating Last-Mile Hazard Information Dissemination” pilot 
project through the supplemental agreement was important on a number of levels: 
 
1.  Provision of knowledge to the field of community-based early warning. The 
HazInfo pilot is on the cutting-edge of hazard early warning systems in that it 
recognizes the ability of communities to make decisions on its vulnerability to disaster 
based on a trusted and recognized source of information through appropriate 
technology. Prior to this project, few had explored the appropriateness of technology 
within a “last-mile” community-based early warning system as a part of a national early 
warning system. Thus, the dissemination of HazInfo within the region was vital to 
expressing its unique findings and contributing to the development of sound, 
responsible early warning systems. Time, effort and funding towards this purpose were 
highly effective. 
 
2.  Congregation of national experts in three nations for regional cooperation on 
community-based early warning. HazInfo was quite effective in garnering the 
necessary interest from disaster management stakeholders though the pilot was 
administered by a research organization specializing in telecommunications. Not only 
did disaster reduction and response organizations respond favorably, but so did 
government, academia, NGO/INGO and civil society. Moreover, HazInfo succeeded in 
bringing these various actors together in national workshops for discussion on 
contributions of community-based early warning systems to national early warning 
systems as well as regional early warning.   
 
3.  Promotion of cooperation amongst region on community-based early warning 
initiatives. Although workshops were conducted in the three individual Bay of Bengal 
nations, LIRNEasia’s organizational regional focus has promoted a regional view of 
community-based early warning; how organizations at the grassroots level may be 
able to influence policy through substantial evidence on usage of technology and 
training in providing an effective solution to early warning systems by incorporating 
community.  
 
4.  Advocacy of HazInfo findings amongst government officials. HazInfo has 




repeatedly been showcased to government so as to demonstrate the benefits of 
community-based early warning systems within the national public warning system. 
Building upon one-on-one organizational interactions with the Ministry of Disaster 
Management and Human Rights (MDMHR), the September 7, 2007 meeting with 
telecom providers and operators was a significant step in coordinating and advising 
telecom providers about their potential contribution to early warning. Although 
provisions were made to initiate a working committee to outline and provide a solution 
to the issuance of public warning through the use of cell broadcasting, no further 
action has since been taken. However, LIRNEasia continues to lobby and discuss the 
issue with the MDMHR through sharing of the HazInfo dissemination paraphernalia 
and activities. 
 
11. Recommendations  
With the conclusion of the HazInfo supplemental on 31 March, 2008, there are a number of 
recommendations that can be made based on this extension as well as the original HazInfo 
project. 
 
• Dissemination of HazInfo should go beyond national workshops to a regional 
workshop. A regional workshop would enhance both the reach and influence HazInfo 
can have on development of an early warning system(s) that account for the last-mile 
and are community-based. 
• Expansion of HazInfo national workshops. Workshops should be held in other 
countries within the region, not just the Bay of Bengal region. 
• Encourage a HazInfo Workshop “ Road Tour” . This “road tour” concept was proposed 
to LIRNEasia from its HazInfo workshop partner in India, AIDMI. Basically, it would be 
a traveling group of HazInfo experts and affiliated experts who would conduct 
workshop/demonstrations in several other major (Indian) cities at-risk in more public 
venues targeting more than just other experts, researchers, policymakers and 
regulators. The goal would be to mainstream the concept of “last-mile” community-
based early warning systems with other community-based NGOs as well as the 
general public. 
• Provide support for an Internet database on “ last-mile”  early warning systems. 
Currently, a comprehensive database on projects/initiatives in this area is lacking. Not 
only would such a website, feature HazInfo, it would also enable greater cooperation 
and coordination of existing projects towards a more meaningful and substantial 
regional workshop should one be held. Eventually, this may enable “last-mile” 
emergency telecommunications to influence existing regional early warning systems 

























Appendix A: Proposed Participants for HazInfo Indonesia Workshop 
 
Proposed participants include: 
• BAKORNAS PB-National Disaster Management Coordination or its replacement 
• BMG Bureau for Meteorology and Geophysics 
• Indonesian Institute of Sciences- LIPI 
• BPPT-National Board for Development and Application of Technology 
• Directorate General of Geology 
• Directorate of Vulcanology 
• Government Institutions related to the community preparedness: 
• Directorate General of Social Protection, Ministry of Social Affairs 
• Directorate General of Social Assistance, Ministry of Social Affairs 
• Directorate General of Social Empowerment, Ministry of Social Affairs 
• Directorate General of Community Empowerment of Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) 
• Directorate General of Governance Affairs, Directorate of Disaster Management, MOHA 
• Directorate of Community Protection and Nation Unity, MOHA 
• Ministry of Public Works 
• Ministry of Health 
• Ministry of Education 




• Ministry of Environment 
• Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
• Ministry of Women Empowerment 
 
Universities having faculty or research institute or Section on disaster management: 
• Center of studies for disaster - Gadjahmada University, Yogyakarta 
• Center of Studies for earthquakes- Institute of Technology of Surabaya 
• Center of Studies for conflict and disaster mitigation- Tadulako 
• University-Palu, Central Sulawesi 
• Center Study of disaster-Bandung Institute of Technology-West Java 
• Faculty of Disaster Management-University of Krishna Dwipayana-Jakarta 
• University of Jember- East Java 
• University of Malang-East Java 
• University of Syiah Kuala-Aceh 
• University of Indonesia-Jakarta 
• CARE IPB, Institute of Agriculture of Bogor-West Java 
 





• Community Association of Merapi Mountain (Sabuk Gunung Merapi-related to volcanic 
eruptions) 
• Local NGO of East Java (take care of hot mud flow) 
• Local NGO of Padang (take care of earthquake Bengkulu and West Sumatra) 






















































Appendix B: Distribution of HazInfo DVDs 
 
“The Long Last Mile” has been distributed to the following partners/organizations: 
 
1. Dr. Mehedi Ahmed Ansary, BUET 
2. Dr. S. Rangarajan, WorldSpace 
3. AJJDC 
4. Dr. Vinya Ariyaratne 
5. All India Disaster Mitigation Institute 
6. Tamil Nadu Tsunami Resource Centre 
7. Prof. Pete Anderson, Simon Fraser University 
8. Dr. Gordon Gow, University of Alberta 
9. GK3 South Asia Pavilion 
10. Government of Maldives 
11. Vijay Pratap Singh Aditya, Ekgaon Technologies 
12. GK3 “Making Communities Disaster Resilient” session participants 
13. Mr. Michael De Soyza, Dialog Telekom 
14. Ms. Mala Rao, WorldSpace 
15. Dr. Lareef Zubair, IRI – Columbia University 
16. Dr. Kathleen Tierney, Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado 
17. Mr. Sanjana Hattotuwa 
18. Prof. Dr. Sudhir K. Jain, Dean & Professor, IIT-Kanpur 
19. Mr. Terry Jeggle, UNISDR 
20. Dr. A. S. M. Maksud Kamal, UNDP-CDMP, Bangladesh 
21. Mr. Mostafa Kamal, Bangladesh 
22. Mr. Ravi Kandage, Director – Shanthi Sena, Sarvodaya 
23. Mr. Samerendra Karmaker, BMD, Bangladesh 
24. Mr. Shisir Khanal, Executive Director, Sarvodaya USA  
25. Mr. Spiros Konstantakos, IDEP, Indonesia 
26. Dr. Frederick Krimgold, Director – DRR, Virginia Tech, USA 
27. Mr. Rahul Kumar, WorldSpace India 
28. Mr. Barjor Mehta, World Bank 
29. Mr. Mehrun Nessa, SPARSSO, Bangladesh 
30. G. Padmanabhan, UNDP, India 
31. UNISDR, Switzerland 
32. UN-ISDR, Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning, Germany 
33. Ms. Meenakshi Ahluwalia, UNDFW, India 
34. Ms. Wahida Bashar Ahmed, Action Aid Bangladesh 
35. Monowar Hussein Akhand, Ministry of Establishment, Bangladesh 
36. Dr. Nihal Attapattu, Canadian High Commission, Sri Lanka 
37. Dr. B. K. Bandyopadhyay, IMD, India 
38. Mr. Teddy Boen, Earthquake Engineer, Indonesia 
39. Ms. Zoe Chafe, Worldwatch Institute, USA 
40. Shri G. M. Dar, J & K Institute of Management, India 




41. Prof. Dileeka Dias, University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka 
42. Mr. Laurent Elder, IDRC, Canada 
43. Mr. Theo Fernando, ICET, Sri Lanka 
44. Mr. Michael Renner, Institute for Environmental Security, USA 
45. Mr. Satya Sagar, India 
46. Jean Slick, Canadian Red Cross, Canada 
47. Mr. Man Thapa, DRR Advisor, UNDP, Sri Lanka 
48. Dr. John Twigg, Benfield UCL Hazard Research Center, UK 
49. Major General Gamini Hettiarachchi, Director General, Disaster Management Centre, 
Sri Lanka 
50. Dr. Ananda Mallawatantri, Asst. Resident Rep., UNDP Sri Lanka 
51. Dr. Cosmos Zavazava, Head, BDT, ITU, Switzerland 
52. Mr. Md. Nasir Ullah, Director, CPP, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society 
53. Mr. Kamaruzzaman, Program Coordinator, BNNRC, Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
 
